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Abstract 
This research dissertation analyses and compares the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Cyber Security 
Strategy and Police Cyber Security Strategy in the UK. The research employed qualitative and 
quantitative methods to investigate issues in the partnership by focusing on the police force and the 
MOD represented by the Armed Forces. 
 The research objectives were: identifying challenges in police-military partnership and collaboration 
in cyber security; examine personnel understanding of the cyber partnership and pluralisation of 
policing in a cyber context and also propose means of facilitating participation and understanding of 
cyber issues. Questionnaires and telephone interviews were used to gather information on personnel 
understanding of cyber security strategy and the nature of the partnership that exists between the two 
forces – military and police. Research findings reveal that despite efforts by Government and the 
MOD to streamline Cyber into defence and policing, the workforce has not been educated in the 
whole concept of cyber defence, thereby undermining the implementation of the strategy. The 
research reveals that to effectively prevent, investigate and prosecute cybercrime in the UK, policing 
techniques and strategy that will meet the challenges of current crime environment will need to be put 
in place by the both forces. The research also found that the Cyber Security Strategy is mainly state 
centric while policing is human centric in approach, this accounts for the challenges in bringing the 
policing cyber strategy in line with the National cyber strategy.  The research concludes that an 
increase in education and expertise of both forces will help enhance bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
partnerships in the race to make the UK cyberspace safe. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction  
The thesis investigates partnership in National cyber security strategy and the role of the police force 
and the Military as stakeholders in the partnership. The research strategy began with a review of 
policy documents from both forces. Defence policies reviewed are those related to technological 
changes from the twentieth century that have a big impact in the way defence conducts its business. 
The lessons learnt from these events were compared to the unfolding cyber state to shed more light of 
the research topic. The research also involved interviews with members of the two forces to gain a 
current view on cyber security practice on a day by day basis. 
This chapter examines different definitions of cybercrime and how varying definition affects 
approaches to dealing with the crime.  The chapter considers the different arguments as to what 
constitutes cybercrime from the perspective of United Kingdom and other developed world. 
 Chapter two looks at cyber governance and how the stages in adopting a cyber-strategy in United 
Kingdom unfolded. The definition and scope of cybercrime lies in the layout of cyberspace. This is 
explored in the chapter and offers reasons why cyberspace requires a strategy to defend and govern it. 
The chapter raises salient points from the 2009 UK Cyber Policy and Strategy, when the first UK 
cyber security strategy was released and post 2011 when it can be argued that UK adopted a cyber-
security strategy that reflects the importance of cyber security on the ladder of the national security 
agenda. The cyber strategy of the United Kingdom identifies roles and responsibilities for both the 
Ministry of Defence and the police force amongst other partners.  
The research methodology employed in the thesis is presented on chapter three. It details the use of 
mixed methods of questionnaire and semi structured interview; leaning on the guidance of the mixed 
method proponents. While presenting the ethical and reflective experiences of the researcher; the 
chapter shows the difficulties in conducting research within the Armed forces and the police force.  
 Chapter four presents the analysis of the data from questionnaires and the semi structured interview. 
The salient observations from the data are further elaborated alongside current issues arising within 
the cyber security environment. 
Chapter five discusses the findings and themes especially in Pluralization of policing which is also 
evident in cyberspace and different models of pluralized policing employed in combating Cyber 
Crime are explored in chapter five. The chapter explores the plural policing bodies that currently exist 
and how interactions between them keep cyberspace monitored.  
To achieve cyber security and resilience, partnership has been proposed as the best option in 
combating cybercrime and achieving the objective of the National cyber security strategy. The thesis 
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seeks for ways through which military and law enforcement strategies have to find a meeting point in 
order to work together to meet the challenges that cyberspace poses; challenges that transcend 
national boundaries.  
Chapter six focuses on the two forces that are involved in policing cyberspace namely the police force 
(policing by government) and the Armed Forces (policing inside government).  
The NSS and CSS have set out their objectives which challenge the established responsibilities of law 
enforcement and the Armed forces such as jurisdictions, law of arms conflict and issues of security. 
The police forces amidst the challenges of cyberspace are still responsible for law and order. What are 
the features of a police Cyber Strategy that is required in the wider scope of Policing in 21st Century? 
Is the police force in the United Kingdom an adaptable force or does it muddle through organisational 
change that 21st century imposes. 
The research looks at how the personnel of both forces interpret and understand the cyber security 
strategy and means to achieve the objectives and the role they have to play towards its success.   
 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis. It reflects and evaluates the whole thesis, the research field, 
limitations and advantages and suggests areas of further research.  
Survey Questionnaires were sent to personnel from the two forces to gauge their understanding of the 
cyber strategy and their role; also key personnel from the Armed forces were interviewed to elicit how 
organisational culture have evolved within their workforce from a cyber-security perspective. The 
Armed forces and the police force are known for their secrecy and rank structured access to 
information. While cyber Security permeates all level and rank of the work force, the research will 
inform whether there is openness in informing and educating the work force on cyber issues. The 
thesis does not delve into the technical and technological development in the national security 
strategy. 
 Research context 
 
There has been scholarly research in cyber strategy in recent years across the developing world. From 
the 1993 book by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, titled ‘Cyberwar is Coming’ where they comment that war 
has shifted from the traditional ‘attritional warfare by massive armies’ borne from industrialisation, to 
the digital war whose victor is the entity that can deploy superior networks over the other, a shift from 
‘mass and mobility’ to computer network manoeuvres which will demand a huge change in military 
strategy and conduct of war.  
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‘As a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of warfare 
[…] just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993). 
This notion of cyber war gained traction and in 2005, the US National Defence Strategy formally 
recognised cyberspace as a war domain (National Strategy of The United States, 2005).  
There ensued books, media announcements, reports, research and commentary speculating on the 
newly declared domain. Nations started recognising the threat that cyberspace poses, and cyberspace 
became a regular lexicon in military and national defence policies (Weimann, 2004; Nissenbaum, 
2005; Eriksson; Kramer; Starr, 2009; Rid, 2012). Countries in Europe started publishing their national 
cyber strategies following the attack on Estonia by Russia in 2007 (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993). 
Finland and Slovakia published theirs in 2008, with the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK following in 2011. 
The UK cyber security strategy was published soon after the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), 
and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Its publication was welcomed and also criticised 
as lacking depth. ‘While widely acknowledged as a “good start”, most security industry 
representatives felt the strategy did not provide enough detail on how its goals can be achieved, how 
success will be measured, and what the deadlines are for many of the initiatives’ (Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt). Peter Sommer in his column in The Guardian (Sommer, 2011) raises the question of 
command and control namely; who will authorise offensive cyber weapon capability - the MoD or the 
Government, what are the rules of engagement and who is in charge of cyber incident monitoring? 
These questions are directly linked to the role of the military as laid down by law. With the vagueness 
of the strategy, it also follows that there will be unfolding readjustments and additions to the strategy 
through reviews. 
This is not the first time that a government strategy has been criticised as being off the mark. Some of 
the UK’s military strategy in operations have been criticised and often accused of being unfit for 
purpose, due to its inability to articulate a sustainable strategy given the UK’s failure in recent 
operations abroad (Johnson et al., 2011).  
Concentrating on the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), the Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (SDSR), the 2011 Cyber Security Strategy (CSS) and the Serious and Organised Crime 
Strategy (2013), the thesis looks at how the military and the police have been influenced by these 
strategies. For the military, an overhaul of the whole concept of defence has gradually changed as 
cyber security is streamlined into defence policy coupled with economic influence and globalisation. 
‘In the military, information and intelligence operations, routine administrative functions, and a wide 
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array of everyday jobs have been increasingly developed and transformed with the support of 
interconnected electro-electronic devices’(Cepik, Canabarro and Ferreira, 2015, p2).  
Defence policy and military strategy go hand in hand and defence policy is guided by the budget of 
the present government and since the UK economy was in recession in 2008 prior to the release of the 
CSS, the question of funding becomes unavoidable. Both the Armed Forces and the police budgets 
were cut during the coalition government budget statement. Amid the reduced budget, the MoD will 
follow the route of research and development to develop, test and evaluate their cyber warfare 
capabilities leaving the police force lagging behind due to their organisational structure. 
 
From 2011 to 2015, the Armed Forces commenced changes that reflect the then current economic and 
technological state nationally and internationally and which included reducing the workforce through 
four tranches of redundancy and the formulation of a new employment model (Army Technology, 
2016). The number of trained regular soldiers will be reduced from 102,000 to 82,000, while 
increasing the number of reservists from 19,000 to approximately 30,000 by 2020. This will generate 
a savings of £10.6bn (ITV News, 2014). 
Although the thesis does not take this line of enquiry but instead concentrates on the partnership with 
the police force, it is worth noting that the relationship that exists in this partnership as recognised by 
the new doctrine will reflect how the current regular force will view their role in future.  
 With this reduction, the MoD released a Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01) (5th Edition), 
dated November 2014 that ‘draws on the lessons of history, upon original thinking and from 
experiences gained from training and operations (UK Defence Doctrine, 2014). It sets out the 
fundamental principles of the future military force which is depleted from what it used to be. The new 
doctrine takes into consideration the following strategies; International Defence Engagement Strategy 
(Ministry of Defence, 2014), New Operating Model: How Defence Works (Ministry of Defence, 
2014), and DCDC’s Global Strategic Trends Programme (Ministry of Defence, 2014). 
The policy is steeped in utilising the present budget dispensation and optimising efficiency of the 
workforce and recognition that many essential defence skills are in the private sector rather than the 
Armed Forces, and promotes partnership with the private sector and industry. The theme of 
partnership that runs across the cyber security strategy for the first time in military doctrine is the 
basis for a whole new defence doctrine that spans from now to 2020 and beyond. 
The national cyber security strategy (Cabinet Office, 2011) involves partnership across different 
institutions which predictably will involve an overlap of responsibilities. The two forces are both 
public entities. There are many studies on public private partnership but not much on public to public 
5 
 
partnership which, like the public private partnership has components of feasibility, legality, 
scalability and accountability. The proposed partnership across the public sector has limitations which 
will be investigated in relation to the Cyber Security Strategy. 
The distinction between the police force and the military both strategically and operationally 
according to Friesendorf (2012), highlights the complexity of such partnership.  
The Internet has redefined national security and an emerging strategic perspective is challenging the 
functional and fundamental role of both forces. What is the state of the UK cyber capability 
maintained and sustained by both forces? Both forces are empowered to fulfil specific roles. How is 
the power shared within the same role: the National Cyber Security Strategy? Is there military cyber 
defence capability convergence with police cyber security capability? 
 
In situating the institutions in their roles within the national cyber strategy at the end of the research, it 
will be evident to identify a practical approach to harness the benefit of each institution’s expertise 
within the CSS.  
The partnership proposed in the NSS involves the private sector, the MoD and the police in a common 
goal to protect society, the economy and the critical national infrastructure. These stakeholders have 
different management systems and organisational culture which is likely to affect the collaboration 
between them.  
The MoD is tasked with defending its own network and mainstreaming cyber into its operations. The 
Defence Cyber Protection Partnership (DCPP) will identify and implement actions that have a real 
impact on the cyber defences of its members and the UK defence sector as a whole (MoD, 2013). The 
research will explore the extent of the above statement among members of the Armed Forces. 
The police strategy stems from the role of the National Crime Agency (NCA) (National Crime 
Agency, 2013). The NCA’s responsibilities are to prevent cybercrime and make the UK a safer place 
to do businesses.  
 Cybercrime: Definitions and Scope 
 
In this section, issues concerning the definitions and scope of cybercrime will be discussed so as to 
put the research into context. The section starts by bringing together all the definitions of cybercrime 
across the United Kingdom and other states that have recognised the threat that cyberspace poses. It 
explores how this awareness has been incorporated in the legal systems of these states. 
The United Kingdom’s National Security Strategy (NSS) together with the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR) raised cyber security to a Tier One risk to national security, with the former 
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launched to deal with policing cybercrime (HM Government, 2010). The strategy recognises the role 
of partnership in cyber security. It also recognises that the relationship between the law and the 
policing of cybercrime is a crucial part of the UK’s evolving cyber strategy. These strategies and 
policies inform law making and law enforcement in the UK, but cybercrime is also an international 
crime and the role of law enforcement agencies is not restricted to within the UK only. There are a 
global perspective of strategies on cybercrime and how law enforcement should develop in dealing 
with cybercrime, especially in the empowerment of the police and partner agencies in fighting, 
investigating and the prosecution of cybercrime and in future international partnership. 
‘The changing nature of transnational threats has made it imperative that we achieve greater 
cooperation at many levels — national and local, national and international, military and law 
enforcement, private and public’ (Pumphrey, 2000). 
 
Computer crimes have been in existence since the invention of computers and their worldwide 
application since the 1970s (Staff, 2017). While these incidents were localised, the advent of the 
Internet transported computer crime to a global status. Majid Yar defined computer crime based on 
the computer as the object of the crime (Yar, 2006). Cross and Shinder (2008) distinguish between 
types of crime according to the level of violence involved: cybercrime is either classed as violent 
crime, potentially violent crime and non-violent crime, while Wall (2007) defines cybercrime as “the 
transformation of criminal or harmful behaviour by networked technology,” other authors have 
defined cybercrime as new wine in an old wine skin but however it is defined, the effect of 
computerization and cyberspace gave rise either to new crimes or enhanced the commission of old 
crimes. Wall’s classiﬁcation reflects the United Nations’ definition of cybercrime. He classified 
cybercrime under three categories, namely ‘crime involving the integrity and good working order of 
computer systems (hacking); crime making use of cyberspace (encrypted communications among 
criminals, the sale of counterfeit pharmaceuticals); and crime involving computerized information 
contents (theft of secrets, dissemination of harmful contents)’. The United Nations definition groups 
cybercrime under three broad headings as follows- 
Crimes against the Machine: This includes offences such as hacking, denial of service, deception, 
spying and interception of computer data. Cybercrimes are those crimes that prevent the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the computer system. 
Crimes using the Machine: This category of crime are old crimes that have been facilitated by the 
computer, they include forgery, fraud and defamation.  
Crimes in the Machine: Content-related crime such as copyright offence, piracy and website 
defacement (Wall, 2014). 
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There is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes cybercrime and terminologies such as 
cybercrime, high tech crime, computer crime, technology crime, digital crime and IT crime seem to 
connote the same thing.  
The United Kingdom approaches the classification of computer-related crime from two perspectives. 
The country’s adaptation of existing laws by way of inclusion of definitions and references to 
electronic modes of communication and commission means that there will not be exclusive laws to 
deal with cybercrime. The actual criminal acts of cybercrime are similar to traditional offences, 
therefore existing laws will be sufficient in dealing with cybercrime and where there is insufficient 
coverage, and a modification of the existing law with new definitions relative to cybercrime will be 
enacted. Chik (2006), in his seminal work, summarised the difference between computer crime and 
cybercrime as follows - 
 
‘Computer Crime encompasses crimes committed against the computer, the materials contained 
therein such as software and data, and its uses as a processing tool. These include hacking, denial of 
service attacks, unauthorized use of services and cyber vandalism. ‘Cyber Crime’ describes criminal 
activities committed through the use of electronic communications media. One of the greatest 
concerns is with regard to cyber-fraud and identity theft through such methods as phishing, pharming, 
spoofing and through the abuse of online surveillance technology. There are also many other forms of 
criminal behaviour perpetrated through the use of information technology such as harassment, 
defamation, pornography, cyber terrorism, industrial espionage and some regulatory offences’ (Chik, 
2006). 
The above extract makes a distinction between cybercrime and computer crime, a distinction that 
mimics that of crimes against the machine and crime through the machine; a summary unlike the 
Council of Europe treaty which does not go into minute details but offers definitions from previous 
existing laws and open to varying interpretations across European nations. 
The Council of Europe on Cybercrime Convention, also referred to as the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime, is a criminal justice treaty that has established criminal law measures based on rule of 
law and human rights principles (Council of Europe, 2004). The treaty has not made a distinction 
between computer crimes and cybercrimes but defined cybercrime as any offence targeting computer 
data and systems. This definition encompasses all offences that involve computers without 
restricting the offences that have existed before the Internet but which have acquired a momentum and 
proliferation through the Internet. These are old offences like fraud, intellectual property rights 
violations. Offences against computer data and systems are classified as offences against the 
“confidentiality, integrity and availability” (C-I-A offences) of computers, such as illegal access, data 
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and system interference and others. In addition to these “c-i-a” offences, it also addresses offences 
that have been given coverage by procedural law. 
The three prescribed guidelines in dealing with cybercrime by the Convention on Cybercrime are: 
harmonisation of Substantive Criminal Law, harmonisation of Procedural Law, and enactment of the 
rules of International Judicial Cooperation. The first section of the second chapter of the Convention 
refers to the Substantive law provisions and includes the following categories of criminal activity: 
Crimes against the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of Computer Data and Systems. These 
are expounded in articles 2-6 and Computer-related offences within articles 7-8. The whole of article 
9 deals with Content-related offences, and Offences related to infringements of Copyright and Related 
Rights come under article 10. There are other notable treaties and conventions initiated by states and 
union of states, all focused on dealing with the threat of cybercrime. Below are a few: 
 
ORGANISATION CYBER CRIME STRATEGY 
UNITED NATIONS UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the child, Tenth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Prostitution and Child Pornography. 
UN General Assembly Resolution 45/121; 56/121; 55/63; 64/211. 
The Commonwealth 
 
Commonwealth Model Law on Computer and Computer-related 
Crime. 
European Union 
 
The EU Directive on Electronic Commerce 
European Union Council Framework Decision on 
combating fraud (2001) 
European Union Council Framework Decision on attacks 
against information systems (2005) 
Data Retention Directive (2005)  
Amendment of the European Union Council  
Framework Decision on combating terrorism (2007) 
Draft Directive on attacks against information systems  
strengthens the 2005 directive with two extra articles; 6 and 7 
 
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
 Development 
 
 
 
The Information, Computer and Communications  
Policy (ICCP) Committee  
OECD Guidelines for the Security of Information. 
Report on the legislative treatment of “cyber terror” in the 
Domestic law of individual states. 
 
Asia-Pacific Economic Statement on fighting terrorism (2002) and Conference on 
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Cooperation cybercrime legislation (2005) 
The Group of Eight (G8) Subcommittee on High-tech Crimes (Reviewed from 1997 to 2011) 
 
Computer-related crime comes under the Computer Misuse Act (Cap. 50A) (CMA) in the United 
Kingdom and cybercrime is dealt with under the provisions of the Penal Code (Cap. 224) and a host 
of other legislation. Despite these treaties and conventions, there is no unified stance on cybercrime 
globally and this can be directly linked to the differences in the definition of what constitutes crime 
and cybercrime, and differences in the legal systems of various nations. The differences in definition 
are because of the fundamentals of traditional criminal law. In criminal law, there are two important 
elements that must be present. It is a common test of criminality expressed in this Latin phrase: ’actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, which means "the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty". The 
onus is to prove that there is an actus reus, or "guilty act”, and a corresponding mens rea present 
before there is a conclusion that a crime has been committed. It also follows that a person acting in a 
mental fault cannot sustain criminal liability. Relating this legal principle to cybercrime (the computer 
as an object is personified as the offender), the computer must be proved to have the knowledge or 
intention to commit a crime either by its use or content. Furthermore, both must be viewed as property 
(content and usage) that should be protected under the law. The content of a computer is inert until it 
is used in the commission of a crime; however, the objectivity of a computer in legal liability infers 
treating it as human and with no mental faults. It is quite complex and difficult to prove culpability in 
cybercrime, especially in the case of fraud where the computer’s connectivity via the Internet is used 
or where an accountant alters a database for fraudulent gains. Cases are thus different; in the first 
instance, the computer can be used as a ‘BOTNET’ and in the second case, the computer is not 
connected to the Internet or other computers but its content. Therefore in both cases the extent that the 
computer is used as a tool or instrument to commit a crime determines the proof of culpability. The 
actus reus of the computer crime is its content. Relating this to cybercrimes lies in the communication 
means through which the crime was committed, that is; the Internet and the connectivity of 
computers. Therefore, the crime committed through the use of the Internet connectivity, primarily 
qualifies the offence as if the offence concerned relates to tangible property. The definition of what 
constitutes a computer crime varies from country to country. There is no universally accepted 
definition. In practice, the two similar categories of crime have been treated as two separate forms of 
crime. Some Commonwealth countries follow the United Kingdom in legislating new laws to deal 
with computer crime and existing laws to deal with cybercrime, and modifying the existing law to 
accommodate the ever-evolving technological development and appropriate enforcement 
mechanisms. The modification of existing laws does not always occur at the same rate as the 
technology that facilitates the crime, thus leading to ‘a lost in translation phenomenon’ making the 
new law either antiquated or inadequate for the crime for which it was initially modified to deal with. 
Justin Hughes, in his article ‘The internet and the Persistence of Law’, identifies three possible 
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approaches to cyber law, namely: Internet law as a translation of existing law, the no-law Internet and 
the Internet law as a separate jurisdiction (Hughes, 2003). To view the Internet law as a translation of 
existing law creates a loophole that is often exploited by cyber criminals and when prosecuted may 
result to inadequate and unsuitable punishment for the crime in question. This leads to a deficiency in 
social policy objectives in punishment, crime prevention, and offender rehabilitation.  
The UK Data Protection Act 1998 is one of the laws that were modified to protect individuals’ rights 
regarding their personal information held by others. The law also imposes greater control over 
individuals or organizations that hold and process personal information. In modifying existing laws, 
the new fraud bill carries a maximum of a 10-year jail sentence and has eased the prosecution process; 
the main feature of the bill is that it defines that new offences exist through false representation, by 
failure to disclose information or by abuse of position. This covers offences such as phishing and 
potentially can be used to deal with Internet fraudsters, financial crimes and services.  
 
There are countries whose cyber law and regulation is restrictive and certain instances of cybercrime 
are treated differently, such as China’s cyber policy which upholds that the use of the Internet must 
directly benefit the state. China’s cyber policy has led to laws that segregate, control and monitor 
telecommunications; the laws also empower the blocking of access to any Internet content that does 
not promote the national interest (Chang, 2014). In the Commonwealth nations, Europe and the other 
western countries the penal code and the common law are generally similar in nature and hence are 
susceptible to equal and similar laws and punishments. Differential treatment exists in different 
jurisdictions due to the social and cultural make-up of the country and the political dispensation. In 
jurisdictions where the distinction of what constitutes cybercrime or computer crime overlaps, judicial 
discretion takes precedence; however, these similar approaches to cyber policy and law have not yet 
been built upon in effectively combating cybercrimes. The reason may be political rather than legal. 
Cyber fraud, phishing, pharming, identity theft and other related cybercrime have not received the 
same enforcing effect in every jurisdiction; these crimes demand a consistent treatment under existing 
law, both in its criminalization and punitive sentencing. This will require extending existing laws and 
enacting new ones to cover all intricacies of the crime. Yet there are regional differences on 
interpretations, definitions, applicability and scope of criminal liability. The debate on whether to 
criminalise illegal access to a computer network is an example of variance in the scope of a criminal 
act. Illegal access to a computer system is always the first step in subsequent crimes. It is the first step 
in modifying or obtaining stored data which by law has violated the integrity and confidentiality of 
the data. Some countries criminalise mere access, while others limit criminalization only to offences 
where the accessed system is protected by security measures such as a password or encryption keys 
(an example is the German Criminal Code before it was amended in 2007) or where the perpetrator 
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has harmful intentions, or where data were obtained, modified or damaged, whilst other countries do 
not criminalize the access itself, but only subsequent offences (Kadir, 2010). 
 
Most existing laws were in force long before the advent of the Internet. Although they may cover the 
same crime in the same principle with cyber fraud, their interpretations may not fully apply to the 
Internet technology and its fast changing environment. The recent ‘cloud computing’ poses an 
ongoing contention on ownership and intellectual property. Also, the electronic form of transacting 
and banking falls into the two categories of crimes which can be dealt with under the penal code, such 
an offence as cheating should apply to acts of phishing, fraud and crimes in banking and financial 
institutions, companies and business. It is not enough to have a prescriptive judicial stance in 
criminalizing acts of cybercrime, without a criminal legal procedure to bring offenders to justice. The 
future establishment of a global legal system to govern cyberspace will eliminate variations in 
regional legal systems. 
The enforcement of the law in countries affected by the same cybercrime should be a provision in a 
cyber treaty. This will ensure that criminals do not seek protection in jurisdictions where the law is 
either lax or non-existent. An adjudicatory and enforcing jurisdiction will also facilitate extradition of 
offenders, a common biding law dealing with the offence but most importantly the recognition of the 
decision of the court where the case is tried irrespective of the nationality of the offender or victim or 
location of the crime’s asset. Some countries do not recognise the sovereignty of other countries and 
the adoption of cyber threat in these countries are yet to be realised. For example, Iran does not 
recognise Israel, and there is the issue of South Korea and North Korea, to mention a few. A cyber 
treaty appears to be the only way out of these political stalemates. 
Crime fighting is traditionally associated with nation states and their police force but when the crime 
and its victim is located in a particular state while the criminal is situated across the globe, fighting 
such crime will no longer be the sole responsibility of one of the nation states linked to the crime. 
This is usually the nature of cybercrime. 
Cybercrime’s profile often spans across countries with judicial disparity. This makes investigation and 
prosecution difficult except between countries that have an established relationship and cooperate in 
trans-border crime investigations. In cybercrime cases that span across countries with legal 
disparity, where the case does not have the same priority rating in the countries it will not get the 
same level of investigation or conviction. In countries that have no specific law dealing with a 
particular crime which in a different country has an established legal definition, it poses a problem to 
prosecute the same crime and obtaining similar conviction. That is if the alleged crime is recognised 
as a crime in the first place; nullum crimen (No Crime, No Offence). An example is the United States 
V. Elcomsoft (Whyte, 2017), where Elcomsoft, a Russian company, was indicted for offering 
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advanced eBook processor software that exposes the weakness in Adobe software. The law’s 
enforcement in the United States is not consistent with the traditions of the international system, as its 
application to a foreign corporation for activities that occurred in cyberspace would conflict with the 
laws of Russia. Russian law permits the development and sale of the AEBPR [Advanced eBook 
Processor) program. The case was dismissed because of its violation of section 1201 of title 17 of 
the United States Code, which prohibits subjecting Elcomsoft to a law that conflicts with the 
regulations of sovereignty. 
 
The current judicial procedure safeguards the traditional law enforcement which fights crime by 
investigating and prosecuting physical crime. The police are vested with the sole right of investigating 
crime. Cybercrime tends to follow a different style of investigation due to its very nature of mostly 
not being a physical crime; it thus becomes inadequate for the police force to investigate cybercrime 
with the same method for localised crime. Apart from technical competence in computer technology, 
an administrative cooperation and legal assistance and cooperation in investigations between countries 
affected by the same cybercrime will facilitate the enforcement of a cyber treaty by law enforcement 
agents. Interpol currently has a legal recognition internationally. Such legal infrastructures are 
paramount to successfully investigate, capture, prosecute and convict cyber criminals. 
The police have been constrained by the law, institutional structure and protocol and international 
regulations and this has extended to their efficiency in fighting cybercrime, but a central specialized 
policing authority open to consenting countries’ signatory to a legal cyber treaty is a step closer (Seth, 
2010).  
Internet Service Providers also play a crucial role in the investigation of cybercrime. Most cybercrime 
investigation is often traced back to the provider of the service as in the Canadian legal case of R v 
Kerr, and then linked to the culprit through log files maintained by the ISP (Kerr and Gilbert, 2004). It 
is thus difficult to prosecute a culprit who is thousands of miles away without the cooperation of the 
ISPs. The very nature of the web architecture places the ISPs with access to the entry point of all 
cybercrimes. While the law enforcement agencies are legitimate enforcers of the law, the role of 
the ISP in fighting cybercrime cannot be viewed in the same light.  
The provision of a legislative mandate to private agencies such as ISPs with regards to their role in 
cybercrime will give them the legal authority that is extended to the police. 
This will define their responsibilities, power and limits. The onus of the matter then becomes how to 
bring the two bodies to work together effectively within judicial and legal bounds without each of 
them diluting or losing their primary role. 
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This will also prescribe their obligation in procedural law. In support of the above recommendation is 
the 2007 Council of Europe project on cybercrime, as contained in the Global Interface Conference in 
Strasburg of April 2008. 
The applicability of substantive laws to electronic transactions, both tangible and transient digital 
assets, has limited coverage in deterring offenders or preventing the cybercrimes. There is no legal 
sanction applied for intention to commit such crime. In some decided cases the punishments have 
been found to be grossly ridiculous compared to the effect of the crime committed; this calls for either 
specific stand-alone legislation for all cybercrime or, at best, extension of existing laws with new 
definitions specific to cybercrime. Still, on the extension and amendment of existing laws, procedural 
laws that cover the investigation of crimes are also insufficient in facilitating the gathering of 
evidence and investigation of computer-related crimes. Apart from the technical competence of law 
enforcement agencies in computer forensics, the volatile nature of computer data requires expedited 
procedure in gathering of digital evidence while protecting human rights yet not sacrificing evidence 
at the expense of data protection acts. In other words, procedural law should be succinct in drawing a 
line where investigation supersedes data protection, especially in cases of national security. The 
current procedural law cannot keep up with the speed of technological developments. The need for a 
technologically neutral law is needed. The composition of such laws should guarantee their 
applicability to changing technology and techniques used by cyber criminals. The downside of non-
specific open ended laws is that their application will be down to interpretation, making such laws 
difficult to be applied and, at most, useless. Except where provisions are made for reactive 
amendment to existing laws to deal with an emergent trend of technological crime, this is the current 
situation (Malby et al., 2013). 
 
The law should create a credible and effective deterrent effect and sufficient punishment to suit the 
nature and severity of the offence. Also where relevant, provisions allowing for rehabilitation could 
be useful, particularly if previous offenders, with their expertise, knowledge and connections, can be 
inducted into the system to aid and assist in future investigations and in the development of computer 
forensics. Chapter II, Section 1, Title 5, Article 13 of the Cybercrime Convention, states that each 
party “…shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the 
criminal offences established in accordance with Articles 2 through 11 are punishable by effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, which include deprivation of liberty…[and] shall ensure that 
legal persons held liable in accordance with Article 12 shall be subject to effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions or measures, including monetary sanctions”. The 
sanctions within this Convention are prescriptive without going into detail of its relationship to 
existing law. 
14 
 
Britain as a key member of the European Union has had its criminal justice system influenced by the 
Standards set out by the Council of Europe. United Kingdom was a signatory state of the Council of 
Europe (CoE) in its Cybercrime Convention. Although the Cybercrime Convention provides for both 
computer crime and cybercrime under one instrument, the United Kingdom has implemented the 
provisions under the Convention alongside other European Union countries; however, a two tract 
approach was adopted by the United Kingdom. As previously mentioned, the United Kingdom’s 
Computer Misuse Act of 1990 (CMA) and its amendments deals with computer crimes while  
cybercrime or computer-enabled crime resembling traditional offences are to be dealt with under 
existing criminal legislation. The amendments to traditional criminal laws are to accommodate the 
new breed of criminal acts and actors, means and modes of crime commission and digital information 
and products from the Internet technology. The amendments take into consideration issues arising 
from definition, interpretation and the scope of Internet crimes.  
The amendment affects legislations pertaining to fraud and theft, pornography and intellectual 
property offences. The fraud bill proposed to modernise the definition of fraud which has been in 
existence in its original wording since 1968, and will cover cases of phishing and other Internet 
enabled fraudulent activities. This will close up the loophole in the law that has seen criminals escape 
prosecution due to the limitations of the provisions of The Theft Act of 2006 in covering such crimes. 
The new bill will cover offences of fraud which can be committed in one of three ways: 
"Fraud by false representation" is defined by Section 2 of the Act as a case where a person knowingly 
(makes a representation that is false and misleading) "any representation as to fact or law". 
"Fraud by failing to disclose information" is defined by Section 3 of the Act. A person legally bound 
to disclose information by virtue of the relationship to another party, fails to do so. 
 
"Fraud by abuse of position" is defined by Section 4 of the Act as a case where a person is expected to 
safeguard the financial interests of another person by virtue of his position, and abuses that position; 
either by omission or intentionally.  
 
The scope of the Act encompasses scenarios that can arise in cybercrimes (Fraud Act, 2006). In spite 
of the enhanced Fraud Act 2006, the UK Government was involved in the creation of two treaties on 
the prevention of cybercrime, under the CoE and the EU, both of which originated in Europe and both 
of which calls for international coordination to tackle abuses of computer systems. They are the 
Cybercrime Convention of 2001 and the E.U. Council Framework Decision on Attacks Against 
Information Systems (OJ L 069, 16 March 2005), which was proposed on 19 April 2002, adopted on 
24 February 2005 and required to be transposed into national law by 16 March 2007 by member 
states. The UK opted out of the framework decision in December 2014. 
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Cybercrime has given rise to new concepts in criminal activities that traditional law does not cover. 
One of the legal challenges in fighting cybercrime, as mentioned before, is definition of concepts. 
Definitions are a very important aspect and a common element of the judicial framework both 
nationally and internationally. But why are definitions so important? It is because they differentiate 
functions. There are two main definitions in law, namely descriptive and statutory definitions. 
Statutory definition provides meaning of words within certain context while descriptive definition 
defines concepts by removing ambiguity where features could lead to confusion. The concept of both 
definitions is challenged in the quantitative aspect of cyber law. The Convention on Cybercrime has 
been criticised for not being computer-specific; it contains only five definitions of cybercrime, with 
four definitions included in Art. 1 and an additional provision was included in Art. 9 of the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime.  
 
Convention on Cybercrime does not define child but only child pornography; child pornography is a 
new concept within cyber law that requires new definition. 
There is a significant difference to the definition of child pornography provided in the Optional 
Protocol and the definition in the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. The later focuses on 
visual depiction; however, child pornography comes in various forms such as pictures or movies, and 
audio files. Audio files are not visual and therefore not provided in Article 9 which refers to “material 
that visually depicts” a child. 
 
The fight against cybercrime is global and involves multi stakeholders. The launch of the Global 
Cyber security Agenda (GCA) on 17 May 2007 was one of many international efforts to resolve the   
legal, technical and institutional challenges of cyber security. The GCA aims to coordinate 
international cooperation in five areas; Legal measures, Technical and procedural measures, 
Organizational structures, Capacity building and International cooperation. The legal measures and 
international cooperation involves both national and international legislation. As mentioned before, 
the provision of national criminal codes are not fully adequate to deal with criminal acts committed 
over the Internet; there are lacunas in current national laws and substantive criminal law. These laws 
need to be critically enhanced to empower law enforcement agencies to investigate cybercrime on a 
global platform. 
Law enforcement is another area of focus of the global cyber security agenda. The success of 
cybercrime investigations depends on cooperation between the countries affected by the crime. Much 
improvement is needed in harmonising the current legal assistance between law enforcement agencies 
globally, which is frosted with complex protocol and procedures. The concept of dual criminality 
investigation is limited to cybercrimes that are criminalised by the participating countries; however, 
the cybercrimes that have regional differences in definition do not meet the same level of 
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investigatory cooperation. This is where harmonised global law enforcement will play a vital role to 
ensure quick procedures and response to incidents. 
 
To fight cybercrime there needs to be a global legal framework, with globally efficient and 
empowered law enforcement agencies. Over the last decade, improvements have been made in 
educating law enforcement agencies especially with regards to hi-tech crimes and cyber forensics to 
facilitate joint policing operations across national borders. To investigate cybercrime, law 
enforcement agents require change in procedural law to empower them in investigating crime. Brown 
Cameron, associate investigator of Australian National University notes that the identification of 
offenders, preservation of evidence and actual prosecution of offenders for traditional crime is 
different from cybercrimes (Brown, 2015). The evidence in cybercrime is digital and often outside the 
jurisdiction of the state. The provision of procedural law that will make way for the peculiarities of 
digital evidence is crucial. The provisions of the data misuse act, computer misuse act and human 
rights act hinders access to cyber investigation. It is in areas like this that a procedural law specific to 
cyber forensics is needed.  
Professional law enforcement is a reactive system that is centralised within a set geographical 
boundary, which operates by deterring crime, investigating and aiding the prosecution of crime 
(Balkin, 2007). By its definable geographic position, the current judicial model is limited in its 
applicability in cybercrime prosecution within traditional law enforcement.  
Cyberspace, which literally means extra-terrestrial, has no geographic boundaries but transcends 
geographical boundaries. This unique nature of cyberspace demands a different judicial approach 
which is outside the scope of this research. However, close to the research objective is the need to 
differentiate cybercrime from other traditional criminal acts because there is a marked difference 
between the nature of crime and cybercrime within the scope of criminal opportunity. While physical 
crime deals with tangible concepts, is symmetric and cited within a physical time frame and 
boundaries, cybercrime on the other hand is asymmetric, intangible and cannot be cited within a fixed 
time and physical location.  
Similar to physical crime is the different levels of criminal activity associated with cybercrime. The 
levels of activity/victims are; criminal activities that affect personal security, corporate/organisational 
security and national/international security. The legal approach in prosecution and punishment of 
cybercrime hence will have to be structured according to this form, because each requires a different 
form of investigation and deals with different stakeholders. However, it is difficult to propose a 
judicial process that will not have an international recognition as is the case with localised crimes and 
law enforcement agencies. The disparity in the definition of computer-related crime by different 
countries also has a great effect on the prosecution of the crimes. 
17 
 
The burden on the Criminal Justice Authorities is the need for a unified legal empowerment that is 
universally accepted in dealing with cybercrime in a way that meets the international divergence of 
cybercrime. There exists currently two courts with international reach; the International court of 
Justice so far is the principal organ established by the United Nations that presides over legal disputes 
submitted by its member states and gives judicial advise. On other hand, the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) is the first ever permanent, treaty-based, fully independent international criminal court. It  
was established to promote the rule of law and the trial and punishment of the gravest international 
crimes. Its jurisdiction complements national criminal jurisdictions. There is a parallel need for the 
establishment of an international court or tribunal for dealing with the most serious cybercrimes of 
global dimension; cases where the crime spans across the globe and across different judicial systems. 
Global cyber-attacks in recent years have been either poorly investigated or prosecuted because there 
is yet to be a global treaty on cybercrime to facilitate investigation and prosecution before an 
international criminal court or tribunal. 
However, without a universal cybercrime convention, cross-jurisdictional conflict of criminal laws 
raises the unavoidable dilemma of “what law should be applied to determine the legal effect of a 
person's conduct when he does an act in one state which produces harmful effects in another” (Brown, 
2015). The 2010 WikiLeaks activity is a typical example, till date no state has been able to 
successfully prosecute Julian Assange and he is currently living at the Embassy of Ecuador in London 
(Alexander, 2015). The delay in such a binding legal common ground has been influenced by the 
definition and differentiation of criminal concepts relevant to cybercrime. 
The collection and presentation of evidence is a vital part of the legal process. Digital evidence arising 
from the use of the Internet becomes a new source of evidence in not just cyber prosecution but in 
traditional crime. The use of digital evidence found in mobile phones and emails is now being used in 
traditional crime investigation and prosecution. The United Kingdom Police and Criminal Evidence 
Code (currently reviewed by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005) defines digital 
evidence as “all information contained in a computer”. The definition of computer here covers a broad 
spectrum electronic appliances. A definition of computer in the 2002 Commonwealth Model Law on 
Computer and Computer-related Crime defines a “Computer system” as a device or a group of 
interconnected or related devices, including the Internet, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, 
performs automatic processing of data or any other function. 
The admissibility of electronic or digital evidence in court differs from traditional evidence; 
although both traditional evidence and digital evidence undergo two stages, namely the investigation 
stage and the presentation stage. Traditional evidence exists in a physical state but digital evidence 
needs to undergo certain processes before it can be extracted and presented in a physical state. This 
process of extraction means that the digital evidence has technically been altered and as such rendered 
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inadmissible under traditional law, and therefore the likelihood of admissibility of digital evidence in 
court is slim. 
A cybercrime can be committed in the United Kingdom using cloud computing, with the victims 
being in Japan and France. Or the cybercriminal can be in Nigeria, using a computer server in South 
Africa. These scenarios present a typical transnational crime that involves different jurisdictions. It 
raises the questions of which country’s criminal law is applied, which of the countries has jurisdiction 
and which country should investigate? To deal with cybercrime’s global dimension the principle of 
jurisdiction has to be addressed. In the principles of public international law, the authority of a 
sovereign state to apply its domestic law in a criminal matter implies that such a state has 
“jurisdiction” over other affected states. There are different principles of jurisdiction in the legal 
process. Below are some of the issues of jurisdiction in cybercrime. 
The most common basis of jurisdiction is the principle of territoriality. It defines jurisdiction by virtue 
of a state’s geographical location and boundary. It is applicable if an offence is committed within the 
geographical boundary of a sovereign state irrespective of the nationality of the offender or victim. 
Article 22 paragraph 1.a of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime stipulates a state’s 
jurisdiction to include its geographical territory, a ship flying the flag of the state, an aircraft 
registered under the law of the state or a citizen of the state if the crime is punishable in another state 
where the crime is committed. In traditional law, a crime is committed when the offender and the 
victim were physically present within the state’s boundary when the offender illegally accessed the 
victim’s computer system. The application of this principle in cybercrime raises a problem when we 
apply the previous cloud computing scenario.  
The International Court of Justice expressed in the “Lotus” case the “principle of objective 
territoriality” that extends the definition of territoriality but considers a scenario where both the 
offender and victim are not located within the country, but that instead the crime is committed via a 
server in an entirely different country albeit the effect of the crime is huge in another country entirely 
unrelated to the country of the victim, criminal and infrastructure. 
The principle of nationality refers to jurisdiction exercised by a state over their citizens that are 
located abroad. It reinforces the right of the state over its citizen. Without due consideration of the 
location of the citizen or its law, a state can try its citizen in absence and enforce its judgment. This 
poses a problem where countries act as havens for criminals avoiding prosecution in their country. 
The principle of passive nationality is jurisdiction based on the nationality of the victim. For 
cybercrime, its relevance is when a citizen of the state becomes a victim. For example, Section 7 of 
the German Penal Code recognises the application of German criminal law to offences committed 
abroad where a German is the victim of the offence, ‘if the act is a criminal offence at the locality of 
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its commission or if that locality is not subject to any criminal jurisdiction’. It appears that the 
German law does not recognise the jurisdiction of any other associated state. 
The principle of universality establishes jurisdiction in relation to specific crimes that are in the 
interest of the international community, such as serious crimes such as crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. Again the German Penal Code, in section 6(6), stipulates that where ‘offences committed 
abroad against internationally protected legal interests; German criminal law shall further apply, 
regardless of the law of the locality where they are committed’. The list of crimes or offences covered 
in this section of the penal code includes cybercrimes and computer crimes such as child 
pornography, human trafficking and acts of terrorism. Once more Germany may exercise jurisdiction 
even if the victims are not German nationals and the operator of the website or the infrastructure are 
not located in Germany. 
The 2008 training course of The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) listed countries and the offences that they have 
criminalised according to the Council of Europe’s convention on cybercrime. Fighting cybercrime has 
been a challenge to most countries. The establishment of appropriate strategies and policy to deal with 
these crimes involves a multifaceted and interdisciplinary process. It includes, but is not limited to, 
areas such as substantive law, procedural law, International Corporation, stakeholder’s empowerment 
and technical regulations. There is no ‘one cap fits all’ solution to the problem.  
 
Some countries have a separate legal system dealing with cybercrime, while others such as the UK 
have modified and extended existing structures to deal with cybercrime. In the Explanatory 
Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, the drafters reiterated the importance of 
substantive criminal law, procedural law and investigative technique to be robust enough to deal with 
emerging new techniques in cybercrime. They should be pre-emptive in dealing with new technology. 
This is desirable but not easily achieved. It is not simple to prescribe legal concepts to deal with 
technology that has not been developed, rather it is the need for nation states to expedite law making 
process to deal with variants of emerging cybercrime as the need arises. This involves three stages; 
extending existing laws to cover the new cybercrime, identification of gaps in the penal code that 
cyber criminals will take advantage of and avoid prosecution, and the drafting of new legislation 
where the last two approaches will not suffice. 
 
As advancement in Internet technology has given rise to new cybercrime and criminal technique, so 
also must it to new investigatory technique. The fight against cybercrime will be facilitated by the 
provision of cyber/computer forensic training for law enforcement and establishment of specialist 
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units to deal with cybercrime, as was the case of the defunct UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA).  
 
The need for collaboration is unavoidable in the fight against cybercrime. One of the advantages of 
collaboration is learning from other partners’ experience, both in dealing with certain kinds of crime 
and sharing of resources to deal with specific criminal acts.  
 
This chapter has put cybercrime in a context that is neither in respect of air, land, sea or space. The 
next chapter will discuss the concept of cyberspace and why it needs a strategy. Because of the threats 
and challenges in cyberspace, an attempt is made in the chapter to expunge the need for a strategy for 
dealing with these threats and challenges. It also looks at the history of the UK’s cyber strategy and 
the role that partnership plays across private and public organisations in the United Kingdom. This 
directly links to the research objectives.  
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Chapter Two 
Literature review of cyberspace   
 
What is cyberspace and why does it require a strategy to govern it? 
Cyberspace is described in the UK Government’s National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) as 
“encompassing all forms of networked digital activity” (NCSS, 2011). This is a blanket definition 
which agrees with the DCAF Horizon 2015 working paper by Fred Schreier which also named 
cyberspace the 5th space of warfare: ‘Cyberspace, the novel 5th space of warfare after land, sea, air, 
and space, is all of the computer networks in the world and everything they connect and control via 
cable, Fiber-optics or wireless. It is not just the Internet – the open network of networks’ (Schreier, 
2015, p10). 
This definition encompasses the Internet, extranet, transactional networks, Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and many other networks that are designed for purposes other 
than the obvious Internet usage, such as: GPS, ACARS, SWIFT, GSM Cellular. Other definitions of 
the cyberspace looks at the different levels or components that make up cyberspace causing the 
definition of cyberspace to be diverse to a point that there is no unified definition but instead the very 
concept of cyberspace varying from country to country, organisation to organisation and even from 
academics to academics. Some definitions of cyberspace appear to portray it as insubstantial. The 
definition by Wingfield (2000) is an example of such definitions. He notes that ‘cyberspace is not a 
physical place – it defies measurement in any physical dimension or time space continuum. It is a 
shorthand term that refers to the environment created by the confluence of cooperative networks of 
computers, IT systems, and telecommunication infrastructures commonly referred to as the World 
Wide Web’(Wingfield, 2000, p17). This definition is ambiguous as it suggests to alienate the physical 
connectivity that exists to make communication in cyberspace possible.  
Kuehl offered a table of definitions of cyberspace as detailed below. He then defined cyberspace as 
’an operational domain whose distinctive and unique character is framed by the use of electronics and 
the electromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via inter-
connected information and communication technology-based systems and their associated infra-
structures’ (Kuehl, 2009, pp26-28). 
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Table 1. Definitions of Cyberspace 
• Greece: kybernetes (the steersman) or cybernetics, the study of control processes, which was 
the basis for Tom Rona’s concept (1976) of “information warfare”. 
• William Gibson, Neuromancer (1984): “a consensual hallucination”. 
• Edward Waltz, Information Warfare: Principles and Operations (1998): The “cyberspace 
dimension” refers to the middle layer—the information infrastructure—of the three realms of 
the information warfare battle- space. These three realms are the physical (facilities, nodes), the 
information infrastructure, and the perceptual. 
• Google: “The electronic medium of computer networks, in which online communication takes 
place. . . . a metaphor for the non-physical terrain created by computer systems. . . . the 
impression of space and community formed by computers, computer networks, and their users. . 
. . the place where a telephone conversation appears to occur. . . . the place between the 
phones.” 
• Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway (1994): “That 
intangible place between computers where information momentarily exists on its route from one 
end of the global network to the other. . . . the ethereal reality, infinity of electrons speeding 
down copper or glass fibers at the speed of light. . . . Cyberspace is borderless . . . [but also] 
think of cyberspace as being divided into groups of local or regional cyberspace—hundreds and 
millions of smaller cyberspaces all over the world.” 
• Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway (2d 
ed., 1996): “[National] cyberspace is distinct entities, with clearly defined electronic borders. . . 
. Small-C cyberspaces consist of personal, corporate or organizational spaces. . . . Big-C 
cyberspace is the National Information Infrastructure. . . . add [both] and then tie it all up with 
threads of connectivity and you have all of cyberspace.” 
• Oxford English Dictionary (1997): “The notional environment within which electronic 
communication occurs.” 
• Walter Gary Sharp, Cyberspace and the Use of Force (1999): “The environment created by the 
confluence of cooperative networks of computers, information systems, and telecommunication 
infrastructures commonly referred to as the Internet and the World Wide Web.” 
• Dorothy Denning, Information Warfare and Security (1999): “The information space 
consisting of the sum total of all computer networks.” 
• Gregory Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (2001): “A physical domain resulting from 
the creation of information systems and networks that enable electronic interactions to take 
place. . . . Cyberspace is a man-made environment for the creation, transmittal, and use of 
information in a variety of formats. . . . Cyberspace consists of electronically powered 
hardware, networks, operating systems and transmission standards.” 
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• Merriam-Webster Third New International Dictionary (2002): “The on-line world of computer 
networks.” 
• National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (2006): “A domain characterized by the 
use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange information 
via networked systems and physical infrastructures.” 
• National Security Presidential Directive 54 (2008): “The interdependent network of 
information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, 
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries.” 
• Deputy Secretary of Defence Gordon England (2008): “A global domain within the 
information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers.” 
 
 
Drawing from the various definitions above, cyberspace can be seen to operate at different layers. 
Kuehl offers ‘three separate but related and synergistic dimensions’ or levels, namely: connectivity, 
content, and cognition. These levels of connectivity are similar to the US Army’s layered approach to 
defining cyberspace. The US Department of Defence defined cyberspace as comprising of ‘three 
layers (physical, logical, and social) made up of five components geographic, physical network, 
logical network, cyber persona, and persona’. 
.  
Figure 0-1 
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Figure 0-2 - Pictorial depiction of the three layers of cyberspace (AcqNotes, 2015) 
 
The three layers of cyberspace, namely; physical, logical and social have five subsets of layers. The 
physical layer subsets are the geographic and the physical network layers. While the geographic layer 
is the physical location of the network hardwares or structures, the physical layer is the actual 
hardware and structures. 
 
The logical layer is made up of all the logical connections that exist between networks and connected 
nodes. This layer includes the routing system, connectors, nodes, and other devices that interact 
within the network and the programme that controls the interoperability of the components. While this 
aspect of the cyberspace make-up is outside the scope of this research, its relevance to the need for a 
cyber strategy will become obvious as the thesis develops. 
 
The social layer comprises the human and cognitive elements that use the network. It consists of the 
cyber persona component and the persona component. The cyber persona component relates to all the 
identifiable features of a user of the network such as the user’s profile: username, e-mail address, 
computer IP address and phone numbers. The persona component consists of the users that are 
actually on the network at a given time. A user can have more than one profile within a particular 
geographic network and a group of users can have one cyber persona, for example two research 
students can have one email address which they use collaboratively. At any given time that both users 
are on the Internet at the same time (multiple users), their persona is still single. 
The dependence of the 21st century on telecommunication technology leads to both vulnerabilities and 
strengths (NCSS, 2011). Prior to the financial crisis of 2007 and successive cyber security attacks on 
Estonia in 2007, there have been other attacks but what made Estonia different is that the western 
world suddenly took notice of the potential harm and the costly effect of cyber-attack on national 
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infrastructure (European Parliament, 2011). Other cyber-attacks recorded include cyber-attacks 
between India and Pakistan which commenced in the 1990s. India and Pakistan were engaged in a 
long-term dispute over Kashmir which escalated to cyberspace (BBC 2009). There have been 
instances where state sponsored hackers from both countries repeatedly attacked each other's 
computing database system. The statistics recorded 45 in 1999, increased to 133 in 2000 and to 275 
by the end of August 2001 (Prichard and MacDonald, 2004). 
In 2000, cyber-attack between Israel and Palestine witnessed the launch of DOS attacks on computers 
owned by Palestinian resistance organizations (Hamas) and Lebanese resistance organizations 
(Hezbollah) by Israel. Israel’s action attracted reprisals from anti-Israel hackers who crashed several 
Israeli websites by flooding them with bogus traffic (Cllifi, 2014). 
The Lovegate attack on Ministry of Defence Computer systems in April 2003 did not destabilise 
operations but took four weeks to be cleared at an estimated cost of £10 million (Computer Weekly, 
2004). This attack came during the early months of the US-led invasion of Iraq in which UK forces 
were involved. The Titan Rain attacks of 2007 on UK Foreign and Commonwealth office systems 
were alleged to have originated from China and also attacked US governmental agencies (Norton-
Taylor, 2007). 
The BBC reported the July 2009 cyber-attacks against South Korea and the United States (BBC News 
Online, 2009). The attacks involved the activation of a botnet against major government, news media, 
and financial websites of these two countries. More attacks directed at the UK government were 
countered; amongst the list is the Zeus attack on government systems in December 2010. In February 
2011, news sources revealed that the Government of Canada suffered cyber-attacks by foreign 
hackers using IP addresses from China (McMillan and Kan, 2011). Over the years up until now, cyber 
threat escalation has speedily increased across the globe. 
The Fire Eye advanced threat report of 2013 recorded 5,000 APT attacks where the use of distinct 
TTPs appeared to have been carried out directly or indirectly by a nation state, or a professional 
criminal organization, for the purposes of cyber espionage and subversion of target computer 
networks (Fire Eye Lab, 2014). From these attacks, 160 malware families associated with APT 
activity featured initial CnC infrastructure within 206 national top-level domains (TLDs). Cyberspace 
has been argued as strategic importance to both the military and the police in the 21st century. A 
NATO review of member state Information Operation Documents cites the evolution of war from the 
traditional warfare to the information warfare (NATO, 2010). The current international strategic 
environment suggests that modern conflict and warfare is characterised by advanced information 
technologies and asymmetric threats, a notable shift away from military tactics to non-military tactics 
that are affecting the social, political, economic and traditional military battle space. Although 
specifically referring to Information Operations Strategy, it features in the broader spectrum of cyber 
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strategy because Information Operations are intrinsically linked to computer networks. The Review 
proposed that the provision of security through prevention, defence and management of threats and 
conflicts globally will be the strategic issues of the 21st century. 
Threat in cyberspace can come from any of the layers mentioned in the previous pages, therefore to 
manage these threats, a multi-layered approach is required. Public / private organisations control the 
entry point of the cyberspace and therefore have a flexible continuum of monitoring and preventing 
crime than the physical law enforcement agent (police). The big question is who is responsible for the 
Internet and how can cyberspace be governed. With responsibility is the connotation of ownership and 
governance. 
Cornish, Hughes and Livingstone (2009) came up with the notion of the ‘Village Commons’. 
According to them, cyberspace belongs to everyone and should be safeguarded by everyone ranging 
from individuals to states and nations. It is the ‘global technological common’ based on how its users 
perceive it. Using cyber espionage as an example, these authors propose two approaches; deterrence 
by interdependence and deterrence by association. Relating deterrence by interdependency to other 
cyber threats, behaviour and norm building of the users (both individuals and state nations) becomes 
the basis for counteracting cyber threats. 
On the other hand, Nielsen in 2012 described security in cyberspace as risk management comprising 
of threat; vulnerability and consequences (Nielsen, 2012). Cyber threat is a product of the intention 
and capability of the attacker. Vulnerability is the characteristic of the target (cyber persona) that 
enables the probability of a successful attack, while consequences are the cost of a successful attack. 
Vulnerability applies to both the user and the network.  
This opinion is further narrowed down by Deibert and Rohozinski (2010), whose conceptualizations 
of cyberspace security is classified into two dimensions of ‘risk’: ‘risks to the physical realm of 
computer and communication technologies (risks to cyberspace); and risks that arise from cyberspace 
and are facilitated or generated by its technologies, but do not directly target the infrastructures per se 
(risks through cyberspace)’. How can vulnerability be minimised to reduce threat or risk? The need 
for a guideline on behaviour in cyberspace is called for. 
 
Why does cyberspace need a strategy? 
The Internet is made up of areas controlled by private organisations and areas under public 
governance. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) controls the internet protocol, while the 
domain name system is controlled by the Internet Cooperation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN). Different governments have control over copyright, intellectual property and cybercrime as 
expressed in their national policies. And the United Nations and the International 
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Telecommunications Union have all set down norms on how to behave in cyberspace; yet the threat 
posed by both state and non-state actors in cyberspace is proof that not everyone is bound by the 
protocols established by the aforementioned entities, nor is there a unified framework that they all 
agree and adhere to; an opinion that resonates in Deibert and Rohozinski’s article. State actors can 
form alliance as evidenced in previous technological innovations such as the nuclear and the industrial 
revolutions but unlike these past inventions, cyber technology also empowers non-state actors. The 
options available in order to maintain safety and security and mitigate threats include collaboration 
amongst government and the non-governmental sector. To attain this, nations need to set out rules on 
their behaviour in cyberspace and how to counter or operate against rules established by other state 
actors. How these rules will translate to accommodate non-state actors is yet to evolve. However, the 
need for a cyber strategy is born. 
Strategy has its origin in the military. Callahan, quoting Paul Nitze, notes that ‘the notion of strategy 
implies an organised authority capable of sustained action along the lines of policy’ (Callahan, 1990). 
Three aspects of strategy emerge here: that strategy is organised authority, it is sustainable, and it 
follows the line of policy. Policy according to the Oxford English dictionary is the course of action 
adopted and pursued by a government. Policy therefore is a political goal of a government for the 
collective benefit of its nation. If policy is ‘what needs to be done’, then strategy is ‘how to achieve 
what needs to be done’. Strategy is the means to achieve policy. It is therefore the precise objectives 
and resources that are to be applied to meet the goals of a policy.  
 “…In other words, strategy is the interface which provides governmental policy with its ways and 
means (or its capability), and which gives activity – military or other – its ends (or its purpose) (House 
of Commons, 2010). The USA’s Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defence Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, defines strategy as ‘A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the 
instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national, 
and/or multinational objectives’ (Thomas, 2014). 
 
Applying this definition to cyber strategy falls short in covering the basic components that make up 
cyberspace. The ‘instruments of national power’ are diplomatic, information, military, and economic 
(DIME). Although cyber encompasses these instruments, there are other instruments which have 
emerged since this definition and must be considered. More so, the definition was applicable to 
definite geographic terrain, while cyber encompasses these terrains and much more. Cyberspace is 
interconnected and constantly changing. 
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History of UK Cyber Strategy 
 
Military strategy has been expanding since technology began to emerge before the 18th century. The 
concept of warfare exists over two levels: strategy and tactics. In modern military leadership, the 
separation of military and political leadership led to two levels of strategy: grand strategy and military 
strategy. Grand strategy is the government’s strategy. It sets out the government’s policy on war and 
peace at a national level. Liddell Hart wrote that grand strategy coordinates and directs all the 
resources of the nation(s) to the attainment of the political objective of war (Liddell Hart, 1991). The 
British defence doctrine of 2008 published the hierarchy of command, establishing four levels of 
strategy, namely; 
Grand Strategy – Is the national political aim in peace and war for Her Majesty’s government. 
The Military Strategy – The strategy of the Ministry of Defence stems from their responsibility within 
the grand strategy in developing, sustaining and assigning military forces and assets to support 
government policy and achieve the goals of the grand strategy. It operates on two levels, namely the 
Operational Strategy which is the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) strategy guiding the use of 
military forces to achieve the objective of the MoD, and Tactical which is the field commanders’ 
directive for Land, Sea and Air in achieving the Operational goals. The grand strategy was renamed 
the National Strategy but its definition remains as ‘Co-Ordinated application of the instruments of 
national power in pursuit of national aspiration’. 
Boyd’s strategy for cyberspace, for both national and international, defined strategy as: 
‘A mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonizing and focusing our efforts as a basis for 
realizing some aim or purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering 
events and many contending interests’ (Boyd, 2017, p58) .  
 
Cyber strategy has also been described as “the development and employment of capabilities to operate 
in cyberspace, integrated and coordinated with the other operational realms, to achieve or support the 
achievement of objectives across the elements of national power” (Kuehl, 2009). 
It explores the intricate influence of politics on policy and national objectives and goals. To achieve 
goals and objectives, nations will have a means of employing the resources at their disposal, 
translating this to cyber strategy, with cyber resources and cyber protocols being combined in a 
systematic way to achieve the objective of the nation towards its security, economic or social 
objectives. This also echoes Nielsen’s views on risk management because national cyber strategy 
should focus on how nations employ their cyber capability to achieve their aims and objectives by 
employing their cyber power, and the risk associated with it (Nielsen, 2012). 
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Cyber power therefore extends to the larger military, political, economic, diplomatic, and national 
security objectives of a nation. As mentioned before, the United kingdom, New Zealand, Luxemburg, 
France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands all produced their national cyber security strategy in 
2011, the US and Australia in 2009 and Canada in 2010. Asian countries have also published editions 
of cyber security strategy and true to the definition of strategy as continually changing, most countries 
have reviewed and published versions of their cyber security strategy as the world of technology 
changes or releases new cyber threats (Sabillona et al., 2016). Prior to the official publication of the 
UK’s NCSS, threats posed by the Internet have been on the agenda of the UK government and actions 
to mitigate against these threats were in place but not in such a wide scale and coordinated means as 
now. Below is a chronological list of offices set up to tackle these threats: 
 
1999 - NISCC 
The National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) was set up in 1999 to minimise 
the risk to the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) from electronic attack. The NISCC provided 
advice and information on computer network defence and other information assurance issues across 
different sectors of the CNI. NISCC existed for eight years and in 2007, it merged with the National 
Security Advice Centre (NSAC) to form the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI). 
2007 - CPNI 
Under the mandate of the security service act of 2008, the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI) was formed to bridge the gap between the role of the NISCC and the 
requirement to integrate the non-governmental organisations and UK business sector. It provides 
integrated security advice to businesses and organisations by providing security information and 
educating personnel. Its responsibility is to reduce the vulnerability to terrorism and other threats to 
the CNI. The CPNI is a part of MI5 and accountable to the Director General of the Security Service, 
and exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. 
2009 - OCS & CSOC 
The UK’s first Cyber Security Strategy (CSS) was produced by the Labour government in June 2009. 
The publication of the CSS led to the formation of the Office of Cyber Security (OCS) and the Cyber 
Security Operations Centre (CSOC) in the same year. The CSOC was renamed the Office of Cyber 
Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) in 2010. OCS was located in the Cabinet Office and 
responsible for running cyber security programmes such as the allocation of the National Cyber 
Security Programme funding, while CSOC is housed with the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) and is responsible for cyberspace monitoring and analysis, including threat and 
advice to government and businesses. 
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The lifespan of the CSS was short when a change in government led to the apparent jettison of the 
CSS and the publication in 2010 of the NSS and SDSR by the Coalition government. 
 
2010 - NSS and SDSR 
 
The National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) and the Comprehensive Spending Review were the 
guide behind the drafting of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (SDSR). This was during the peak of the UK economic recession. The NSS was to 
ensure a secure UK resilient to cyber-attacks. The protection of the national economy and critical 
infrastructure against threats was the main purpose of the strategy, and cyber security was given a 
multi-dimensional approach in the new UK security strategy split into three main stages.  
The end result is national security, and the SDSR was the framework through which the aims of the 
NSS will be achieved. The timeline contains a series of maturity milestones in achieving the goals for 
national security set at 2020. The National Cyber-Security Programme was allocated £650 million 
over four years to deliver the goals of the NSS. 
The National Security Strategy concentrated on the high possibility of cyber-attack on the UK’s 
critical infrastructure, and past attacks on the UK highlights the cost of such attack on the UK 
economy. A holistic approach was used in the drafting of the NSS. Cyber-security, defence, 
intelligence, security and resilience (ISR), international relations and development were contributing 
factors. This led to the establishment of the Defence Cyber Operations Group (DCOG) which was 
responsible for defence-wide cyber-security, as at this time the role of the military was yet to be 
defined, especially within the protection of the critical national infrastructure. The Defence Cyber 
Operations Group (DCOG) has the responsibility of developing, testing and validating more efficient 
military cyber capabilities. 
2011 and 2016 - CSS 
 
Finally, in 2011 the Cyber Security Strategy was published with an increasing budget of £860 million 
and with the following objectives: 
To make the UK public safe online and……one of the most secure places in the world to do business 
in cyberspace. A UK that will……be more resilient to cyber-attack and better able to protect our 
interests in cyberspace and a UK to have helped shape an open, vibrant and stable cyberspace that 
supports open societies; a UK that will…have the cross-cutting knowledge, skills and 
capability……to underpin……cyber security objectives. 
The 2011 CSS highlight is mainly on the Government and private sector relationship in tackling 
cyber-attacks. Both the NSS and the CSS identify only three types of actors, namely; criminals, 
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terrorists and foreign states (HM Government, 2011). The CSS has omitted the individual cyber 
attacker who is not linked to any state but in some cases is motivated by political aspirations or 
financial goals. The focus is on groups, organisations and state actors. Such oversight creates a 
problem, bearing in mind that individuals acting alone can cause the same damage as states or 
organisations. 2015 saw the launch of a new strategy, building upon the success of the one of 2011 
and increasing the budget to £1.9 billion which will be channelled to protecting the UK from cyber-
attack and developing the UK’s sovereign capabilities in cyberspace. 
The chapter has built from chapter one an understanding of the concept called cyberspace and how it 
is viewed as the emergent operational environment of the century. As an environment, it requires a 
code of conduct, a strategy by linking the layers of cyberspace to the type of attack that can originate 
from these layers. It continued to trace the history and origin of strategy from a military perspective to 
a national agenda. The history of cyber strategy in the UK paints a picture of reactive continuum as 
cyber threats emerge and the system finds out that it has not prepared for the next challenge. By 
recognising the role of the Armed Forces and the police force, the next chapter details the research 
method employed to explore the application of the cyber strategy in the Armed Forces and the police.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Research Methods  
 
This chapter discusses the methodology and stages that the research underwent. It narrates the issues 
encountered in the course of researching in predominantly male organisations by a female researcher 
who is of ethnic minority, and also junior ranked personnel in the Armed Forces. The author of the 
thesis  had her  studies significantly disrupted and was significantly hampered by injuries for 
17months. The chapter commences with the current affairs of the period and goes on to the fieldwork 
of accessing, sampling and interviewing police and military personnel and the ethical considerations 
that appeared at different stages of the research. 
` 
From 2011 to 2015, the Cyber Security Strategy (CSS) was released and reviewed, containing 
objectives that the Armed Forces and the police force are to fulfil. These objectives were rolled out in 
policies and courses across public establishments in the country. The research aimed to investigate a 
disparity between the policies and objectives and the practices within the units and during this period 
consideration was given to whether the same practice existed in the police force. The research 
explored the differences between the policies; their interpretation and challenges in application and 
this led to the interest in researching cyber security within the Armed Forces and the police. Although 
both forces have different responsibilities within the CSS, the thesis was scoped to investigate the 
means of achieving the objectives of the CSS within both forces, especially in the partnership that 
exists within the diverse governmental, public and private bodies that have a role to play in the CSS. 
The research objectives were: 
 
1. To identify the role of the Future force *(Armed Forces and police) in cyber security. 
2. Explore Plural Policing in cyber security. 
3. Study Public Private Partnership within the CSS and the relationship between the police 
and the Armed Forces. 
4. Identify the level of awareness within members of the two forces of cyber security 
policies and their role. 
 
Achievement of this aim lies in the answer to these research questions: 
1. What is the role of the MoD and the police force with regards to the Cyber Security 
Strategy? How does it work? 
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2. What framework is employed for categorizing cyber incidents and allocating response? 
3. What are the rules for escalation of cyber incidents and what agencies are involved? 
4. What is the nature of the police-military relationship in the Cyber Security Strategy? 
 
The research questions emerged from data condensed from open source publications, defence 
publications and books and research on policing and lesson notes from London Metropolitan 
University. The research questions covered three areas: 
 
• General awareness of roles within the National Security Strategy for Cyberspace. 
 
• Cyber security in the workplace. 
 
• Partnership and Multi-disciplinary governance for cybercrime in the UK. 
 
From the onset of the research, the researcher was in direct contact with the military participants and 
discussed the issue of cyber security and the SDSR freely; however, the change in response was 
noticeable whenever the topic of carrying out a research for a degree in the same field was mentioned. 
Issues that were freely discussed and critiqued did not receive many comments and often the 
individual would indicate that they did not wish to discuss the issues again.  
This response was predominant across ranks but higher from officers than Non-Commissioned 
Officers. 70% of the officers were willing and interested in discussing cyber security but refused to 
participate in the research, citing the Official Secrets Act, while 50% of junior rank personnel were 
unwilling to discuss or participate in the research for reasons that ranged from absence of an officer 
ordering them to participate to their view that their opinion and that of the researcher, a fellow JNCO, 
does not matter in the bigger scheme of things. On the policing side, the researcher had no direct 
contact with any police establishment and discussed the issue of cyber security and policing with 
course mates who are in the police force. At this point there was a re-basing move of British forces in 
Germany where the researcher was based and some of the respondents were also posted out from their 
current location. The strategy to carry out the research was being formulated and looking at past 
research in the field of policing and security; the use of qualitative and quantitative methodologies and 
mixed methodology was considered suitable for the research due to their merits and demerits and the 
aim and objectives of the researcher. 
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Choosing a research strategy and methodology 
 
Focus groups and semi-structured interviews were the two qualitative methods considered for this 
research. Semi-structured interview has the flexibility and style that fits the aim of the research 
because the conversational style helps both the interviewer and participant to be unrestricted in the 
flow of the interview. Opinions expressed during the interview can open related issues that were not 
initially on the list and this can also reveal the wealth of experience and knowledge of the participant 
unknown to the researcher but pertinent in uncovering useful research data. However, the constant 
relocation of potential respondents resulted in a small number of respondents from both forces being 
available for interview. The small sample sizes were matched and within these sample sizes were 
respondents who would not commit to the whole research process for various reasons; recurring 
reasons were that the researcher is not of the correct rank associated with such a level of study and did 
not have the direct mandate from the MOD or police to study to this level. It is not common for junior 
non-commissioned officers (JNCO) in the British Army to be studying at post graduate level. These 
misgivings about the person and rank of the researcher ruled out the use of a focus group as a form of 
qualitative approach because the time constraint and lack of practicality and affordability. Interview 
method was considered to bridge the logistics of time and affordability compared to using focus 
groups, despite interviews being time-consuming in terms of analysis.  
Semi-structured interviews do not pose the same challenges that a focus group entails and offers the 
flexibility that is absent when using questionnaires. It links directly to the context and the personal 
view of the respondent (Barbour and Schostak, 2005). Barbour and Schostak proposed that qualitative 
research aims to produce data that is in depth, flexible and focused on the topic in real time. 
 
To achieve the research objectives, certain aspects of the research require the use of questionnaires. 
As a quantitative method, it was considered as it will give a statistical basis that captures more 
participants across the police and Armed Forces and also lends to greater reliability of the data, and 
the structured nature of the questions will eliminate personal bias that may arise from using semi-
structured interviews only; more so when considering the constant mobility of the participants in the 
Armed Forces who were constantly moving from one location to another.  
It is worth mentioning that the researcher encountered a number of comments that were biased and 
aimed at the researcher being of ethnic minority; bias often creeps in when male respondents express 
their opinion that the researcher should be concerned in areas that are easier for women of black 
origin than in policing and security, or that the topic is suitable for commanders and not a female 
JNCO. These biases were dealt with in a way that reassured the respondents of the focus of the 
research rather than the personal characteristics of the researcher.  
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Structured questionnaires made it easier to collect primary data, while the key informant semi-
structured interviews provided means for further exploration of pertinent points that were raised from 
the questionnaire response. 
Mixed Methods 
For this research, a mixed method aptly suited the successful completion of the research. Using a 
mixed method offers the advantage of the two methods stated above, without the limitations that the 
use of just one method will present. 
In the 1990s and up to the present time, the term 'mixed methods’ has become more acceptable as a 
research methodology in the behavioural, social, business, and health sciences (Creswell and Plano 
Clark, 2006). The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods as a recognised methodology is 
the fundamental principle of ‘mixed methods’, and using two separate methods of qualitative and 
quantitative has given rise to the diverse definition of mixed methods across various fields and 
schools of thought.  
Another definition is by (Johnson 2007) who summarised mixed method research as 
‘The type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines elements of 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative 
viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth 
and depth of understanding and corroboration’ (Johnson 2007 p.118).  
 
Johnson et al. (2014) identified various definitions of mixed method research by leaders in the field 
and the definition that represents the purpose of this research is that by Creswell (2013) in Johnson et 
al. (2014).   
‘John Creswell: Mixed methods research is a research design (or methodology) in which the 
researcher collects, analyses, and mixes (integrates or connects) both quantitative and qualitative data 
in a single study or a multiphase program of inquiry.’ Johnson et al. (2014) p. 51 
Mixed methods combines the strength of both qualitative and quantitative methodology, eliminating 
the shortfall of both, and it is also opined that mixed methods offers a more comprehensive 
understanding of the research data (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010). 
The need for a framework to categorise different aspects of mixed methodology is met in Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie and Turner’s (2007) three classification of mixed methods research. They proposed 
three distinctions of mixed methodology, namely: quantitatively driven approaches/designs, 
qualitatively driven approaches/designs, and interactive or equal status designs.  
This research follows the quantitative approach which Johnson et al. (2014) describes as: 
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‘The quantitatively driven approach is a quantitative study augmented with a qualitative 
data/method to supplement and improve the quantitative study by providing an added value 
and deeper, wider, and fuller or more complex answers to research questions’ (Johnson and 
Christensen, 2014, p311) 
This framework reflects the approach adopted throughout this research and resonates with the 
complexity of researching in the police and military establishments. 
This approach is suitable because in this research the questions that emerged from the application of 
cyber security policies were directly correlated to the research questions and vice versa. For example, 
the role of the future force (Army 2020) links directly to what is the role of the MoD and police force 
within the Cyber Security Strategy; resultantly the answer to the question of what are the rules for 
escalation of cyber incidents and what agencies are involved, links to the exploration of plural 
policing and its limitations in cyber security. 
 
The process of matching the research method with the identified issues in cyber security policy and 
practices was rigorous, the research topic was continuously in a modification mode as the cyber 
strategy unfolds nationally; published books and articles with in-depth analysis of the subject matter 
and responses from study subjects/respondents suggested a developing and volatile research field.  
The widening understanding of the subject matter shaped the choice of the wording of the thesis title 
and with Government and academia in a better understanding and agreement on the role of 
partnership in cyber security, I began thinking of the area of cyber security that will suit my current 
job profile and be relevant to academia at the same time. Selecting the topic required a lot of soul 
searching, consideration of career prospects and the rigorous task of fieldwork. 
I decided that the strategy for developing and administering my research instruments (questionnaire 
and (structured and semi structured) interview) in order to obtain a statistically valid sample size will 
be the use of the mixed method. 
Sampling  
 
 
The initial stage of the fieldwork was to identify the sample population to contact; the research 
purpose indicates that cyber security within the police and military cuts across all ranks, therefore the 
general population is the entire membership of the two forces. Sampling was made for both the 
qualitative and quantitative phase of the research. The initial stage in the sample planning was to 
decide which phase of data collection should come first, what Onwuegbuzie and Collins (2007) refer 
to as ‘time orientation dimension’. 
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‘Time orientation refers to whether the qualitative and quantitative phases of the study occur 
at approximately the same point in time such that they are independent of one another (i.e., 
concurrent) or whether these two components occur one after the other such that the latter 
phase is dependent, to some degree, on the former phase (i.e., sequential)’ (Onwuegbuzie and 
Collins, 2007, p290). 
 
The researcher decided on a two-phase sequential explanatory mixed method research to collect 
statistical quantitative data and follow up with a few qualitative interviews to further explain the cyber 
security strategy within the police and Armed Forces. 
 
The quantitative phase sampling 
 
A list of units with cyber related roles was selected across the two forces. For the Armed Forces, the 
DII (Defence Information Infrastructure) profile was used to select those with security roles. Out of 
this initial list, another sample was created of those with a system security role or information security 
officer roles. These personnel have a cyber security responsibility and are required to comply with 
cyber security policies in daily routines. A total of 200 email profiles were finally selected and were 
sent the questionnaire for completion. For the police force, lists of police units with a cyber 
department were contacted across England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The units can only offer 
cyber security advice and were unable to involve themselves in any research. The communication 
with the units informed the choice of units with an established cybercrime department and willingness 
to complete the questionnaires. 200 questionnaires were sent to selected police units in England, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively. 
 
For the police, initial telephone calls were made to the contact numbers for reporting cybercrime and 
the researcher explained the reason for the call. Further advice was given with the detail of the 
officers to contact, some police departments requested that the questionnaire be emailed to the head of 
the cyber team. Other police units requested that the questionnaire be sent via post and addressed to 
the head of the cyber department. Questionnaires for the police force in Northern Ireland and police 
units in Scotland were sent via email although completed questionnaires were returned by post. 
 
Purposive sampling was used for the qualitative phase. This is a non-probability sampling technique 
based on the role of the officers interviewed within the chain of command of both forces. The 
qualitative stage concentrated on key personnel that have a direct role in cyber security policy 
formulation within units. Eight people were interviewed, five from the armed forces and three from 
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the police force. The researcher conducted two face to face interviews, while the rest were conducted 
over the telephone. All interviews were recorded and later transcribed to paper. 
 
This choice of sampling is supported by Morse (1994, p228), in that respondents are selected from 
those “who have the knowledge and experience the researcher requires, have the ability to reflect, to 
articulate, the time to be interviewed and is willing to participate in the study”. 
 
Connection 
 
The researcher was confident at the initial stage of the research fieldwork that gaining access to the 
research population will be easy because she considered herself as part of one of the organisations. 
However, access to the police was almost non-existent in the interview stage. The lack of access to 
high ranking police officers was so pertinent to the result of the research that the researcher had to 
seek the assistance of the John Grieve Centre colleagues to facilitate access to relevant police 
establishments. Such was the difficulty in gaining access to the policing establishment that despite the 
reference from the John Grieves colleagues only three out of the five high ranked police officers 
responded and were eventually interviewed. Nevertheless, the questionnaire stage received a good 
response. There was a better outcome within the Armed Forces on both the questionnaire and 
interview stages because the researcher had an easier access to the Armed Forces research population 
compared to the police population, as not having pre-existing relationships with the police posed 
problems (Duke, 2002). Also, the researcher could be classified as what Brown (1996) describes as an 
“outsider outsider” within the police force and at a certain level in the military because despite being a 
serving member of the latter, she was still unable to gain free access with some officers who felt that 
she was not educated enough and being a junior ranked soldier was consider proof of this. In some 
cases she was asked what ‘relevance will her research have as any findings cannot be taken seriously 
due to the way the system works’.  
 
The dilemma of the researcher being presented as an ordinary researcher or revealing her links to the 
military was constantly played out throughout the research fieldwork. In most cases, the researcher 
often had to go through higher ranked military officers to forward questionnaires and then be linked 
up to willing participants. As for the police force, as mentioned elsewhere, academics from the 
university who had trusted links with the police force connected the researcher to potential 
participants. This was the indirect way in that she was vetted and considered to be good enough and 
acceptable in the eyes of some of the research population.  
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Ethics 
The research was given consideration and approval by the London Metropolitan University Ethics 
Committee. During the course of the research, other ethical considerations came up and were mostly 
dealt with in accordance with the guideline laid down by the UK Research Integrity Office, to ensure 
that the research adhered to and was conducted within the established standards such as: 
 
Informed consent  
 
Gaining informed consent of the participants was covered in the introductory part of the questionnaire 
and the email. Those who responded were made to understand their right to freely volunteer and what 
their role was, as well as the choice to refuse further involvement. The majority of the participants 
were voluntary and a few that may have been asked by their superior officers were encouraged to 
make their own decision and some took the choice of refusing to complete the questionnaire.  
 
With the interview, two participants who were asked to participate kept changing the schedule until 
one was posted to another job and informed the researcher that he could not represent the views of the 
department as he does not work there anymore, while the second participant was relieved from 
participating in the interview because of his reluctance to answer questions during the interview. His 
body language was interpreted as indifferent as though he was taking part in obedience to an order 
from a superior officer. It was apparent that being in the military, they are expected to obey orders; 
however, respecting the ethical consideration that the participant’s willingness to freely consent to the 
research, both of them did not want to take part in the research. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
Measures were taken to ensure confidentiality during and after the fieldwork. The interview 
transcripts and field notes held no information that can personally identify the participant and this was 
maintained throughout the analysis and writing up stages to ensure anonymity. Although emails were 
used to communicate with the respondents, the attached questionnaires were printed off, the emails 
deleted and the responses were manually entered into the Survey Monkey tool.  
 
Stage 1: The questionnaires were designed for the army and police/law enforcement. Qualitative data 
from open-source literature and defence-related publications were used to inform the formulation of 
the questions and link the questions to current cyber issues. The questionnaire is pre-coded using the 
Likert scale, and which enables an easier grading of the responses. As mentioned earlier, the 
questionnaire contained 10 questions, two of which have no pre-coded options; they are free text 
responses to allow the respondent to confer their opinion freely.  
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Stage 2: 200 questionnaires were then sent out to respondents. The aim was to explore the level of 
involvement and awareness of the cyber security strategy. The research focused on the workforce 
within defence and the police who have a cyber security role so as to identify the hierarchy of cyber 
strategy participation.  
Stage 3: Responses from the questionnaire were then used to formulate the interview questions for the 
qualitative stage involving head of departments. This stage involved 8 participants because their level 
of involvement directly linked into the daily implementation and realisation of the cyber strategy goal.  
Stage 4. The analysis of the questionnaire survey and the interview.  
Data from the questionnaire were analysed with the online tool Survey Monkey. 
  
Qualitative Stage - Interview Data Analysis 
Several methods were considered for the analysis of the interview stage of the research: Thematic 
Analysis (TA), Grounded Theory (GT), and Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). 
The Grounded Theory approach utilises trends and codes prominent in sets of data to formulate a 
theory (Sigel and Leiper, 2004; Charmaz and Bryant, 2010). The validity of the collected data is 
directly proportional to the validity of the resultant theory; therefore the data must be of a quantity 
representing a high percentage of the participants. ‘The data are analysed using coding and theoretical 
sampling procedures. A set of interpretative procedure are then used to assist in the construction of 
theory that emerges from, and is grounded in, the data (Haig, 2010).   
This interview stage involved subject expert specialists (SEP) in cyber security in the police and 
Armed Forces and GT would have been suitable because their account of the research subject fits into 
the objective of GT; however, the small number of participants made it unsuitable to use GT as it 
requires a higher number of participants (Richardson, 1996; Sigel and Leiper, 2004). 
With the number of participants in this interview stage, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis 
would have been a suitable approach, as it focuses on the account given by a small homogenous 
number of participants to find similarities and differences in their experience of a particular event in 
their life. However, it was not used because there was not enough homogenous attributes shared by 
the participants to justify its use (Smith et al., 2009). 
Thematic Analysis is popularly used in qualitative research (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Holstin and 
Gubrium, 1994). TA looks at themes that emerge across the data, and these themes are patterns 
contained in the data sets that describe a phenomenon in the research area which can be associated to 
a specific research question. Braun et al. note that ‘a theme captures something important about the 
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data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning 
within the data set’ (Braun et al., 2006). 
These themes will be categories under which the data analysis can be headed. Guest (2012) wrote that 
thematic analyses “move beyond counting explicit words and phrases and focuses on identifying and 
describing both implicit and explicit ideas within the data” (Guest, 2012, p10). Braun and Clarke 
(2006) developed a six-phased process for developing meaningful patterns. These phases are: 
familiarization with data, generating initial codes, searching for themes among codes, reviewing 
themes, defining and naming themes, and producing the final report. Thematic Analysis using the 
Braun and Clarke (2006) Model can use either an inductive or deductive approach, or both. According 
to Braun and Clarke (2006), the researcher remains open-minded towards the themes that might 
emerge in an inductive or ‘bottom up’ approach, while in a deductive approach or top down approach 
the emerging themes may not relate to the interview questions but are uniform across the experiences 
of the participant (Gray, 2009). Both inductive and deductive approaches were used in this interview 
analysis because themes that came out of the data contained both approaches.  
The researcher will not deny a certain degree of interest in the emergence of the themes in the initial 
stage of formulating the themes because cyber security was and still is a major topic, both in the 
media and in the Armed Forces. This does not negate the value of the themes from the data set, as  the 
interpretation of the data was not biased. Furthermore, TA provides a flexible tool which enables a 
detailed analysis of the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006) 
 
PHASE DESCRIPTION OF THE 
PROCESS 
OUTCOME 
1.Familiarization 
with data 
This stage involved a lot of 
rereading of the interview 
transcripts and cross-referencing it 
with the research questions. 
Rereading facilitated 
familiarisation with the data. 
The interviews with the Armed 
Forces participants were conducted 
first and were brief in detail 
compared to the interviews from 
the police participants. The initial 
interviews were transcribed in a 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
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tabular format. (See Appendix 2 
for an example of the transcribed 
data.)  
 
The interviews with the police, 
although less in number, contained 
more detail. The codes identified in 
the transcripts from the Armed 
Forces also reoccurred in the police 
transcript. (See Appendix 3.) 
Critical and repeated readings of 
the interview transcripts led to the 
identification of a list of recurrent 
phrases which were later used to 
formulate codes. (Braun and 
Clarke, (2006)... (see Appendix 4 
for an example.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 
2.Generating 
initial codes 
“A code in qualitative inquiry is 
most often a word or short phrase 
that symbolically assigns a 
summative, salient, essence-
capturing, and / or evocative 
attribute for a portion of language-
based or visual data...In qualitative 
data analysis, a code is a 
researcher-generated construct that 
symbolizes and thus attributes 
interpreted meaning to each 
individual datum for later purposes 
of pattern detection, categorization, 
theory building, and other analytic 
processes" (Saldaña, 2013, pp3-4). 
 
The sorting of initial codes from 
data was carried out in this stage. 
 
Appendix 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6 
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Clusters of data were collected and 
grouped alphabetically. (See 
Appendix 5.) 
Emerging themes were extracted 
with references to keep track of the 
research questions that they related 
to. Then the themes were reviewed 
to identify patterns that were 
recurring. As many codes as were 
relevant were compiled (Boyatzis, 
(1998); Braun and Clarke (2006). 
(See Appendix 6.)  
Divergences in the data were noted 
and, where further scrutiny was 
desirable, were revisited later in the 
course of the analysis.  
 
3.Searching for 
themes among 
codes 
This stage was predominantly 
reiterative.  It follows a broader 
view of the codes as the themes 
form. Themes were identified and 
codes were assigned then arranged 
in a tabular format, which made it 
easier to identify 
“The relationship between codes, 
between themes and subthemes” 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006, p89).  
Themes were approached at both 
semantic and latent levels 
(Boyatzis, 1998).  
Semantic themes were taken 
literally while latent themes were 
explored further to uncover 
possible meanings. 
 
Armed Forces extract:  
The MoD has the task of defending the UK 
in the event of any threat 
(role/responsibility). We will work with 
other government bodies such as the police 
in the event of a cyber-attack. However, I 
would argue that the military, police, 
government companies and individuals all 
have a role to play. 
(partnership/corporate responsibility). 
Cyberspace does not have physical 
boundaries so you cannot defend it in a 
traditional military way. 
(complexity/difference in approach). All 
have a responsibility to defend cyberspace 
where they interact and use it (corporate 
responsibility). 
 
Police extract: 
The police as well as their primary role are 
one of the key stakeholders in the 
NCSS.(role/other responsibility) 
The role of investigating cybercrime with 
partner agencies and safe guarding the 
police computer system is their main remit. 
(Role/responsibility). 
The police force has a labyrinth of partners 
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of which the MoD is one. (partnership) 
4.Reviewing 
themes 
INITIAL REVIEW. Here the 
themes were generated from codes 
depending on: relationship between 
codes, frequency (see Appendix 7a 
and 7b) and underlying meaning. 
Firstly, by checking that there is a 
correlation in meaning across 
collated extracts under each theme, 
each theme, code and extract were 
extracted and reviewed. The 
purpose of the review was also to 
check whether the extract 
represented the code and in turn the 
over-arching.  
 
In the second phase, themes were 
reviewed in relation to the entire 
data set. This process showed that 
that the themes accurately reflected 
the meaning evident in the whole 
data set and made it easy to 
identify possible divergent themes 
or any data omitted during earlier 
phases that could be explored 
further. 
This phase led to a thematic table. 
(See Appendix 8 for extract.)  
 
 
5.Defining and 
naming themes 
In this phase the thematic table of 
the data was used as a guide to 
determine the scope and content of 
each theme. Final titles for the final 
analysis were selected out of the 
emerged titles.  
 
6.Producing the The final analysis and report of  
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final report findings began. Throughout the 
report, extracts from the data were 
used to support the argument of the 
data in relation to the research 
questions posed. 
 
 
Research Evaluation 
The research is not entirely a comparative study (law enforcement vs military) of like vs like due to 
the differing roles and priorities of the two forces within the Cyber Security Strategy. The military see 
the principal danger from cyberspace as sabotage or disruption of equipment and systems, whilst law 
enforcement have a wider remit of cybercrime in terms of leakage or victims; financial 
information, the virtual dimension as an extension of perpetrating fraud, use of the Internet and a 
virtual domain for sexual exploitation, and as a prelude to the process of luring victims of human 
trafficking. 
 
During the initial stages, actual information on the application of policies on the cyber strategy across 
the MoD and the police were unavailable on open sources and in libraries. Most importantly, 
cybercrime was not included in the police crime data report until 2015 when the first estimate of 
cybercrime was reported: 
‘2015 saw the Office of National Statistics trial the inclusion of cybercrime in the annual Crime 
Survey for England and Wales for the first time. The ONS estimated that there were 2.46 million 
cyber incidents and 2.11 million victims of cybercrime in the UK in 2015. These figures highlight the 
clear shortfall in established reporting, with only 16,349 cyber dependent and approximately 700,000 
cyber-enabled incidents reported to Action Fraud over the same period’ (NCA: Cyber Crime 
Assessment 2016). 
As a starting point, the research needed data that indicates the framework for the implementation of 
the Cyber Security Strategy and collaboration across government establishment and public bodies. 
Without these secondary data, the research would have limited grounds for evaluation. A Freedom of 
Information request was sent. There was no response on the initial request and so a second one was 
sent and the response is attached at Appendix 1. The absence of real time police and military data on 
collaborative fieldwork in cyber security along with the withheld data from the Freedom of 
Information request made by the researcher did not help the research and could have steered it to a 
wide scope or coverage. 
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The research concentrated on the three arms (Army, Navy and Air force) and the police force. The 
focus was restricted to the police military exchange, and only the police force was used from amongst 
the members of the law enforcement agencies as the police force is facing greater radical pluralization 
than other law enforcement agencies, and policing as a concept is dominant in the realization of goals 
of the Cyber Security Strategy. Out of 200 questionnaires distributed, 13 were chosen for being 
properly completed. 60 questionnaires were completed with only the neutral option, with the 
remainder of the questionnaires not being returned despite repeated reminders. The result of the 
survey might have been different if a higher number of questionnaires had been properly completed. 
Subsequent email reminders did not yield any further returns. 
Furthermore, this reflects one of the critiques of mixed method research, where the exclusion of 
responses presents a dilemma and the researcher has to be careful in justifying the choices made 
against the validity of the overall result; this situation is also concurred in Curtis et al. (2000). 
A research commissioned or sponsored by the MoD or Police would have had a wider access to 
restricted data, and personnel would be more agreeable to be interviewed because such authority will 
bridge the negative effect of the organisational culture and the political sensitivity behind the research 
topic. The limited number of respondents did not give a wider reflection of the whole forces. 
However, judging the research on its merits, its contribution is beneficial. One of the merits of the 
research is that it gave a glimpse of the infancy of the cyber strategy as both forces attempt to unravel 
their specific roles, it also shows the views of both forces regarding policing roles in cyberspace. 
While the police are aware of the pluralization of policing functions, the impressions expressed by the 
Armed Forces regarding plural policing were vague.  
Validity 
In this thesis, the validity of the research refers to the credibility of three issues: the case study; the 
data/evidence and the conclusions drawn from the data. Tashakkori et al (2003) offers advice on 
answering the question of validity by answering the question: ―did we indeed capture the 
phenomenon or attribute that we intended to (or we believe we captured) (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
2003, 694). The onus of the research is to capture and present authentically the lived experiences of 
people being researched. In this thesis both the qualitative and quantitative case study and data are 
authentic; however the number of participants and the resulting data collected restricts the conclusions 
drawn to be generalised. This issue reflects the difficulty of researching into the Armed forces and the 
police force (Gravelle and Rogers,( 2014) and (Punch, 1989) . Similar experiences found in these two 
books while relating the difficulties of reaching the research group also encourages the conducting of 
such researches because these researches collectively present insightful information about the police 
force and similar institutions. The inferences and interpretation of data in this thesis are indicative and 
relevant not definitive. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Questionnaire and Interview Analysis 
The joint public and private sector initiative ‘Cyber Security Challenge UK’ launched a new 
framework to enable people to move into cyber security mid-career. The government delivered 
‘Protecting Information’ levels 1 to 3 and ‘Fraud and Corruption’ e-learning packages for the wider 
public sector. Cyber security training for the civil service, law enforcement and the military was rolled 
out. 
The National Audit Office 2014 report on the progress of the Cyber Security Strategy mentioned the 
Armed Forces only once and nil occasions in its 2015 report (National Audit Office, 2014). The above 
objective implies that the Armed Forces and the police have received education on cyber security. It is 
the back drop of this claim that the field research was carried out. 
The first question in the questionnaire, that ‘The policing of cyber space lies more with the police than 
with the MoD and private agencies’, elicited the perceived stance of each force’s suitability for the 
role. Responses of the participants from the police force shows that none of the participants strongly 
disagree while 15% of them disagree, 15% strongly agree, 38% agree and 31% are neutral. Inference 
from these responses suggests that although the responders from the police force recognise the need of 
partnership, they will prefer the ultimate control of cyber policing to be led by the police, a stance that 
stands short of the expectation and resources needed compared to police capability. On the other hand, 
the respondents from the military responded with 35% disagreeing that ‘The policing of cyber space 
lies more with the MOD than with Police and private agencies’. 29% are neutral and 18% agree and 
with the same percentage strongly agreeing. 
The role of the Armed forces is to defend Britain and its overseas and crown dependant territories, a 
task that is defined within a set geographical dimension. The notion of waging cyberwar irrespective 
of cyberspace identity as the fifth domain of war is still novel to majority of servicemen and women 
(The Economist, 2010). 
 
The police encounter crime more often than the Armed Forces due to the nature of their job, and so it 
is not surprising that 77% of respondents from the police agree to the question that ‘I am aware of the 
specific strategy or policy giving guidance on the role of the police regarding cyberspace within the 
work place’. 8% strongly agree and 8% were neutral and unaware respectively. This differs to the 
responses from the military where 15% were neutral and 35% disagree and very strongly disagree 
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were 5%. 40% are aware and 5% very aware of the policy and strategy. Policy and strategy in most 
Armed Forces units is the remit of commanders rather than the wider ranks. 
Since 2011, the police forces across the UK have had a specific strategy for cybercrime. The strategic 
framework and good practice guidelines for forensic investigation of e-crimes is contained in the 
National Association of Chief Police Officers (formerly ACPO) Core Investigative Doctrine. 
However, specialist training is still required for investigating cybercrime due to its fragility and 
stringent prosecutorial requirement. Building on this, the ‘Think Digital’ Framework was introduced 
in 2015 to map police grassroots investigatory guideline on cybercrime. 
The review of cybercrime report conducted by the computer security firm Norton estimated that the 
annual number of UK victims of cybercrime is more than 12.5m people, which is 34,246 cases daily 
(NORTON, 2012), a figure higher than the 2.5millin reported by the National Crime Agency (NCA 
2006).  
Compared to the Armed Forces, the investigation of cybercrime is outside the military, Naval or Air 
Force police personnel and there is nil or few requirements for the wider members of the Armed 
Forces to investigate cybercrime. However, being users of technology both in private and at work, the 
necessity to be cyber aware is high and a specific strategy should be in place for guidance. Judging by 
the responses, if there is one, it is classified or not widely published. 
The police forces across the UK are working hard to keep up with the increase in cybercrime. The 
respondents were asked if ‘Policing across the United Kingdom should focus more on cybercrime’. 
The question was asked to capture attitudes towards the recent criticism levelled against the police 
force over failures to adequately investigate and deal with cybercrime as, reported in the SC Magazine 
UK edition of July 2015 (Drinkwater, 2015). The former Scotland Yard's Computer Crime Unit 
Detective, Adrian Culley told SCMagazineUK.com that a ‘digital society requires digital policing' 
(Drinkwater, 2015). 
“It is as fundamental now for all police officers to be trained in cyber-crime, as it was in previously 
for them to be able to read and write. Every police service in the world is currently addressing this 
challenge.” The response from the questionnaire presents a marginal value of 46% agreeing and 38% 
neutral while 8% strongly agree and disagree respectively. While the opinion that the police should 
focus on cyber security received a 46% score for agree, 69% agreed that reactive and proactive 
actions should be extended to policing. Presently, such a role is reserved for Special Forces outside 
the core police force, and there was no indecisive response expressed in respect of this question 
(Corera, 2012). With strongly disagree and disagree scores at 8% each, a total sum of 74% 
agree/strongly agree that the police should have a reactive role to play in their future expectation of 
cyber roles. At present, cybercrime is transnational in nature and the constraints imposed on the police 
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force by virtue of the area of jurisdiction poses a big problem. Law enforcement is restricted to 
dealing with domestic security while the military deals with national security. 
 
One of the Armed Forces-specific questions on the questionnaire was whether cyber strategy and 
tactics were included in recent military courses or presentations that they attended in the past 12 
months. The period covered in this questionnaire was from September 2014 to August 2015. By this 
time, cyber security had been proposed to permeate every aspect of defence and this includes the 
Armed Forces. 
The Defence Cyber Security Programme (DCSP) responsibilities include improvement and 
transformation of MoD Cyber Operations via four major work streams (Publications.parliament.uk, 
2012). One of these streams covers the wider employees of the MoD; the Armed Forces. 
‘Mainstreaming Cyber’ seeks to establish cyber operations as part of the mainstream of departmental 
planning and operations through appropriate training, education and awareness. The research 
responses reflect the Armed Forces’ notable practice of high secrecy, although the responses cannot 
be attributed to lack of awareness or refusal to divulge classified information. 5% jointly agree / 
strongly agree while 15% disagree and 5% strongly disagree. Furthermore, a high number of 
respondents (70%) were neutral about receiving any training in cyber security in the past year. 
‘Military strategy links political aspiration, expressed in Government policy, and military feasibility. 
It is derived from national strategy and determines how the Armed Forces should be configured and 
employed, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, to achieve favourable outcomes’ 
(Chin, 2009). 
The response of participants from the Armed Forces does not agree with the ‘political aspiration’ 
leading to the previous report from the UK Parliament’s select committee Committee’s Sixth Report 
of Session 2012–13. Furthermore, the responses indicate that one of the aims of the UK Defence 
Cyber Operations Group (DCOG) to ‘plan, train, exercise and operate in a way which integrates our 
activities in both cyber and physical space’ is yet to be achieved (HM Government, 2010).  
 
Both forces have a wide list of cyber courses on offer. For the Armed Forces, courses are available for 
all levels and ranks, but which cannot be mentioned in this thesis as this falls within the remit of the 
Official Secrets Act. However, its publicity and awareness across the ranks is very low. The Army is 
still operating on the ‘Cold war needs to know’ basis of information dissemination. Such an approach 
may be redundant in the present environment because cyber awareness should be widely known and 
cascaded down the chain of command to the lowest ranks, but the reverse is the case based on the 
interviews responses. From the questionnaire responses, the need for the two forces to engage more in 
cyber security knowledge is clear and both forces have introduced cyber courses. The MoD has not 
released publicly the number of its personnel that are cyber trained; while citing national security as 
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the reason behind non-disclosure, it is difficult to estimate the level of awareness across the three 
Arms. 
The UK Cyber Security Strategy Report on progress and forward plans – December 2014, reports that 
‘The College of Policing has designed four e-learning modules on cybercrime aimed at police officers 
and staff, which give an introduction to cyber, digital and social media (Cabinet Office, 2014). Since 
they were rolled out in 2013, over 120,000 of these modules have been completed. The College and 
police forces have also been delivering a classroom-based course to police investigators which gives 
them understanding of how to exploit intelligence and evidential opportunities offered by technology, 
social networking and communications data’. 
The question of ‘To increase resilience to cyber-attacks, cyber tactics should be included in policing 
courses’ was asked to find out how cyber security courses have been applied to current modules 
offered to police staff.  
Figures obtained by Veracode under the Freedom of Information Act reveal that ‘Nineteen police 
forces across the country revealed how 3,888 police officers have undertaken specific cyber security 
training in 2015, a near 100 times increase from five years ago’ (Veracode, 2015). 
Respondents from both forces were asked in the questionnaire ‘if cyber security strategy/policy 
regarding actions in the event of an attack is published and understood within the workplace’. 
Despite the availability of cyber-related courses or the number of personnel who have undertaken 
specific training in cyber security, a high percentage of personnel on both forces do not understand or 
have access to strategy/policy regarding actions in the event of an attack. There is also lack of a clear 
reporting chain in the event of a cyber incident. Although such directive exists and is enshrined in the 
day to day practice of the two forces, the interpretation of the responses suggests either a lack of 
understanding of the reasons behind the security practices or a carefree view of security measures; an 
attitude that permeates the lower ranks more and is almost non-existent with high ranking personnel. 
None of the respondents expressed having actual knowledge of reading such guidelines. This was 
more in respect of the responses from the Army than the Navy or RAF, and less on the police 
response.  
The responses of participants from the Armed Forces was; strongly agree 10%, agree 30%, neutral 
5%, disagree 50%, strongly disagree 5%.  
The role of the MoD in cyber defence is contained in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 
(SDSR) which required the MoD to establish ‘a cadre of experts to support (its) own and allied cyber 
operations to secure our vital networks and to guide the development of new cyber capabilities’ (HM 
Government, 2010). This responsibility is part of a transformative cross-government approach; 
bringing in other governmental agencies in joint collaboration. 
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The answer to the question above affirms a different perspective, because cyber security awareness is 
not specifically prominent both in the 2011 National Strategy for Defence and the MoD Defence Plan 
2010-2014 (Ministry of Defence, 2010). Both documents did not place Cyber security and associated 
threat on the same par as did the National Security Strategy (NSS); despite the MoD being named as 
the governments lead to ensure that the UK has the capability to protect our interests in cyberspace 
(HM Government, 2010).  
The UK Parliament’s select committee Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2012–13 highlighted the 
lack of transparency and coordination, especially in the internal structure and division of 
responsibilities for cyber security in the MoD and the Armed Forces; 
‘Good cyber-security practice needs to permeate the whole of the MoD and the Armed Forces. It 
would be a cause for concern if different units were to compete for particular roles and resources, if 
lines of accountability were to be unclear, if they were to operate in silos that would obstruct the best 
use of skills across the organisation, or if policy were to become fragmented’ (House of Commons 
Defence Committee, 2012).  
A similar question on the MOD questionnaire ‘The relationship between the MoD and partner 
agencies is reflected in the Cyber Strategy’ also reflects the same level of response from participants 
from the police. 
The question of ‘The legal role of the military, for both offensive and defensive actions should be 
reviewed regularly to reflect changes in cyberspace’ was asked to weigh the respondent’s grasp of the 
fast changing cyber environment. Most MoD defence instruction notices have a lifespan of one year 
or whenever superseded by a new notice. It is not uncommon to have an event in cyberspace that will 
have high strategic and operational effect occur with rapid succession with zero time for contingency 
plans to be effective. To that end, the resilience of the two forces to cyber-attack will depend to a 
great extent on their grasp of technological progress that is likely to impact on their network. 70% of 
the Armed Forces’ respondents strongly agreed and 20% agreed. None disagreed or strongly 
disagreed, while 10% were neutral. The police respondents answering a similar question had 38% 
agree and 15% strongly agree. The sum total of those that disagree and strongly disagree was 31% 
while 15% were neutral.  
The question of ‘The structural governance suitable to cyber defence should be jointly controlled by 
the police and the Armed Forces’ aimed to test the understanding of partnership within the cyber 
strategy. The existence of other stakeholders is not reflected in the responses. The nature of 
cyberspace demands a cross spectrum of participants in its defence. Although 23% disagreed and 8% 
strongly disagreed, the 38% that strongly agreed and the 15% that agreed constitute more than half of 
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the responses. The role of academia, the private sector and industry is as important as the joint role of 
the two forces. More education is needed to highlight the joint defence that partnership offers. 
The pluralisation of policing involves diverse organisations involved in policing both the Internet and 
other traditional crimes. However, knowledge of the relationships and vital roles of these organisation 
is not reflected in the responses. 
46% of the police were neutral to the question ‘The relationship between the police and partner 
agencies is reflected in the policing Cyber Strategy’. A response that is worrying and reflective of the 
problem the police faces in combating cybercrime. The response also concurs with the criticism on 
the policing of cybercrime across the UK by the media. On 21 March 2014, Charlie McMurdie - 
senior crime adviser with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and former head of the Met Police Central 
e-Crime - told SC UK (SC Magazine UK, 2014): 
 “We are moving in the right direction, building national capability to provide a response around 
cyber-crime. But time and time again, what we are really missing and where we need to focus more 
effort is better intelligence, both strategic and tactical intelligence exchange with industry.” 
She comments on the lack of cooperation between the police and partner agencies which includes the 
MoD and the private sector.  
“We keep using the ‘partnership' word but it is still frustratingly difficult for industry to identify who 
to speak to (in the police) and how to actually become part of that intelligence exchange. There's a 
wealth of knowledge and expertise in industry that needs to be capitalised on.” 
The MoD is not the only partner in this case. In the 2013 Waking Shark II Desktop Cyber Exercise: 
Report to participants, participants received a stimulated cyber-attack exercise across the wholesale 
banking sector, including investment banks and key financial market infrastructure to rehearse their 
cyber response mechanism and communication. Throughout the successful exercise, there was a 
notable absence of the police and law enforcement agents (Keeling, 2013). 
‘The participants did not engage directly with law enforcement during the exercise in reporting the 
cyber-attack, primarily because there were no law enforcement representatives present. It is possible 
that participants considered that law enforcement agencies were aware through the extensive media 
coverage, or assumed incorrectly that reporting via the CISP platform constituted advising law 
enforcement.’  
The response from the military on the same question yielded 25% agree and 5% strongly agree, 30% 
are neutral and 40% disagree. 
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Cyber-attacks, threat and vulnerability information released to the public and partner agencies does 
not reflect reality. In April 2014, the United Kingdom’s government published a new classification 
standard. The Government Security Classifications Policy (GSCP) uses three levels of classification: 
OFFICIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET. 
The act of classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying is balanced against the expectations of the 
citizens of any democratic country. It is for the protection of the citizen and the state and it is 
behind this backdrop that various nations have a system of classifying information. Balancing the 
need for transparency and security of sensitive information has always been a challenge for any 
administration. 
Against this classification lies the declassification of information that is previously classified. 
Protecting information critical to a nation's security requires strict adherence to these standards and 
elicits outrage when such information is released to the public without proper authorisation or even 
leaked for whatever altruistic reasons. 
The question ‘cyber-attacks, threats and vulnerability information released to the public and partner 
agencies does not reflect reality’ had very high scores on agree and strongly agree. A sum of 77% of 
participants from the police force agreed, while 23% remained neutral. 
The effect of releasing the wrong kind of information to the public is typified by the Snowden 
disclosures from the National Security Agency in 2013 (Lanchester, 2013), which has been argued 
by some as a threat to freedom and for some was ‘treacherous betrayal’ (Coughlin, 2014). 
Although, it can be argued that Article 8 of the Human Rights Act which safeguards the freedom 
being referred to above can be violated or breached by the state if it is: "In the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others" 
(Equalityhumanrights.com, 2015). 
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Interviews Analysis  
The interview stage involved eight participants; five from the armed forces and three from the police 
force. These participants are top management in their respective forces in a cyber security capacity. 
The interview analysis was based on the research objectives and incorporated answers to the research 
question as presented in the interview transcripts. The first objective was to identify the role of the 
Future force (Armed Forces and police) in cyber security. 
Both the police force and the Armed forces are convinced in their current and future roles in 
cybersecurity despite the uncertainty in the nature of the threats that cyberspace will present in future. 
From the interviews, similar responses to the question of role were made by the three participants 
from the armed forces. They responded that ‘The MOD has the task of defending the UK in the event 
of any threat. We will work with other government bodies like the police in the event of a cyber-
attack’ while first armed forces participant concluded that he ‘ will argue that the military, police, 
government companies and individuals all have a role to play. Cyberspace doesn't have physical 
boundaries so you can't defend it in a traditional military matter.  All have a responsibility to defend 
cyberspace where they interact and use it’ and second armed forces participant agreed that cyber 
security is larger than the military can contain and acknowledged the contribution of other 
governmental and non-governmental bodies. Second armed forces participant also noted that the 
armed forces are not the lead department. 
 
The police responses also point to the established role of the police force as incorporating cyberspace 
but acknowledged that the ‘The police as well as their primary role are one of the key stakeholders in 
the NCSS. The role of investigating cybercrime with partner agencies and safe guarding the police 
computer system is our main remit’.  First Police participant noted that’ currently there is no specialist 
department in this force. Cybercrime is referred to CERT UK or resolved through the ACTPOOL. 
The force has collaborated with MOD, as well as other organisations on issues of personal protection, 
infrastructure protection, and public crime’. This brings to fore that plural policing is also present in 
cyber security and is further explored in the net chapter. From the responses, the future force; both 
military and police, still have significant roles within the cyber security strategy, roles that are bound 
to evolve in the future as threats evolve. 
Exploring Plural Policing in cyber security within the United Kingdom recognises that crimes and the 
notion of security reflect policing in the physical state. The presence of partner agencies in cyber 
security is mentioned by all the participants however; the level of involvement, roles and area of 
expertise is vague. In answer to the second research objective, the question ‘What frame work is 
employed for categorizing cyber incidents?  was asked in order to elicit the levels of involvement of 
the participants in cyber security and cyber policing and also the category of the cyber incidents. The 
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research data points to varying understanding of how the interaction with other agencies works. The 
four Armed forces participants mentioned ‘The National Cyber Incident Management Plan (NCIMP). 
The three police participants have different answers varying from the first police participant who 
stated that there is no specific framework: ‘There is no framework that we strictly adhere to. Local 
cybercrime are dealt with locally while crimes that have a national scope are delegated to a higher 
authority’ 
The second police participant stated that ‘Currently in place is a tiered system starting with the local, 
national and international levels. There are also specialist units that work across these tiers. 
As a developing area of study, uniformity is hard to define due to the autonomy of each force but the 
framework exists. How it is adhered to is up to respective forces and the nature of the crime. Overlaps 
will always exist’ while the third participant stated that ‘There is a consistent framework in use which 
is restricted. The breakdown is a 3321 tier. Tier 1. Highest, global and National Cyber Security. Tier 2 
Dealt with by NCA and Tier 3 is the remit of Local police forces. There is a grey area of overlap but 
progress is being made to fine tune this’ 
The responses from the armed forces regarding the framework within which partners operate shows 
lesser awareness compared to the police responses. The National Cyber Incident Management Plan 
(NCIMP) held by OCSIA in Cabinet Office defines the framework, reporting and escalation process 
 The security behind the NCIMP held by OCSIA is highly restricted and confidential that the 
document is not available through the freedom of information request. Compare to the NCIMP of 
United States of America, which is electronically available on open sources.  Although the framework 
exists; adherence to it or in-depth knowledge of its guidelines appears vague and no insight is further 
given to the question:’ ‘What are the rules for escalation of cyber incidents and what agencies are 
involved’? The response across the armed forces participants was: ‘All contained in the NCIMP’. No 
further information was given and questions relating to the framework were ignored or discouraged 
during the interview. 
The first police participant responded with these words’ The force works with NCA and MI5. Officers 
will link up with regional cyber unit and partners with full collaboration on both side’ and the second 
participant stated that ‘fighting and policing cybercrime is a joint role involving other agencies. 
Global and national incidents are dealt by GCHQ, NCA and MOD’ and finally the third participant 
response was that’ depending on the scale. GCHQ, NCA and MOD deal with Tier 1’. 
With varying answers to the framework question; further responses reveal a level of critique of the 
current National Security Strategy especially in the question:’ Is the strategy comprehensive or are 
there areas that need more work’? The Armed forces responses conveyed a mixture of technical terms 
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that was not elaborated on. however, these responses are notable. From first Armed forces participant, 
the response was: 
 ‘Areas like the defence of CNI (SCADA, Banking etc.), corporation/info sharing with PAGs and 
multi-national agencies, what limits sovereignty places on DCO-RA when CNE/A originates 
overseas. General awareness of vulnerability of C4I systems may be useful. Understood within 
specialist agencies, but cyber awareness across the military remains poor’. 
The second participant stated that: 
 ‘There is still more to come. Cyber is a new challenge for many organisations and the MOD is not 
exempt. The relationship between military mission critical assets and the network.  The value of 
information within the MOD. The value and subsequent criticality of applications and networked 
enabled platforms’  
The third participant noted that: 
Any strategy needs to have a clear, deliverable ‘end-state’, with balanced ‘ways’ and ‘means’ to 
achieve. Sadly most strategies are high on ambition, and delusional on ‘ways’ and ‘means’. So my 
focus would be on achieving something that is actually deliverable and not just a pipe-dream. 
Cyber defence must take priority over offensive cyber in particular funding of capability. 
 
The strategy must highlight who is responsible for what – too many 2*(two star generals) think they 
own the issue which is creating friction and empire building. 
The need for better doctrine – the JDP isn’t well written’ 
The fourth response was: 
 ‘National vulnerability impact assessment to assure appropriate proportional effort is expended on 
defence (thus denying adversary’s easy access through national weak points, regardless of 
ownership)’ 
The fifth response was: ‘Provision of an integrated National Capability CONOPs (Concept of 
operations) for delivery of tactical cyber effects in a JOA (Joint Operational Area.)  Authorities to 
execute cyber missions at the tactical level. The industrial base needed to provide the enduring 
national and tactical capabilities. 
 
These responses from the armed forces participants compared to the response from the police 
participants below show that the Cyber Security Strategy is short of expectation. These responses are 
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also centred within the Armed forces and do not mentions other partner agencies like the police force 
and the law enforcement agents. 
 Responses from the three police participants refer to other partner agencies operating in the Cyber 
security partnership.  The first police participant noted that: 
‘Media collaboration, victim support group. Legislation on cyber forensics such as removal of 
malicious data online’ are areas that need to be incorporated in the Strategy but were absent or 
sparingly explored. The second participant mentioned areas like: ‘more funding, issues of human 
rights, etc. Existing barriers to collaboration… Time and tier pose a few barriers’ and the third 
participant stated that the: 
’ key thing here is that the strategy should be all inclusive down to the citizens on the street. Priority 
should be reassessed. Funding made available. Other issue is the commercial interest and capitalist 
base in the cyber industry should be addressed. There are disparate areas that make up cyber security 
strategy in need of harmonisation’.  
These responses bring to the fore the different angles that the two forces approach the Cyber security 
Strategy. They responses also show that the strategy is awash with shortfalls that undermine its 
success at least within the two forces. The interview also delved into the  Public Private Partnership 
within the CSS and the relationship between the police and the Armed Forces.  Public private 
partnership is dealt in depth in one of the chapters however the present relationship between the police 
and the armed forces with regards to cyber security strategy is limited and almost non-existent. There 
is no depth to show that both forces are working together. 
The question ‘What is the nature of Police military relationship in cyber strategy (if any)’? led to the 
following response from the first Armed Forces participant: 
‘There is a network of relationships among agencies including the police and the NCIMP is the 
umbrella that connects all relevant agencies’.  
The second participant stated that:’ there is a relationship that exists among agencies not only the 
police and the NCIMP is the umbrella that connects all relevant partners’ 
Similar responses were given by subsequent participants accompanied by gestures that dismiss further 
questions or elaboration. The citing of the NCIMP, a document that is classified and unavailable can 
be construed that either the participants are evasive or have no clue as to the content of the NCIMP or 
the police military collaboration in cyber security.  
The police response on the other hand elicits some form of relationship. The first police participant’s 
comment was that: ‘MI5 provides liaisons in areas of collaboration, infrastructure and equipment 
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sharing’. The second participant stated that: ‘There is no strict or restricted role for both forces 
however military police partnership exists in many operations such as peace keeping and when and if 
a need to work together in cyber related incident, both forces are by law expected to collaborate. 
Areas like infrastructure and equipment sharing’; while the third participant noted that there is ’Very 
limited due to difference in roles. Areas of collaboration include, infrastructure and equipment 
sharing. Note that the MOD does not have operational independence. Collaboration is possible were 
the need arises’ 
There is an absence of a collaborative relationship between the armed forces and the police force 
going by the responses above which can be attributed to the diversity of the cyber spectrum however 
the need for partnership is critical to the success of the strategy and the wider partners. The interview 
aimed to gauge the level of awareness within members of the two forces on cyber security policies 
and their role. During the interview, participants from the Armed forces were reluctant to answer 
questions about specific cyber security courses available to the members of the armed forces while the 
police force participants were open to questions in this regard. The question ‘What percentage of your 
workforce received or attended cyber security courses in the past six months? How many are qualified 
cyber forensic. Is cyber course mandatory to all staff?’ received the following responses: 
First Police participant: ‘Current policy and training has been given on personal protection’. The 
second participant went on to say that ‘Currently the figures are not consolidated but it depends on 
what aspect of cyber security. Cyber security is now a mandatory course for new intakes. As we 
speak, courses are running across the country’ and the third participant  said that ‘There is no priority 
for a specialist course as the need is met through partner agencies; there is ongoing training in 
specialist areas especially in capability to conduct core role without much recourse to private 
organisations. Training is tailored to need due to limited funding. Mandatory training is not popular 
with the force; funding dictates training.  
The findings of the study are a revelation of the influence of current practice over proposed practice. 
For example, most of the participants exhibited a degree of indifference to cyber security and were 
willing to adhere to policy only because there will be disciplinary consequences otherwise. The next 
chapter will delve more into the themes and sub themes from the interviews and how the themes are 
reflected in current practice, especially in regards to the research questions and objectives. 
Pluralization of policing is very central to the cyber security strategy and is discussed in detail. 
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Chapter Five  Discussion of Findings and Themes 
The overarching themes from the interview data are Plural policing and partnership. They are central 
to all the main themes and their sub themes like: Collaborative Governance, Partnership, Levels or 
Responsibility and diversity of the police force.  
Pluralisation of Policing and Cyber Security Partnership  
Most of the literature on pluralization or fragmentation of policing have omitted cyber policing and 
instead concentrated on policing within geographical boundaries; yet cyberspace has its share of 
fragmented policing as reflected in the interview and questionnaire data. This chapter applies the 
framework and classification offered by these studies to analyse the different means through which 
cyberspace is policed. 
The chapter explores the plural policing bodies that currently exist and how interactions between them 
keep cyberspace monitored. There is policing by the government carried out by the civil police; 
policing through government, policing above government, policing beyond government, policing 
below government and policing inside government, which are forms of policing undertaken by 
entities other than the civil police. Each form of policing will be described in detail in this chapter. 
Cyberspace has introduced non-traditional crimes conversant to the public police; a continuous 
phenomenon that has left the public police striving to be reactive and adaptive, however not truly 
winning the war on crime control, as noted by Wall (2010): 
‘The relationship between the public police and technology dates back to their origins in the early 
nineteenth century. Traditionally a responsive organisation designed to counter the dangers produced 
by urban migration caused by eighteenth-century industrial technology, the police had, by the second 
half of the nineteenth century, situated themselves as an all-purpose emergency service.’ 
The policing of cyberspace revolves, to some extent, around received notions that policing is the core 
responsibility of the police as an instrument of a modern state; a notion that has far-reaching 
significance in the challenges that face 21st century policing (Etter, 2001). Burton, in his book ‘private 
policing’, documents the history and development of policing in the United Kingdom and unfolds the 
public private relationship between the diverse bodies that engage in policing (Burton, 2012). The 
book lays out a framework that identifies subsets of both private and public policing bodies with 
varying levels of legitimacy, albeit in a broad spectrum.  
Other writers have explored the emergence of policing services other than the services offered by the 
public police; Johnston (1992) offers four forms of policing: Public Police, Citizen/Self-Policing, 
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Private Policing and Hybrid Policing. He uses the term ‘Hybrid’ to further categorise a grey area in 
policing that is provided by private and public bodies. 
A four-fold alternative classification of private policing was offered by Jones and Newburn (1998). 
Their classification also captures the nuances that have shrouded the development in policing without 
offering a succinct distinction of these ‘other bodies’ engaged in policing.  
Burton (2012) noted that although Jones and Newburn (1998) rejected Johnson’s use of ‘Hybrid’, they 
used the term in their classification to describe a new category of space which is neither public nor 
private. It is safe to suggest that cyberspace fits into this new ‘hybrid space’, though the definition at 
the time was focused on territorial policing. Burton further broke down the ‘Hybrid’ into three distinct 
categories: 
‘Central and Decentralised public policing bodies; specialised police organisations and Non-private 
security private policing bodies’ (Burton, 2012). 
There are varying reasons given to explain the current state of policing; from the view that policing 
has devolved over the years as events unfold over time and require different approaches in the 
systems of policing (Bayley and Shearing, 1996), which has inevitably been formally harmonised 
through lessons learnt (Jones and Newburn, 2002). Terpstra et al. opines that the changes in policing 
are a result of complex social, political and economic circumstances and changes (Terpstra et al., 
2013a). 
A wider view is held on the financial and manpower deficit of the public police and the heightened 
demand for security in the society (Crawford, 2008; Jones and Newburn, 2006; Terpstra et al., 2013a). 
Finally, changes in the urban economy and space are also reported to have influenced pluralization 
(Crawford, 2008; Terpstra et al., 2013a). There is the issue of how private or public is the policing 
service offered, but which is outside the scope of this chapter. 
Irrespective of the views expressed, the provision of policing services by diverse bodies other than the 
public police have been held a permanent fixture (Burton, 2012) with varying consequences, such as 
the increasing outsourcing of core policing duties from the public police and the drift from a state-
centric policing framework to a multi-platform of policing network (Loader, 2000; Crawford, 2006), a 
term Loader (2000) defined as plural policing: 
 
‘What we might call a shift from police to policing has seen the sovereign state – hitherto considered 
focal to both provision and accountability in this field – reconfigured as but one node of a broader, 
more diverse network of power. Sure enough, this network continues to encompass the direct 
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provision and supervision of policing by institutions of national and local government. But it now also 
extends – as we shall see – to private policing forms secured through government; to transnational 
policing arrangements taking place above government; to markets in policing and security services 
unfolding beyond government; and to policing activities engaged in by citizens below government. 
We inhabit a world of plural, networked policing’ (Loader, 2000, pp323-324). 
Loader’s definition contains a framework that can be extended to capture a more compact 
categorising of the various means; public and private or even hybrid forms through which cyberspace 
is policed. 
Adopted Cyber Policing Framework 
Policing by Government 
The government plays a significant role in the policing of cyberspace. Despite the nature of 
cyberspace which negates the concept of geographical boundaries within which a state exercises 
sovereignty, a percentage of the infrastructure that is part of the connected network of networks that 
make up cyberspace still falls under the jurisdiction of the state. In the UK, policing by government is 
carried out by the 43 Home Ofﬁce police forces in England and Wales, The Police Service 
of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and Scotland. Some of the trans-force police units also fall within this 
category such as the National Crime Squad and National Criminal Intelligence Service. 
Due to the unique organisational structure of the UK police force, police cyber strategy varies from 
county to county in the UK, although each regional force operates with the same objective as 
contained in the UK strategy.  
Different policing strategy over the years shows that these strategies have been changing to 
accommodate different aspects of crime. Since the 1990s, policing and crime analysis have undergone 
rapid development in approaches to fighting crime, namely; community cohesion policing, 
neighbourhood policing, problem oriented policing, intelligence led policing, citizen focused policing, 
knowledge based policing, and reassurance policing, with each approach having consolidated and 
directly built on the legacy of the other approaches. 
Policing is a multi-contextual public service and it follows that different context requires a different 
policing approach and style and that no particular context fits all. It is also because people and society 
change and this is followed by policy and perception changes. Law enforcement is both reactive and 
proactive in many aspects, therefore the specific challenges of policing cybercrime have been 
explored by different governmental policies, strategies and initiatives. The cyber policing strategy 
evolved from the challenges from cyberspace on traditional policing. 
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The National Hi-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) is the first actual civil police department that was formed 
as part of the National Crime Squad (NCS) in 2001. The NCS deals with national and international 
organised and major crimes such as human and drug trafficking, murder for hire schemes, illegal arms 
dealing, computer and high tech crimes, money counterfeiting and laundering, extortion, and 
kidnapping.   
NHTCU had a £25 million budget for its operations; a budget that was criticised widely as too low for 
fighting crime that has cost the UK economy £27 billion (Anderson et al., 2013). The criticism over 
the commitment of the UK government in tackling cybercrime was reported widely in the media 
(BBC News, 2013).  
The NHTCU was set up to deal with cybercrime due to the specialised nature of the evolving 
cybercrime. It ceased to operate in April 2006 following the amalgamation of its parent unit, the NCS, 
with HM Customs National Investigation Service and the National Criminal Intelligence Service to 
form the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) (House of Commons, 2005). SOCA operated 
till 2013 when it was absorbed to form the non-ministerial National Crime Agency. 
The Police Central e-Crime Unit was established as a lead force in the fight against e-crime by the 
Home Office. The unit was merged with the Computer Crime Unit of the Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS) and hosted also by the Met Police. 
The Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) 2012/2014 (Home Office, 2012, 2014) sets out the Home 
Secretary’s perspective with regards to appropriate national policing capabilities to policing the nation 
during a national threats incident, which includes a large-scale cyber incident. The Home Office 
Select Committee published a report on the failure of the police in adequately winning the war on 
cybercrime on 30th July 2013, following a 10 month enquiry. The committee based its report on the 
increase in cybercrime and the decrease in resources to fight the crime; notably the decrease in 10% of 
funding of the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre. The cut of a quarter of the 800 
specialist Internet crime officers by the City of London Police will have enormous effect on cyber 
policing (Professional Security, 2016).   
The National Crime Agency (NCA), was formed in October 2013, merging the Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA) and the Police Central e-Crime Unit in the Metropolitan Police Service and 
with an annual budget of just under £500m. Unlike SOCA, The NCA has a broader mission covering 
economic crime, border security, child exploitation, cybercrime and organised crime. The NCA has 
the power to directly task other police forces and therefore is the single, authoritative entity in 
cybercrime in the police force; an area that is strongly vital to the British National Cyber Security 
Strategy. Within the same month as the NCA’s creation, the new Serious and Organised Crime 
Strategy was published, which is structured to incorporate four themes of ‘pursue, prevent, protect and 
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prepare’ (HM Government, 2013). These themes will later be used to access the progress of the police 
force in achieving the objectives of the NCSS. 
On 10 April 2014, the HMIC found that only three forces (Derbyshire, Lincolnshire and West 
Midlands) had developed comprehensive cybercrime strategies or plans and only 15 forces had 
considered cybercrime threats in their Strategic Threat and Risk Assessments (STRA) (HMIC, 2014).  
The UK and a number of other nations such as Germany, Canada, the US and France have published 
editions of their CSS as cyber threats evolve. Although this is a reactive measure and in line with 
Strategy guidelines, the frequency of cyber threat mutations means that the strategies are a step behind 
the threats that they are meant to mitigate and often too slow. 
Policing Through Government  
Loader (2000) defines policing through government as: 
‘Situations where policing services are enlisted by government, but provided by others (though it 
might also be extended to encompass the purchase by private concerns –, for example – of additional 
public police service’ (Loader, 2000, p324). The contracting out of policing services by the 
government to private security firms is opined by Burton as an example. 
G4S, a private security company, features prominently in this category. The company has been 
providing a range of 'police support services' in the UK for a number of years and were awarded the 
policing duties during the 2012 London Olympics. Policing services are handled by its G4S Policing 
Solutions department which employs ex-police officers in areas such as fraud investigation. Other 
parts of its policing portfolio include custody suites, with over 500 cells which they hire out to police 
forces in the UK (BBC, 2015). 
After securing a partnership in 2011 with the Lincolnshire Police Authority (the first of its kind in the 
UK) to provide core policing functions in a 10-year contract worth £200 million, G4S will be 
responsible for the operation of the force's control centre, human resources, training, finance and 
custody. Under the terms of the contract, two-thirds of the force's staff are required to join G4S, 
further blurring the public private distinction. 
Possible comparison in cyber security is the provision of certain services that include a policing 
function among other benefits. This is evident in the contracting or use of data services provided by a 
private organisation where the organisation also polices access to the data bank and monitors usage to 
prevent abuse or breeches that may compromise the security of the data instore (Computer Weekly, 
Aug 2016).  
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Levi (2010) notes that ‘Most policing activity in the area of UK public sector fraud is undertaken not 
by the police but by departmental investigators; most frauds against business come to the attention of 
the police via corporate actors; while frauds against the public may be reported direct, or via 
intermediaries like credit card issuers’.  
An example of private policing of cyberspace in the financial industry is The UK Payments 
Administration Ltd (UKPA) which replaced the Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS), 
and which manages the systems behind UK payments, such as BACS, CHAPS and the Cheque and 
Credit Clearing Company. The company has a cyber security department with policing functions for 
the benefit of its clients among which are the major financial institutions in the United Kingdom. 
There are numerous organisations like UKPA that represent other infrastructure in the UK, and it is 
noteworthy to mention that these organisations have international reach due to the nature of the crime 
prevention and policing that occur in cyberspace. 
There are as many benefits as well as risks involved in the growing dependence on private policing 
through government. Where the risks surpass an unavoidable benefit such as technical expertise and 
human resources, greater regulation should be imposed on private policing firms to increase public 
trust. 
Policing Inside Government  
This ‘Involves organisations employed by the government to police its revenue and expenditure’ 
(Burton, 2002, p15). Burton added this further classification which is used in this paper to classify 
state departments that offer some form of policing and cyber security as contained in the National 
Cyber Strategy. 
The Ministry of Defence falls under this category. Although Burton referred to the Ministry of 
Defence Police under his ‘Specialised Police Category’ (Burton, 2002, pp64-65), it is not in relation 
to cyber policing but rather in a more broad policing role. Chapter five will go into depth on the role 
of the MoD within the National Cyber Security Strategy. 
Other organisations fall into this category and their formation are as a direct response to the growth of 
cyberspace from a mere communication tool to a global marketing and communication arena. As 
opined by Jewkes and Majid (2010), responding to the transformation of cyberspace and within it 
cyber criminality, gave birth to e-policing and the establishment of several agencies to tackle these 
waves of crime (Jewkes and Yar, 2010). 
It began with the formation of the Internet Watch Foundation in 1996. It was not set up as a typical 
civil police department but commenced as a charity organisation with a mandate to tackle illegal 
content online.  
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The Internet Watch Foundation is empowered by the UK ISPs, Crown Prosecution Service and police 
(Internet Watch Foundation, 2013). Functions include reporting illegal material either to the police or 
the ISP. It has become a quasi-public face of Internet regulation in the UK.  
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) is a department of the Cabinet Office that focuses on the 
financial industry. It monitors access to the Internet and assists the police with investigation and 
prosecution when a crime has been committed (Ncsc.gov.uk, 2015).  
In 2008, the National Fraud Authority (NFA) was established to fulfil part of the NSS objective of 
‘Building the UK’s cyber security knowledge, skills and capability’. An agency of the Home Office 
with a budget of £29 million over a three-year period, it comprised a number of counter-fraud 
agencies such as; the National Lead Police Force for Fraud, the National Fraud Reporting Centre 
(NFRC) and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB). It provided support to victims of fraud 
and promoted information sharing with partner agencies, it created means for educating the public on 
the consequences of fraud and how to protect themselves from it.  
The criticism of the low level of budget allocation toward e-crime agencies paid off and in October 
2010, £650 million was allocated to promote cyber security in the UK after The United Kingdom 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) raised cyber 
security to a Tier One risk to national security. The NSS works alongside The National Fraud Strategy 
(NFA, 2009) and the Association of Chief Police Officers’ E-crime [Policing] Strategy (ACPO, 2009) 
(Young, 2009). 
Get Safe Online launched in October 2005 as a public/private sector campaign to raise awareness of 
online security. Its objective was to teach the public about Internet safety and privacy. It is sponsored 
by Government, Microsoft, HSBC, Cable and Wireless, Ofcom, Trend Micro, Gumtree, Verisign, 
Symantec and PayPal.  
The UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS) was established in 2010 (Gov.uk, 2010).  
UKCCIS is working in partnership with over 180 organizations and individuals from government, 
industry, law enforcement, academia and charities to keep children and young people safe online. 
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is a UK government authority that 
advises the UK public and private organisations. Its services deal with threats such as espionage, 
terrorism and other cyber threats that affect British national infrastructure. 
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Policing Below Government 
The users of the electronic/ computing systems  
Internet users are the very individuals that use the Internet, these include; family units, small and 
medium scale businesses that use the Internet in running their business, corporate bodies, and indeed 
anyone that uses a computer that is linked to the Internet. They have the obligation to protect 
themselves from cybercrime, either through practical intervention such as installing firewalls and 
monitoring tools on their computers or in forming interest groups and focus groups whose 
responsibility will entail monitoring the web to protect their interest.  
Burton (2002) calls this voluntary policing engaged by the citizens either ‘responsible’ or 
‘autonomous’; quoting Johnson (1992a), responsible policing has the sanction of the state while 
autonomous citizenship involves individuals or groups of citizens taking out its revenge on alleged 
offenders, such as vigilantism. This form of policing does not have the sanction of the state.  
A corresponding voluntary policing exists in cyberspace, although there is ongoing debate on the 
definition of cyber vigilantism; scholars have hailed an expansion of Johnson (1999) definition to 
accommodate a wide range of online behaviour (Smallridge et al., 2016). In addition to voluntary 
policing, Social Network Supervisors have a policing role over their firms’ domain. They are 
employed by the owners of social networks to monitor the behaviour of their members and ensure that 
the users comply with the norms governing the usage of the sites. Actions that are deemed offensive 
or contravening the set rules are punished either by temporary suspension of access or permanent 
closure. 
In addition to the vested obligatory responsibility to the law, crimes must be reported to law 
enforcement agencies. An example is the Canadian legal case of R v Kerr (Kerr and Gilbert, 2004).  
According to Grabosky and Smith (2001), the security in ‘cyberspace depends on the efforts of a wide 
range of institutions, as well as on a degree of self-help by potential victims of digital crime’ and it is 
more likely to depend on a 'mix of law enforcement, technological and market solutions' (Grabosky 
and Smith, 2001, p29). 
Policing Above Government 
The existence of complex policing arrangements that transcend state boarders evolved in the fight 
against transnational crimes (Walker, 2000). Neil Walker, in Newburn's Handbook of Policing, 
defines transnational policing as 'networks which are relatively autonomous of these states of origin or 
which owe authority and allegiance to other non-state 'polities'’ (Newburn, 2003, p111). The two 
definitions above infer that these arrangements are complex, transcend geographical boarders and are 
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autonomous of the forming states. An example is cited in the CCIC (The Cross Channel Intelligence 
Committee) (Sheptycki 2000), a multilateral collaboration that involved police forces from the UK, 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands. That these forms of policing have increasingly developed 
beyond the control of the state governments of the countries that formed them (Sheptycki, 2000) 
suggests this was not the original vision or status quo. 
Before the escalation of cybercrimes, transnational crimes such as terrorism, organised crime, human 
trafficking, and fraud enforcement have been fought by nations through bilateral and multilateral 
collaborations. The change introduced by cyberspace has increasingly made these means of dealing 
with transnational crime more relevant; not just the difficulty in imposing legal mechanism and 
attribution but in finding a unified platform through which cyberspace can be policed and cybercrime 
investigated effectively. The investigatory aptitude in cybercrime is one of the deficiencies of the 
public police as highlighted by (Doig, 2006, 2009), who notes that there are far greater numbers of 
fraud investigators in non-police governmental and private sectors than in the police force. With the 
private sector firms, the policing services they offer are customer focused compared to the civil police 
that is citizen/state-centric. 
Williams (2005, p317) observes that 'these firms have positioned themselves as suppliers of a unique 
and highly specialized form of investigative and quasi-juridical labour geared to the resolution of 
'business troubles' ranging from the theft of intellectual property, to the misappropriation of corporate 
assets, to breaches of financial security’.  
Internationally recognised organisations that fall into this category include but are not limited to firms 
such as: KPMG, Kroll Associates, Ernst & Young, Deloitte and Touche, Price-Waterhouse and 
Control Risks Group (Williams, 2005), organisations that are experts in insurance, financial and 
accounting management. One of the international organisations that cybercrime policing services is 
the Anti Phishing Working Group (APWG) which has more than 1800 institutions worldwide in its 
membership, ranging from: ‘national governments; global governance bodies such as 
the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, International Telecommunications Union and ICANN; hemispheric and global trade 
groups; and multilateral treaty organizations such as the European Commission, the G8 High 
Technology Crime Subgroup, Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime, United Nations Office 
of Drugs and Crime, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Europol EC3 and 
the Organization of American States. APWG is a member of the steering group of the Commonwealth 
Cybercrime Initiative at the Commonwealth of Nations’ (APWG, 2016). 
The UK is a member of many international policing partnership schemes that collaborate in the fight 
against cyber and organised crime, working closely with other countries including the US, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand. The two partnerships that are directly linked to the UK’s cyber security 
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legal framework are the UN’s ITU-IMPACT and the NATO industry cyber partnership. As previously 
mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the UK is a member of the UN’s Cyber Security partnership 
‘The International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats’ (IMPACT), which was launched in 
2008 and is currently the largest and first comprehensive public-private partnership against cyber 
threats with a membership of 152 nations (ITU, 2015). ‘IMPACT serves as a politically neutral global 
platform which brings together governments of the world, industry, academia, international 
organisations, and think tanks to enhance the global community’s capabilities in dealing with cyber 
threats’ (Impact-alliance.org, 2015). 
UN IMPACT teamed up with ITU in 2008 and both organisations are in partnership with a mandate to 
fulfil ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA). During the World Summit for Information Society 
2011 (WSIS) Forum in Geneva in May 2011, IMPACT became the ITU’s lead agency ‘with the 
responsibility to provide ITU’s 193 Member States access to expertise, facilities and resources to 
effectively address cyber threats, as well as assisting, as required, UN’s agencies in protecting their 
ICT infrastructures’, and adopted the term of reference ITU-IMPACT (ITU, 2014). 
A case file listing the UK’s cyber wellness profile shows the cyber security development through 
partnership with ITU-IMPACT (ITU, 2012). The case file credits the recommendation that global 
partnership is essential in cyber policing and security, due to the conceptual structure of cyberspace 
and the global reach of the criminal activities in it.  
The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is one of the partnerships that aim to 
build cyber capability, cooperation and information sharing in cyber defence. It was formed in 2008 
following the 2007 attack on Estonia. Headquartered in Estonia, it was accredited by NATO in the 
same year and was recognised worldwide as an International Military Organisation on 28 October 
2008. The UK is a full member of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and 
hosted the NATO Summit, at which an Enhanced NATO Cyber Policy was endorsed and the NATO 
Industry Cyber Partnership was launched in 2014. 
 
The UK is a signatory to the formation of The European Criminal Police Office (Europol) from the 
1985 Schengen Agreement; other similar transnational organisations exist such as the International 
Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), United Nations Police (UNPOL), North Atlantic Trading 
Organisation (NATO), and The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). These 
organisations and many more have a dedicated cyber division operating beyond the control of the 
member states and operate under the supervision of international criminal justice organizations.  
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An example includes the policies or directives from the European Union (EU). Prior to the Brexit vote 
and until the UK withdraws from the EU, the 2016 EU Network and Information Security Directive 
(NISD), which has the objective of harmonising the European approach to combating cyber risk, 
remains valid across EU states. 
Policing and Security Services Unfolding Beyond Government 
With the dawn of E-commerce in the 1990s, commercial/ corporate organisations have been 
compelled to set up their own security department to safeguard their website from malicious misuse. 
They protect their interests by exercising contractual governance over their employees and clients. 
This is achieved via software solutions and research by their professional cyber security specialist 
department. 
This concurs with Loader’s reference (2000) to the existence of an enhanced and expanding 
commercial market in security systems and policing services, ranging from the employment by public 
and private concerns of their own ‘in-house’ security staff, and the purchasing by individuals and 
businesses of protective hardware ranging from car and burglar alarms to ‘integrated security 
systems’. 
While the above policing occurs within the state, there are other forms of policing occurring beyond 
the government virtually, provided by the Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The ISPs have a rather 
fluid status because although they are physically located in a particular jurisdiction, they tend to 
function transnationally (Wall, 2011). 
Governors of Internet Services, namely: Network Infrastructure Providers and Internet Service 
Providers (ISP), render some form of policing and are categorised as follows: 
Access providers  
ISPs employ a range of technologies to enable consumers to connect to their network via various 
means such as dial-up, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), Broadband wireless access, Cable Modem, 
Integrated Service Digital Network (ADSN), Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) etc. Each means 
of access is dependent on the need of the user but all perform the same function of connecting the user 
to the Internet. They operate a multi-tiered structure consisting of ISPs with levels of hosting capacity. 
Hosting ISPs 
This group of service providers offer email account services, file transfer protocols (FTP), and web-
hosting services. Other services include virtual machines, clouds, or entire physical servers where 
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customers can run their own custom software or services. Hosting ISPs generally, as the name 
implies, host websites of businesses or individuals for a contractual set time and cost. 
Transit ISPs 
A Transit ISP sits between the Hosting ISP and a larger ISP called an Upstream ISP. Transit ISPs 
connect to the Upstream ISPs for Internet access and then distributes to the lower Hosting ISP; this 
connectivity then enables both the Hosting ISP and the Transit ISP to provide access to parts of the 
Internet that the contracting ISP has no access to on its own.  
Technically the ISPs achieve inter-connectivity via more than one point of presence (POP), that the 
lowest tier on the network is reached. This inter-connectivity leads to peering where multiple 
networked infrastructures are connected to each other, permitting the routing of data via its nodes. The 
role of ISPs in policing cybercrime is through contractual agreement both with their clients; the 
Internet users and the telecommunications providers that are at the supra ordinate ISP Tier. 
They can offer effective policing in many ways of which include software solutions to monitor and 
reduce offending on the Internet such as Spam Filters and other Security systems. They are expected 
to cooperate with investigations by law enforcement agents as well as adhere to other regulatory 
demands imposed by the state. 
Although ISPs are physically situated in one geographic region, their services are distributed.  
Therefore, they tend to be governed within distinct geographical jurisdictions. These jurisdictions are 
further controlled by the law of the countries they are located in. For example, the Internet Service 
provider Consortium is in the United States of America and the Pan European Internet Service 
Providers’ Association (EURO ISPA) govern the whole of Europe. 
Fig 4.1: The Architecture of ISPs (Ferre, 2010)  
 
71 
 
This thus calls for cooperation across political entities or governments in the countries within these 
regions and law enforcement agencies and the private sector. Partnerships are already evolving across 
nations but with increasing involvement of the private sector, it is yet unclear what level of 
involvement the private sector will be allowed in the criminal justice system. 
Indeed there is significant overlapping in Loader‘s categories and this overlap is also evident of the 
complexity in the UK’s cyber policing. He notes that: 
‘These categories are clearly porous ones and no doubt signiﬁcant overlaps exist between the various 
policing forms that I have set out. They remain, however, analytically useful in at least two respects. 
ﬁrst, to map the contours and component elements of an emerging and loosely coupled ‘network’ of 
plural policing; They point, secondly, to the diverse problematics of regulation that are brought forth 
by the advent of plural policing, allowing us in particular to obtain a more adequate grasp of the 
complex social and institutional dynamics that attend attempts to subject the multiple, differentially 
powerful bodies that deliver policing to some kind of democratic supervision and control’ (Loader 
2000, p328). 
With these frameworks it is also possible to bring the decentralised state of the Internet to an 
eventually less complicated mirage of networks as is being proposed by many scholars, but before this 
can be achieved, the policing of the Internet with regards to crime will have to follow the nature of the 
Internet and hence will involve policing across transnational boundaries (Zimmerman, 2014), and the 
private sector taking up more policing functions. True to the above opinion, cyber policing so far can 
also be seen to follow the different layers of cyberspace as depicted in Fig 4.2 below. 
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Fig 4.3 shows the different policing bodies, the populations served and sanctions as at 2010 (Wall, 
2010, p8). Since this date, significant progress has been made in cyber policing in the UK. 
‘The Internet's order-maintenance assemblage’ 
Type (governance providers) Population served  Sanctions (auspices) 
Internet users/user group – 
including Cyber Angels, Adult 
sites against Child pornography, 
spam busters, e-bay  
All Internet users 
within the interest 
group 
Moral censure/cold-shouldering/ 
lobbying/reporting/activism 
Online virtual environment 
managers and security – for 
online role playing, game playing, 
chatrooms, discussion lists, e-
auction rooms, cyber worlds  
Members of online 
environments 
Removal of access rights, exclusion from 
the environment when community norms 
or laws are transgressed   
Network infrastructure (ISPs) – 
Internet Service Providers, ISPs 
Domain Name Registries  
Subscribing 
users/clients 
Withdrawal of Internet service.  
Introduction of control software such as 
spam filters or content management 
Private (corporate) security-
Banks, Telecommunications, 
Corporate entities 
Own private 
interests/private clients 
Withdrawal of services/civil recovery-
prosecution 
Non-government, non-police 
hybrids- Internet watch 
Foundation, CERT, CAUCE 
All Internet users Withdrawal of participation/financial 
sanctions/reporting to police 
Governmental Non-police-
Customs excise, Security service, 
intelligence, Trading standards 
All Internet 
users/business 
Financial sanctions/prosecution (civil or 
criminal) 
Government Funded Public police 
– police forces, national specialist 
units such as Puce, E-Crime Unit 
in SOCA (ex-NHTCU), FBI, 
Local police force cyber 
capabilities  
All Internet users Criminal prosecution, cautions, warnings 
(depending on offence)  
 
Fig 4.4 shows the more recent cyber security policing bodies in the UK and their core function 
(O'Donoghue, 2016). There is realistically an overlap of responsibilities and shows the complex 
nature of the UK Cyber Security Strategy. 
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In summary, the chapter has grouped the diverse cyber policing entities involved directly and 
indirectly with the government to tackle cybercrime using Loader’s framework. It appears that core 
policing duties are gradually being outsourced or taken over by the private policing organisations, and 
private policing regulation in the UK is not comparable to the regulation imposed on the public police 
to ensure police accountability. There are criminal justice commissions, independent commissions, 
police complaints, authorities, royal commissions and internal disciplinary boards or investigative 
mechanisms and media enquiries undergone on the public police which the private firms are not 
bound by. Bringing similar control on private policing is highly desirable. 
The next chapter looks at partnership in detail. It traces the development of public private partnership 
(PPP) in the UK. PPP has been adopted in many government projects over the years due to economic 
constraints. In cyber security, it will be evident that applying PPP while being popularly advocated 
will be a tricky feat because in previous PPPs, the role of the government in security policy and 
strategy has been that of the enforcer; with the increasing reliance on the private sector, public private 
partnership has placed the government in the dual role of enforcer and participant. A delicate balance 
of this role is ensured in the structure and model of public private partnership adopted. This suggests 
that there are different models of PPP depending on the participating bodies. In the next chapter, the 
partnership between the police and the Armed Forces will be explored to draw from lessons learnt and 
how they can be applied to cyber security strategy where both forces are to work in partnership with 
other organisations. 
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Chapter Six 
Policing inside, through and by Government 
This chapter focuses on the two forces that are involved in policing cyberspace, namely the police 
force (policing by government) and the Armed Forces (policing inside government). The chapter also 
delves into different (public to public) partnership that exits between the police and the Armed Forces. 
From the previous chapter, policing inside government is carried out by state departments employed 
by the government to police its revenue and expenditure; they offer some form of policing and cyber 
security as contained in the National Cyber Strategy. Placing the Armed Forces in this category 
recognises that their role is dictated by the government in power (the incumbent government) and 
therefore accountable to the government. Their cyber policing role is not as obvious as that of the 
police force; it is a complex mix, judging by the make-up of the Ministry of Defence and its partners 
and the relationship with the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ).  
The police force has from its origin served the citizen and are accountable to the citizens, while the 
Armed Forces established its civil military co-operation (CIMIC) doctrine in 2003 (Joint Doctrine 
Publication 3-90 2003). Since then the interaction between the military and civil authorities has grown 
and expanded with Internet technology.  
So how do the Armed Forces police cyberspace and who do they police? A look at the unfolding role 
of the Armed Forces will help with answering this question. 
The initial role of the Armed Forces in the 2011 cyber security strategy was within the role of the 
MoD, which is: 
‘Ensuring that the UK has the capability to protect our interests in cyberspace  
• Improving our ability to detect threats in cyberspace  
• Expanding our capability to deter and disrupt attacks on the UK’ 
(CSS, 2011, p38) 
From the above extract, the specific interest or the capability needed for this, or how this can be 
achieved or which are the lead departments are not mentioned, leading to critics of the strategy 
labelling it as lacking in conceptual clarity (computerweekly.com, 2011), coupled with a lack of 
universal consensus on the definition of cyber-weapon or a cyber-attack and what constitutes a cyber-
war, the actual role of the Armed Forces remained vague. The House of Commons committee noted 
that: 
‘At present the stated unifying role of the DCOG is more illusory than real, and among its long list of 
tasks are some which appear to overlap with those of the GOSCC or Information Services and 
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Systems more generally. We urge the MoD to communicate its cyber-security structures a more 
comprehensible fashion, setting out strands of work and lines of accountability unambiguously. Only 
by doing this can we be assured that there is indeed clarity about roles and responsibilities within the 
MoD and the Armed Forces. We recommend, in particular, that the respective roles of the Chief 
Information Officer and the Joint Forces Commander are clarified in relation to cyber-security’ 
(House of Common’s Sixth Report of Session 2012–13). 
It can be assumed that the Armed Forces have a far overriding responsibility in cyberspace than any 
other state department less GCHQ, and the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) budget 
spending below seems to support this assumption (Cabinet Office, 2014, pp10-11).
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Apart from the loosely defined responsibility of the Armed Forces, other sectors that make up the CNI 
were not explicitly allocated roles, and the strategy for the protection of critical national infrastructure 
(CNI) became increasingly difﬁcult to analyse as inter-dependency increases between CNI sectors 
(House of Commons Defence Committee, 2013).  
In academia, the role of the military in cyberspace was also being debated and lends affirmation to the 
earlier assumption. Libicki (2012, p334) brings the debate of the role of the military in defence to 
encompass every route that threatens the nation including cyberspace, especially in the protection of 
the nation’s critical infrastructure and the defence industrial base.  Rid‘s (2011) article ‘Cyber war 
will not take place’ and the counter-argument by Stone (2013) ‘Cyber war will take place’ both 
heightened the issue of cyber security and the military perspective.  
Also, cyberspace has brought extra meaning to what constitutes the United Kingdom’s Critical 
National Infrastructure (CNI), because prior to the explosion of the Internet, infrastructure are 
structures and services owned and managed by a country on which its economy relies. But now the 
core CNI and services are often in the control of foreign investors through the connectivity that links 
these services to cyberspace, and this makes it difficult for the UK government to have full control of 
its CNI, making it a more global infrastructure than that of the UK alone. The potential danger of the 
UK CNI in the hands of foreign and private organisations catalysed the UK authorities to recognise 
and pronounce the intense high threat level in the second decade of the 21st century, and from 2011 
onwards cyber security strategy picked up momentum across the UK’s public and private sectors. 
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It is in the back drop of these teething problems that the MoD tried to forge ahead, and the Defence 
Cyber Protection Partnership (DCPP) was formed in 2012 with the aim of improving cyber security 
maturity. The partnership is made up of MoD representatives, 13 prime suppliers and defence industry 
trade bodies. Prior to the formation of a district defence cyber protection partnership, still in existence 
are a hybrid of governmental agencies and non-governmental agencies involved in cyber security. 
Understanding the organisational issues relating to military cyber-defence capabilities and the role of 
non-military stakeholders, with emphasis on the interdependence between military cyber-defence and 
other organisations such as governmental computer emergency response teams, is desirable.   
Combating cybercrime involves interdependence between the military, the civil police and other 
private agencies which predictably will involve an overlap of responsibilities. The distinction between 
the police force and the military both strategically and operationally highlights the complexity of such 
partnership within the emerging meaning of cyber security from the policing and military 
perspectives.  
Table 5.1 below highlights some of these distinctions: 
 MILITARY POLICE REMARKS 
FUNCTION Securing the state 
against external threat 
through deterrent 
military action 
Controlling crime and 
maintaining law and 
order by prevention 
and apprehension 
Except in civil 
emergencies where 
both forces work 
together to restore 
normalcy 
JURISDICTION EXTERNAL 
Defends the state 
against attack from 
other states  
INTERNAL 
Maintains domestic 
security and defends 
and enforces the law 
within the state’s 
geographical 
boundaries 
 
Pre-globalisation 
concept that is now 
threatened by 
transnational crime 
LEGITIMACY Legitimacy as dictated 
by the government in 
power (the incumbent 
government) 
Legitimacy comes 
from the people 
Gradually 
democratisation of both 
forces in the 21st 
century 
ORGANISATIONAL 
CULTURE 
Professional, value-
oriented, Rank 
structured, Collective 
responsibility 
Professional, value-
oriented, Rank 
structured, individual 
responsibility 
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ACCOUNTABILITY Accountable to the 
government 
Accountable in the law 
of the state and the 
people they police 
 
 
The MoD has an intelligence doctrine that has been applicable to the three Arms over the years, both 
in peace time and in conflict (CDS, 2014). The extension of the doctrine to cyberspace or its 
modification/ new doctrines applicable to cyberspace is gradually becoming the practice. The Law of 
Armed Conflict is the current doctrine guiding the UK in all cases of conflict that comes under Article 
51 of the UN Charter. There is yet to be an internationally contested cyber war, therefore there is no 
record of any other application of similar doctrine in cyberspace. 
‘The term ‘cyber warfare’ is not a legal term or a political concept with a universally agreed definition 
... but it may generally be understood to refer to the hostile use of Malware, which is software 
implemented for the purpose of disrupting the correct operation of computer and network- based 
systems. There are debates as to when the first ‘official’ incident of cyber warfare occurred - a 
Russian pipeline explosion in 1982, allegedly caused by Malware inserted into the pipeline’s control 
software, has been cited as an early example. However, there are doubts as to the veracity of the 
account’ (Chatterjee, 2014). 
The police do not have a current doctrine for a similar situation. Analysis of the military and the 
police reveals certain significant points; both the police and the military have an established chain of 
command, although the UK police force is decentralised; both forces also have highly sophisticated 
specialist intelligence personnel, the military are more advanced because of their exposure to 
international conflict zones outside the UK; the police is restricted to UK geographical boundaries. 
Also, the military are constantly operating in a continuously changing threat environment, therefore 
there is a disparity in the level of competencies between the two forces and it is possible that the 
police internationally will encounter procedures that are different from the practice in their home 
country, or more so apply procedures that are acceptable in their home country but illegal or different 
to the country where the cybercrime or offender is located or a national. 
Compared to the military, the police force is not deeply rooted in reconnaissance training except for 
intelligence gathering in the course of a crime investigation, which differs vastly in application to 
military intelligence and technical ability both in electronic and territorial warfare.  
The notion of a multi-talented functional police force in the UK has changed over the years; different 
policing roles require different capability and accountability to varying authorities. Also, internally in 
the UK, policing within the constabularies is not uniform. Policing business is conducted differently 
from one part to another. A notable difference between policing in the UK and other western countries 
79 
 
is the concept of the police as civilians rather than military (Tupman and Tupman, 1999); a concept 
that is not widely shared across the globe with the majority of nations maintaining a semi-military 
police force. 
‘On the whole the notion of the police being civilians in uniform is not one that has been universally 
accepted by governments on the continent. The police may have had to become civilians in uniforms 
in many cities, but the distrust governments feel for city populations has led many to maintain a semi-
military force as a reserve in the rural areas” (Tupman and Tupman, 1999). 
By militarising the police, intervening states may undermine efforts at community policing and send 
the wrong message to citizens weary of paramilitary forces (Friesendorf, 2012). Pollicising the 
military holds the risk of degrading war‐fighting capabilities.  
In Europe, France’s Gendarmerie strikes a balance between a civilian police force and a militarised 
police force. The Gendarmerie blend both extremes of the two forces’ characteristics and has been 
proposed to be more suitable to a globalised society according to Friesendorf (2010), who opines that 
the hybrid and specialized forces of the Gendarmerie makes them suitable to provide the services 
which fall within the remit of the traditional police or military. They can be deployed internally and 
externally in security operations that are usually the domain of the police and the military as separate 
entities.  
The traditional ‘police–military divide’ has been argued by scholars as blurring in western countries 
(Campbell and Campbell, 2009). The traditional police-military divide refers to the ‘principle of 
Modern state’ (Weber, 1919). The two forces are different in function, accountability, jurisdiction, 
source of legitimacy, and culture. Andreas and Price (2001, p32) claimed that “one of the most 
important blurring of traditional boundaries occurring in the post-Cold War era is that between an 
internally oriented domestic police sphere and an externally oriented military sphere”. 
As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, globalisation has obscured the distinction between internal and 
external boundaries. Resultant security issues born out of globalisation include organised crime, 
terrorism and cybercrime, however the blurring of the police – military divide which has occasioned 
the police-military partnership which is evident in post-war conflicts where both forces have had to 
work side by side in peace operations. Rosen (2009, p11) claims that civil military relation is in its 
third generation, where the differences between military and civil work (police being civilians) have 
interchanged. 
The first and second generation civil-military relations exhibit a divide of ‘military’ and ‘non-
military’(civil) status with its attendant characteristics and boundaries. In the face of global disorder 
or situations that transcend national boundaries such as terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime, the 
blurring of the divide becomes inevitable. 
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What is the state of the UK’s cyber capability maintained and sustained by both forces? Both forces 
are empowered to fulfil specific roles but have also found a common ground to work in partnership 
and consolidate the advantages that each brings. An exploration of the definition and models of public 
private partnership will shed more light on this complexity (Ziolkowski, 2013), because the success of 
the national cyber policy advocates close public-private partnership which over the years has assumed 
different models.  
 
Public to Public Partnership (PPP) – Police and Armed Forces 
Civil-military synergies and police–military synergies have a long history in Britain and the US. Early 
applications in the police-military partnership were in counter-insurgency, peacekeeping and peace 
building (Mockaitis, 2004; Volker, 2006). 
The fight against terrorism is an area that has benefited from partnership between the police and the 
military, both within the United Kingdom and internationally. NATO, UN and EU peacekeeping 
forces feature collaboration amongst member states’ military and police forces in peacekeeping 
operations (Nato.int, 2015; Un.org, 2014; European Union, 2015). The Northern Ireland conflict was 
the setting for one of the UK’s peacekeeping operations. The British police and Armed Forces formed 
the Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG) (Charters, 2009). The function of the group was to co-
ordinate military and police operational activities in bringing lasting peace and end the conflict at 
hand. The two forces had to work together for short- and long-term objectives to end the conflict by 
pooling their resources in a way that maximised the capabilities and resources of both forces.  
The UK’s revised counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) during the 2012 Olympic Games hosted in 
London was a true test of the success of civil, military and police partnership. The Strategy was 
revised in 2011 in time for the Olympics. The CONTEST strategy covers all forms of terrorism and is 
based on four main objectives (Home Office, 2013): 
• ‘Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks; 
• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism; 
• Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and 
• Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack’. 
A partnership exists between Avon and Somerset police force and IBM and Lincolnshire police 
partnership with G4S. The UK police force has an existing ICT policy which the Home Office 
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Minister Damien Green proposes should be applied to cater for the technological need of each police 
force in the United Kingdom. 
Partnership has also been found in maritime security. The Royal Navy is a key stakeholder in the 
partnership involving the police, the UK Border Agency, the security service (MI5) and the 
Department for Transport (DfT) in the ‘UK national maritime security programme’ (Secretary of State 
for Defence, 2014). 
The partnership is coordinated by the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) and the 
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). The NMIC is the centre for information communication 
and based at the military Northwood Headquarters. Other areas where the police have worked in 
partnership with the military are: crowd control and humanitarian aid.  
The National Cyber Strategy offers a joint approach to cyber security involving partnership across 
different institutions. These institutions are the stakeholders. As previously stated, partnership offers 
the best possible means of mitigating the risk in cyberspace.  
Partnership has been proposed over other means such as Contracting and Out-sourcing. The 
advantages of these two means abound. Pitched against the current economic downturn and past 
experiences where each force had worked independently, partnership leverages and reduces cost, 
creates joint assets and new capabilities and a speedy technological development. Coupled with the 
fact that most of the infrastructure of cyberspace is owned by private companies, partnership in cyber 
policing is the best way forward. 
 
There are different models of public private partnership, therefore varying definitions of PPP in the 
UK.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of which the UK is a 
member state, defines PPP as long-term agreements between the government and a private partner 
whereby the private partner delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, sharing the 
associated risks (OECD, 2012). PPPs may deliver public services both with regards to infrastructure 
assets and social assets. OECD principles on PPP guidance does not include projects with rapidly 
changing technology such as IT of which cyber security aptly fits. 
PPP is defined as a contract between the public and private sector to provide services or infrastructure 
jointly by a mutual and clear specification of responsibilities and risk. 
It combines the assets, expertise, risks and responsibilities of both sectors, usually within a legal 
framework of the country where the partnership is situated along with international law and 
regulation. The two sectors achieve their goals by maximising the synergy and shared capabilities. 
82 
 
The UK has one of the highest number of public private partnerships and the maturity of the market is 
evident in its application across a wide-range of sectors such as; the NHS, MoD, education, transport, 
and housing to mention a few (Parliament of Canada, 2010). It also has its share of failed partnerships 
and it is the application of lessons learnt over the years that makes current PPP viable across Europe. 
The application of PPP in policing and law enforcement has proved successful and is still evolving in 
the cyber area. The success of the PPP market peaked as the barrier to government partnership with 
the private sector was removed through legislation and economic downtime, making partnership the 
assured means of project and public service management as opposed to outsourcing or outright 
contract. A time line of the legislation that transformed PPP in the UK is set out below. 
 
Pre 1992 - Public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) in the British economy of the early 1990s 
saw expenditures for the government activities in the public sector of the economy exceed the income, 
leading to a deficit which the government offsets by borrowing from public funds (Lexicon.ft.com, 
2015). This was the favoured means of financing infrastructure by the government. Consequently the 
government repays the borrowing over the years as the taxes received exceed the amount required for 
public spending. Either way, the cost of public spending comes only from the government purse. 
Maastricht agreement (1992) 
Following the United Kingdom’s commencement of membership of the European Union in 1973 
alongside other European states, further economic integration of the states led to the Maastricht 
agreement of 1992 (Euro-know.org, 2013). The central feature of the agreement was the incorporation 
of the European Monetary Union (EMU). The EMU was based on four financial principles of 
inflation, long-term interest rates, fiscal debt and deficit and exchange rates. The aim of the Union 
was to harmonise trade and economic relations across member states and as such the EMU imposed 
restriction on infrastructure investment through strict borrowing limits. As a member state, Britain had 
to comply with the four criteria despite the pressure it placed on its public borrowing and financing of 
infrastructure. To meet its social responsibility, the United Kingdom government started the private 
finance initiative. 
1992 - Private finance initiative was the resultant means of financing infrastructure following the 
Maastricht agreement to reduce public sector borrowing requirement. It was first introduced in the 
1992 Autumn Statement by Conservative Chancellor Norman Lamont.  
PFI was a means through which the private sector financed major infrastructure projects by lending to 
the public sector. Operational risk for the infrastructure is passed over to the private sector. 
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1997 - The Treasury Taskforce 
Sir Malcolm Bates reviewed the PFI and made twenty-seven recommendations to streamline and 
improve delivery of PFI projects (Publications.parliament.uk,). The Treasury Taskforce was one of 
these recommendations, tasked with restructuring the PFI. There were public services that were 
viewed to benefit from PFI, and in September 1997 the Taskforce published a series of guidance 
documents, policy statements, technical notes and case studies to assist government departments to 
maximise the opportunity that PFI could offer. The lifespan of the task force was two years. 
 
2000 - Partnerships UK (PUK) 
 
In 1999, Sir Malcolm Bates published a second review of PFI and recommended the creation of a 
permanent organisation that would interface between the government and the private sector. Thus, 
Partnerships UK (PUK) was formed by the Treasury. PUK was set up as a limited company; the 
company shares were owned mainly by private companies with interests in PFI, and largely staffed by 
personnel from financial institutions and management consultancies.  
‘Partnerships UK (PUK) is a public private partnership which has a unique public sector mission: to 
support and accelerate the delivery of infrastructure renewal, high quality public services and the 
efficient use of public assets through better and stronger partnerships between the public and private 
sectors’ (Partnershipsuk.org.uk, 2016). 
 
In March 2001, 51% of PUK was sold to private investors and the remaining 49% was retained by the 
public sector: 44.6% HM Treasury, 4.4% the Scottish Ministers. The splitting of PUK stakes made it a 
public private partnership (PPP) (Local Government Chronicle, 2001).  
The success of the PPP approach by the UK government lies in the application of a market oriented 
approach, ensuring that the private public partnership operates according to market principles but 
under a binding contract within the confines of the law.  
Below is the list of private companies involved in providing cyber security services in the UK. 
UK Cyber Security Companies (Parker, 2014) 
Global Technology Vendors & System 
Integrators 
• CSC • IBM • HP 
• Atos • CGI 
Defence Contractors 
• BAE Systems • Thales 
• Airbus Defence & Space (Cassidian) 
• QinetiQ • Raytheon • Lockheed Martin 
• Northrop Grumman 
Major Global Consultancies 
• KPMG • PWC 
Telecoms Operators 
• BT • EE • Verizon  
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• Ernst & Young • Deloitte • Gartner • NTT • Vodafone 
Global Technology Vendors 
• Symantec • McAfee 
• Check Point • Trend Micro 
• Kaspersky 
University & Administrations 
• Lancaster University 
• Royal Holloway University of London 
• Dstl 
IT Security Service Specialists 
• Regency IT Consulting (Mandiant Partner) 
• 7SAFE • JustASC 
• Encryption IT Security & Forensic Services 
• FireEye 
Domestic Technology Vendors 
• SOPHOS • NEXOR • Intercede 
• First Cyber Security 
 
 
The UK government departments concerned with cyber security follow the framework stipulated by 
the national Cyber Security Strategy. It provides a strategic framework that involves partnership 
within the UK and internationally. Major government departments, agencies and organisations 
involved are: 
The Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA), which is a directorate in the 
Cabinet Office that works collaboratively with the Government’s chief information officer and the 
National Security Council. The directorate provides strategic leadership in UK cyber security issues. 
 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) works in partnership with government 
departments such as the MoD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and law enforcement agencies to 
protect UK national interests. The Director of GCHQ reports to the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs.  
 
CESG, a department within GCHQ, is responsible for the national technical authority for information 
assurance. It also delivers cyber security advice and support to the UK public sector. 
 
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) works with the security service (MI5) 
and GCHQ to provide information security advice to business and organisations across the national 
infrastructure. It aims to reduce the vulnerability through espionage, terrorism and cyber-attack on 
these organisations in the national infrastructure. 
 
Computer Emergency Response Team UK (CERT UK) is the national-level organisation responsible 
for cyber response and recovery from attacks across government agencies. It will coordinate and 
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manage national cyber security incidents, providing a focal point for government departments in the 
report of and recovery from cyber incidents and be the point of contact for international collaboration. 
CERT-UK has four main responsibilities within the UK’s Cyber Security Strategy (Gov.uk, 2014): 
1. National cyber-security incident management 
2. Support to critical national infrastructure companies to handle cyber security incidents 
3. Promoting cyber-security situational awareness across industry, academia, and the public sector 
4. Providing the single international point of contact for co-ordination and collaboration between 
national CERTs 
The Cyber-security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP) that was formed in 2013 and absorbed 
into the CERT-UK in 2014, is a collaborative venture between the industry, academia and 
government to confidentially share cyber threats and vulnerability information. The rationale behind 
this collaboration is to increase resilience to cyber-attacks, through prevention and application of 
lessons learnt from previous experiences and also shared capabilities. 
The Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) investigates and analyses cyber-attacks on UK 
networks and provides solutions and means to mitigate future attack. Its job is in cyber forensics and 
incident response, while the Government Computer Emergency Response Team (GovCERT) deals 
with the public sector organisations on issues relating to computer security incidents, warnings, alerts, 
assistance and advice to prevent, reduce, expose and mitigate attacks.  
 
The National Crime Agency was formed in October 2013 to replace the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency. It also inherited the National Cyber Crime Unit and the Police e-Crime Unit in the fight 
against organised crime. This is the lead agency in UK law enforcement and works in partnership with 
other law enforcement agencies in the country. 
 
So far, from the publication of the first cyber strategy through three milestone reviews and up to 2015, 
the National Cyber Security Strategy should have a high level of standardisation across public and 
private organisations and government agencies. The question is how comprehensive is the strategy? 
Are the differing organisations and agencies generally following the strategy faithfully? And does it 
effectively facilitate international cooperation? 
 
These questions were answered to some extent in the Cybersecurity Capacity Review of the United 
Kingdom conducted by the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre. The review found that 
standardization is yet to be achieved because the strategy has varying metrics across agencies.  
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‘Another important issue is that differing mandates create a confusion of priorities and it is not clear 
how to separate responsibilities. As a result, there are different metrics for different aspects of the 
national security strategy. Additionally, detection of incidents is rather reactive and this is why 
effective metrics are essential and necessary in order to provide a better understanding of a more 
proactive capacity’ (Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, 2016). 
 
The Armed Forces: policing through government 
 
The policing role of the Armed Forces in the National Cyber Strategy is to protect and defend its own 
systems and networks. Simply put, the Armed Forces in line with the MoD, police the different 
partner organisations and users of their system through various programmes, partnership, policies and 
standards which they have to maintain to promote and ensure the security of their system and supply 
chain. Bearing this responsibility is the Joint Force Command (JFC) which is made up of fourteen 
organisations including the Defence Cyber Operations Group (DCOG). Its role is to ensure the 
success of military operations through joint capabilities.  
Under the JFC is the office of the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) and which is responsible for 
defence intelligence, providing defence and its partner agencies with intelligence and assessment. CDI 
is also responsible for cyber operations. 
Also under the office of the JFC is the information systems and services organisation (ISS) which is 
responsible for cyber defence. ISS is also responsible for strategy, policy and guidance for ICT and 
information across defence. 
 
The defence cyber security programme  
 
From late 1990s, the Ministry of Defence, which had had a growing dependence on civilian 
infrastructure whose network security measures and standards are often below that required by 
defence, began contingent planning to streamline a defence centric network with less dependence on 
civilian-owned networks. Subsequently, the defence cyber security programme was formulated to 
integrate cyber into the strategic and operational realms of defence (National Audit Office, 2014). 
This was to bring the MoD in line with the objectives of the National Cyber Strategy by building a 
cyber force that is agile and resilient in defence to cyber-attacks while developing and retaining 
talents. 
The MOD is no stranger to private public partnership; starting from the Thatcher administration’s 
privatisation of the national armament industry (Krahmann, 2010), some of the MoD services have 
continued to be provided by private companies ranging from equipment, support vehicles, military 
training (the provision of flying courses to the RAF flight simulators and instructors for the Hawk 
Synthetic Training Facility in Anglesey in 1998, for instance), to the present evolving cyber security. 
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A further typical example is the Sponsored Reserves scheme. The Reserved Forces Act of 1996 made 
provision for the establishment of Sponsored civilians who provide specialist services to the MoD and 
can be called out to full service to augment the Regular Service forces. Also, their employers enter 
into contract with the MoD with terms that reflect conditions of employment and release of their 
employees. Examples are the Mobile Meteorological Unit and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA). Both 
are civilian non-fighting components of the Armed Forces and employed by the MoD. Recently, the 
cyber security specialists are being recruited to form the Cyber Reserved Unit. In 2014, the Unit 
reached full capability.  
PFIs exist under the premise that the private companies retain ownership of the equipment, 
infrastructure, technical expertise and military service. As a private contract between the MoD and the 
companies, it cannot be classed as a public responsibility regulated by the government; therefore, the 
contract is not approved by Parliament.  
The European Defence Agency (EDA) is carrying out a study on organisational issues relating to 
military cyber-defence capabilities and the role of non-military stakeholders, with emphasis on the 
interdependence between military cyber-defence and other organisations such as governmental 
computer emergency response teams. It is clear that combating cybercrime will involve 
interdependence between the Armed Forces, the civil police and other private agencies. The police 
Corp in the armed forces in combating crime are like any other police force and their role both in the 
UK and overseas utilize the same concept of partnership in the prevention, reduction and investigation 
of crime. In fighting cybercrime within the military community, the micro and macro policing 
element lies with the Military Police and they do not operate in isolation but depend on the 
partnership of other private agencies. 
The Armed Forces Cyber Strategy Stakeholders 
The Armed Forces, in order to defend its networks, will mainstream cyber into operations and conduct 
CAPDEV (Capacity development) in cyber security. The National Cyber Incident Management Plan 
(NCIMP) held by OCSIA in the Cabinet Office, defines the framework for reporting and escalation of 
cyber events and all agencies relevant to the nature of the incident are coordinated by COBR if the 
incident is catastrophic or the potential to be catastrophic. 
Defence Cyber Protection Partnership (DCPP) 
The Ministry of Defence, GCHQ, and CPNI in partnership with 12 defence contractors form the 
Cyber Protection Partnership (DCPP) as earlier mentioned. The partnership is part of the requirements 
towards the UK government’s Cyber Security Strategy. The companies are BAE Systems, BT, 
Cassidian EADS, CGI, General Dynamics, Hewlett Packard, Lockheed Martin UK, QinetiQ, 
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Raytheon, Rolls-Royce, Selex ES, and Thales UK. These are prime suppliers of UK defence 
infrastructure, equipment and services. The partnership will be a forum for the sharing of cyber risks 
notifications amongst these companies in the supply chain, threat intelligence between and risk-driven 
approaches to applying cyber security standards. 
Part of the government's work towards achieving the goals of the CSS is in developing 'Cyber 
Essentials’, a best practice scheme where defence partners will implement the cyber essentials 
framework to a high standard and in the process identify a measurements and standards framework 
and areas of improvement in: ‘technical risk assessment; control of removable media; physical 
security controls; people security (including information security training, roles and responsibilities); 
compliance with legislation; scanning for vulnerabilities; information security policy; defining 
information security roles and responsibilities’. 
This will culminate in the Cyber Security Model (CSM), a framework that was  rolled out to all MOD 
suppliers from January 2017, with a full launch by April of same year. 
DCPP's work will be piloted in selected MoD projects and cascaded across defence.   
In summary, partnership in cyber security is both present in national and international levels. The 
United Kingdom maintains Intra-State and Intra Agency cooperation and cross-border partnerships 
with ITU -ENISA -TRUSTED Introducer, European CERT Group and NATO. And maintains a 
national program for sharing cyber security assets within the public sector through OCSIA, as 
previously mentioned. The next chapter looks at the challenges of policing cybercrime in real time. 
The police force and the law enforcement agencies are still developing strategies to tackle cybercrime 
in their day to day affairs. It is important to note that policing cybercrime is just one out of many 
responsibilities of the police. Policing in the 21st century amid the current financial strain means that 
resources are scarce and re-training the police force to align strategy, policy and technology becomes 
a priority. 
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Chapter Seven  Conclusions 
 
Pluralisation of policing as Collaborative Governance 
Different theories have emerged in the definition of governance. Public governance involves delivery 
of government services by private and third sector organizations with a need for collaboration and a 
community engagement level (Kernaghan, 2009). Rhodes (2009) defined governance as: ‘self-
organizing, inter organizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules 
of the game based on trust and significant autonomy from the state’ (Rhodes, 1997). 
Collaborative governance involves a formal and voluntary engagement between one or more public 
sectors with a non-public sector or non-state stakeholders in public policy or service.   
A collection of definitions of collaborative governance identifies that none of the stakeholders can 
singularly provide the service or solve the problem (Policyconsensus.org, 2001). Ansell and defined 
collaborative governance as ‘A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly 
engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-
oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public 
programs or assets’ (Ansell and Gash, 2007). 
This fits the analyses from the questionnaire data from a cyber-security partnership context. The 
applicability and extendibility of the collaborative governance model will find parallels that can be 
used to harmonise the role of the MoD (Armed Forces) and the police through the eyes of the 
respondents so that strengths and capabilities are shared and understood.  
Analysis of findings with regards to trust 
Trust Building – Trust has been defined as “willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one 
has confidence” (Moorman et al., 1993). Morgan and Hunt (1994) felt trust exists “when one party 
has confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity”. Trust, therefore, consists of two 
components: confidence in ability and intention. 
The issue of trust is explored and embedded in the questions on the role of the two stakeholders in the 
event of an attack and the relationship with partner agencies. Trust, among other factors, affects the 
willingness of the stakeholders to fully engage in cyber security partnership. The extent of a partner’s 
participation is certifiably a proxy of their perceived trust in the system. This is extended to their 
overall trust when engaging in cyber security partnership (Lee and Turban, 2001) and therefore their 
commitment to the partnership.  
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Trust as a proxy of confidence in the role of the military in the questions ‘Are you aware of specific 
strategy or policy giving guidance on the role of the military in cyber security strategy’, and ‘The 
relationship between the military and partner agencies is reflected in the Military Cyber Strategy’, 
have high score responses in agreement respectively.  
Commitment to Partnership in Cyber Strategy 
Both the police and the MoD are public organisations with different responsibilities which have been 
deemed vital in the cyber security strategy. This position places the two organisations in a legitimate 
opportunity to participate in the partnership without recourse to any alternative differing intention. 
Ancell and Gash opined that organisations that feel they have a legitimate opportunity to participate 
are likely to develop a ‘‘commitment to the process’’ (Ansell and Gash, 2007). The level of 
commitment still varies based on how each entity perceived their role within the NCSS. Both 
organisations recognise the interdependence of the stakeholder without directly elaborating on the 
degree of commitment required of other organisations. The police consistently emphasise on the 
shared ownership of security strategy and an openness and willingness to work with and involve other 
agencies within the NSS (Greenhalgh, 2015). 
Both forces are ambivalent on a joint control of cyber defence. The aim of the question ‘The structural 
governance suitable to cyber defence should be jointly controlled by the police and MoD’, was to 
elicit the reaction for the two forces to work jointly on equal par. Drawing from previous joint 
operations, the lessons learnt and the criticisms that followed suggests that the recommendations to 
ensure success of joint ventures have not been heeded. Notable is the observation by Gillvary on 
Military-Police Interaction: the need for specialisation and co-operation in Peace Keeping 
intelligence. ‘Frequently neither group has sufficient knowledge of the others capacity or capability. 
This can lead to unrealistic expectations and consequently irritation at the other party’s perceived 
failure to do something that they were never likely to achieve’ (Gillvray, 2004). 
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Benefit of the Research 
 
I started this research with the aim to identify the role of the Future force both the Armed Forces and 
police force in cyber security. This journey has followed the two forces as they unravel the challenges 
of cyberspace. The police force has set up strategies which are not uniform across the Regional police 
forces in United Kingdom and depends heavily on the major Cyber units while the Armed Forces 
concentrate on protecting their own networks. The role of the future force depends heavily on the 
budget set out by the government for the cyber industry. It appears to be a role that will keep changing 
within each organisation because cyber security like every other aspect of policing has been 
influenced by Plural Policing and the overlap of responsibilities makes for the complexities within the 
National Cyber Security Strategy 
The research has some limitations such as funding, number of participants and non availability of 
restricted materials. however these limitations of the research does not negate its benefit to policing 
studies as well as personnel studies within the Armed Forces, if cyberspace evolves to be the fifth 
domain of war in all ramifications. Although the information obtained does not represent the official 
views of the two forces, the views expressed and inferred from the research data are worth exploring 
for the future benefit in cyber security studies. Cyber security should be the concern of all, not merely 
a fraction of specialised forces’ members. 
 
Traditionally, police organisations and public prosecution services are well-established organisations 
with a relatively long life cycle. Like all other organisations, national law enforcement organisations 
are primarily characterised by stability, continuity and predictability. Their long-term existence is 
secured by means of a relatively fixed structure, composition and mission. The research will benefit 
studies in cooperate governance and partnership following the need for partnership and 
multidisciplinary approaches to the policing of cybercrime. There is a requirement for change across 
the two forces’ organisational culture, perceptions and role. Cybercrime and its policing are so 
complex that no organisation has sole responsibility or capability to police it. 
Future Research 
Suggested future research in Cyber Security Strategy are: 
 
Armed Forces future employment model and the feasibility of a cyber-force. 
 
The cost and sustainability of volunteerism in the MoD’s cyber-force. 
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The impact of digital technology on personnel security both in the Armed forces and the police force. 
 
Bilateral collaboration between the Police and the Armed Forces in Cyber security.  
 
The Armed Forces runs different staff feedback mechanisms such as ‘Have Your Say’ and the 
‘Armed Forces continuous attitude survey’ which all members are encouraged to participate in. These 
surveys have covered diverse issues of concern in the Armed Forces and can be conducted to analyse 
cyber issues. 
Improved trust relationship between police and the Armed Forces is very vital to building a cyber 
partnership. The question is how this can be achieved against the organisational culture of the two 
forces. The Armed Forces should rise above their sense of autonomy in defending the country and its 
interest and recognise that cyber security has striped this notion away. The police culture in the UK 
also have an element of autonomy due to its history. The need for a uniformed approach to cyber 
security is absent, each force conduct their affairs leading to some forces able to embrace the NCSS 
and some struggling to understand the Strategy. With regards to cyber security, the two forces can be 
more clear and transparent in their policy and practice across all levels of personnel instead of the 
notion that Cyber security is for the high ranking officers or specified cyber units. 
 
The evolvement of an actual cyberwar is an interesting dimension for future research in cyber strategy 
across both forces. Scholars have made a plethora of policing models suitable for cyberspace, but the 
United Kingdom’s police forces are yet to grasp and consolidate a strategy that is standard across the 
nation, for reasons of organisational structure or capability of personnel. Police forces have started 
recording and dealing with cybercrimes following the formation of Regional Cybercrime units. Vital 
statistics from these units can be used to research into the effectiveness of policing, law enforcement 
and cyber prosecution. 
 
Research in law of armed conflict relevant to a universally accepted cyberwar is yet to emerge. There 
is still contested stance on cyberwar and Armed Forces deployment in such a war; future research in 
this area will inform military policy and strategy. 
The Armed Forces cites official Secret Acts as the reason for having  no publicly available policy or 
framework on its relationship with other stakeholders in the cyber partnership. A more open approach 
to cyber security, as the US has, will bring more awareness and understanding to its personnel. The 
US approach ensures that the general public; including industries and partner agencies all have access 
to and know the tiers and responsibilities of all participants in the framework. This controlled the 
overlaps and confusion that was prevalent in the NCSS from the onset and even currently. There is a 
limited availability of empirical research in this kind of multi-stakeholder partnership. Furthermore, 
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there is little research into how the Armed Forces and the police collaborate in their roles within the 
Cyber Security Strategy. 
The results of the research have shown, to some extent, the views of members of both forces’ 
personnel on cyber security strategy, and lay a path for future research studies in cyber security 
partnership. It will also be relevant for both military and police scholars. There is a reason to suggest 
that the cyber strategy and supporting policies are not clearly understood and appreciated by the 
respondents, and hence the varying level of comprehension of issues pertaining to the practical 
application of the strategy.  In conclusion, the police and armed forces need a truly transparent 
platform for partnership in cyber security where their convergence in forward leaning, prevention, 
reacting to attacks and proactive preparations and measures against attacks are unambiguous and 
definite. 
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London foi.team@cabinet-office.gsi.gov.uk SW1A 
2HQ www.cabinet office.gov.uk   
   
   
   
   
Chika Onugha   
esiowuchikaodi@hotmail.com   
   
FOI Reference: FOI320570   
19/2/2015   
   
   
Dear Chika Onugha   
   
I refer to your request where you asked:   
 
Under the freedom of information act I am requesting an electronic copy of the following 
information and documents.  
  
1. For each year, between 2009 and 2013, how many cyber-attacks were 
made against the police database.    
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2. And how many were successful.   
    
3. For each year, between 2009 and 2015, how many cyber-attacks made 
against the MOD.   
    
4. And how many were successful.   
     
5. The role of the MOD under the Cyber Security Strategy.   
    
6. (Capacity development) of cyber report of the MOD from 2010 - 2015.   
    
7. An electronic copy of The National Cyber Incident Management 
Plan  (NCIMP)    
   
   
Thank you for your email of 25 January 2015 requesting information under the terms of the 
Freedom of Information Act.    
   
You requested information about how many cyber-attacks were made against the police database 
and how many were successful between 2009 and 2013.  This part of your request is unclear as 
you do not state which police database this refers to.  Please could you specify the name of the 
police database.     
   
I confirm that information about the numbers of cyber-attacks made against the MOD between 
2009 and 2015 and how many were successful is held.  All of this information has been withheld 
under the exemptions: Section 24(1) (National Security); Section 26(1)(a) and (b) (Defence) and 
Section 31(1)(a) (Law Enforcement) of the Freedom of Information Act   
   
The information that you have requested is exempt under section 24(1) of the Freedom of 
Information Act, which exempts information from disclosure if its exemption is required for the 
purpose of safeguarding national security. By virtue of section 17(4) we are not obliged to give 
any explanation of why this exemption applies because to do so would involve the disclosure of 
information which would itself be exempt.   Section 24 is a qualified exemption and I have 
considered whether the balance of the public interest favours releasing or withholding this 
information.  The Cabinet Office recognises there is a general public interest in openness in 
public affairs in order to ensure that the public are able to scrutinise the manner in which public 
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authorities reach important decisions.  This makes for greater accountability, increases public 
confidence in government decision-making and helps to encourage greater public engagement 
with political life.  There is also a public interest in disclosure of information relating to cyber-
attacks.  I have weighed these public interests against a very strong public interest in 
safeguarding national security.  I believe it would not be in the interest of the UK’s national 
security for the Cabinet Office to provide this information. Taking into account all the 
circumstances of this case, I have determined that the balance of the public 
interest favours withholding this information.    
   
Sections 26(1)(a) and (b) have been applied because knowledge of the number of cyber-attacks 
against MOD’s IT systems being detected, their success and the nature of any information stolen 
could reveal to an adversary the cyber defence capabilities employed by the MOD. Release of 
such information could enable adversaries to deduce how to circumvent our 
cyber defence capabilities. Their ability to conduct damage assessments on any attacks they 
might have conducted would be enhanced, as would evaluation of the effectiveness of 
UK defences, or components of those defences, against cyber threats. Release of such material 
could thus increase the risk of a successful attack on MOD computers, with the risk of further 
information being consequently released which could further compromise the defence of the UK. 
For these reasons I have set the level of prejudice against release of the exempted information at 
the higher level of “would” rather than “would be likely to”. Section 26 is a qualified exemption 
and I have considered whether the balance of the public interest favours releasing or withholding 
this information. There is a general public interest in disclosure of information and 
I recognise that openness in government may increase public trust in and engagement with the 
government. There is a definite public interest in members of the public being able to 
understand the defence of the country. I have weighed these public interests against a 
strong public interest in the government maintaining a robust national defence capability and in 
not disclosing information that would prejudice this capability. Taking into account all the 
circumstances of this case, I have determined that the balance of the public 
interest favours withholding this information.   
   
Additionally, the Information you have requested is exempt under section 31(1)(a) of the 
Freedom of Information Act.  This exemption protects information if its disclosure under this 
Act would, or would be likely to prejudice the prevention or detection of crime.  By virtue of 
section 17(4) we are not obliged to give any explanation of why this exemption applies because 
to do so would involve the disclosure of information which would itself be exempt.  Section 31 
is a qualified exemption and I have considered whether the balance of the public 
interest favours disclosing or withholding this information.  There is a general public interest in 
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openness. I also recognise that there is a public interest in understanding the number of cyber-
attacks on public departments.  These public interests have to be weighed against a stronger 
public interest in the effectiveness of law enforcement.  The Cabinet Office takes the view that 
disclosure of this information would prejudice the effectiveness of the enforcement of the law.  It 
would not be in the interest of the UK’s national security for departments to provide information 
about the number of attacks against their IT systems as this would enable individuals to deduce 
how successful the UK is in detecting these attacks. Confirming exactly what information is held 
could assist someone in determining the effectiveness of the UK in detecting such attacks. 
Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, I have concluded that the balance of the 
public interest favours withholding this information.  You requested information about the role 
of the MOD under the Cyber Security   
Strategy.  This information is already available in the public domain and is available 
at: www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-cyber-security-strategy-statement-on-progress-3years-
on. Of particular interest to you will be “The UK Cyber Security Strategy – Report on Progress 
and Forward Plans” document: www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-security-
strategy-2014-progressand-forward-plans.   
   
I was unclear what information you are requesting when you state “(Capacity development) of 
cyber report of the MOD from 2010 – 2015”.  This information might be held by the Ministry 
of Defence, so you may wish to submit a more fully explained request to the Ministry 
of Defence.   
   
Lastly, you requested an electronic copy of the National Cyber Incident Management   
Plan (NCIMP). The Cabinet Office intends to publish the NCIMP later in the year.  The 
Information you have requested is being withheld as it is exempt under section 22(1) of the 
Freedom of Information Act.  Section 22(1) protects information intended for future 
publication.    
   
Section 22 is a qualified exemption and I have considered whether the balance of the public 
interest favours maintaining the exemption in section 22(1) or disclosing the information.  The 
Cabinet Office recognises there is a general public interest in disclosure and the fact that 
openness in government may increase public trust in and engagement with the government. I 
also recognise there is a public interest in evaluating the NCIMP. On the other hand, disclosure 
of the information requested now would delay the publication of the NCIMP and there is a 
stronger public interest in the timely publication of the NCIMP.  Taking into account all the 
circumstances of the case, I have determined that the balance of the public 
interest favours withholding this information.   
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If you have any queries about this letter, please contact the FOI team. Please remember to quote 
the reference number above in any future communications.   
   
If you are unhappy with the service you have received in relation to your request or wish to 
request an internal review, you should write to:   
   
Roger Smethurst   
Head of Knowledge and Information Management    
Cabinet Office   
1 Horse Guards Road   
London   
SW1A 2HQ   
   
email: foi-team@cabinetoffice.gov.uk   
   
You should note that the Cabinet Office will not normally accept an application for internal 
review if it is received more than two months after the date that the reply was issued.   
   
If you are not content with the outcome of your internal review, you may apply directly to the 
Information Commissioner for a decision.  Generally, the Commissioner cannot make a decision 
unless you have exhausted the complaints procedure provided by Cabinet Office.  The 
Information Commissioner can be contacted at:   
   
The Information Commissioner’s Office   
Wycliffe House   
Water Lane   
Wilmslow   
Cheshire   
SK9 5AF   
   
   
Yours sincerely    
   
   
FOI Team   
Cabinet Office   
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Re: Prof Doc: Research Ethics 
KF 
Klaus Fischer <k.fischer@londonmet.ac.uk> 
 Ethics Approval Email 
Reply| 
Wed 05/03/2014, 09:03 
You; 
Tara Young (T.Young@londonmet.ac.uk); 
Nicholas Ridley (n.ridley@londonmet.ac.uk); 
+1 more 
PHD 
Dear Chikaodi, 
 
Thank you for submitting your revised research ethics application via your supervisor. I am pleased to 
tell you that we are satisfied with your adjustments and research ethics approval is hereby given. 
 
Godd luck with your research which looks important. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
Klaus 
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Appendix 2 - PC 2 
No QUESTIONS RESPONSE REMARK 
1 Looking at the effects of 
the pluralisation of 
policing, what is the role 
of the police with regards 
to the national security 
strategy especially cyber? 
How does it work. 
 
What areas have the 
police collaborated with 
other policing agencies 
and partner agencies like 
the banks and ISPs; 
MOD? 
The police as well as their 
primary role are one of the key 
stakeholders in the NCSS. 
The role of investigating 
cybercrime with partner 
agencies and safe guarding the 
police computer system is our 
main remit. 
The police force has a 
labyrinth of partners of which 
the MOD is one. 
 
2  
What frame work is 
employed for categorizing 
cyber incidents?  
 
Is the framework uniform 
across policing agencies 
and widely available to 
officers? 
 
This is still ongoing as the 
scope of crime survey data is 
expanding to include 
cybercrimes. Currently in 
place is a tiered system starting 
with the local, national and 
international levels. There are 
also specialist units that work 
across these tiers. 
As a developing area of study, 
uniformity is hard to define 
due to the autonomy of each 
force but the framework exists. 
How it is adhered to is up to 
respective forces and the 
nature of the crime. Overlaps 
will always exist 
. 
3  
What are the rules for 
escalation of cyber 
incidents and is the MOD 
involved, also what other 
agencies are involved? 
 
.fighting and policing 
cybercrime is a joint role 
involving other agencies. 
Global and national incidents 
are dealt by GCHQ, NCA and 
MOD  
 
4  
What is the nature of 
Police military 
relationship in cyber 
strategy (if any)? 
 
There is no strict or restricted 
role for both forces however 
military police partnership 
exists in many operations such 
as peace keeping and when 
and if a need to work together 
in cyber related incident, both 
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forces are by law expected to 
collaborate. Areas like 
infrastructure and equipment 
sharing. 
5 What percentage of your 
workforce received or 
attended cyber security 
courses in the past six 
months? How many are 
qualified cyber forensic. 
Is cyber a mandatory 
course or restricted to 
certain department. 
Ask of manpower, 
recruiting etc? 
Currently the figures are not 
consolidated but it depends on 
what aspect of cyber security. 
Cyber security is now a 
mandatory course for new 
intakes. As we speak, courses 
are running across the country. 
 
 
 
6 
 
Does cyber-attacks 
reports, threat and 
vulnerability information 
released to the public and 
partner agencies reflect 
reality. 
To what extent is this 
information tactically 
restricted bearing in mind 
the cross government 
collaboration scheme and 
EU policies? 
 
National security dictates that 
certain data are withheld. So 
the extent of information 
released is security dependant. 
Also certain Acts restrict 
public availability of certain 
data. 
 
No comment. 
 
 
7 
 
Is the relationship 
between the police and 
partner agencies reflected 
in the policing Cyber 
Strategy?  
As always each police force 
have local and national 
agencies they work with. Yes. 
Such relationships I expect are 
mutually understood amongst 
partners. 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
What areas or points in 
policing do you think that 
a future Cyber strategy 
should focus on? On the 
other hand are there areas 
that were ignored in the 
CSS. 
 
More funding, issues of human 
rights, etc. Existing barriers to 
collaboration… Time and tier 
pose a few barriers. 
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Appendix 3 
Table Of Codes 
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 AF 1 AF 2 AF 3 AF 
4 
AF 5 
Cyber 
reports 
Role/respons
ibility). 
Plural 
partners 
Role Public 
partners
hip 
Role Role NSS 
 Guidelines Role/ other 
responsibilit
y). 
Difference 
in roles 
Public 
partnership 
Role Guideli
ne 
Guideli
ne 
Restrict
ed 
guideli
ne 
Plural 
partners 
Partnership Restricted 
framework 
Willingnes
s to work 
Vital 
role  
Restric
ted 
guideli
ne 
Restrict
ed 
guideli
ne 
Relucta
nce to 
comme
nt 
No strict 
framework 
Cybercrime 
category 
Levels of 
crime 
referral 
Recognised 
partner 
Wide 
scope 
Compl
exity of 
cyber 
Relucta
nce to 
comme
nt 
Other 
guideli
ne 
Levels of 
responsibilit
y 
Absence of  
uniformity 
Plural 
policing/part
nership 
Plural 
partners 
Guideli
ne 
Mandat
ory 
knowle
dge 
Plural 
agencie
s 
Vague 
respons
e 
Partnership/a
gencies 
Framework Overlap of 
responsibilit
y 
Complex 
  
Restrict
ed 
guidelin
e 
Negati
ve past 
influen
ce 
Defenc
e policy 
Future 
researc
h 
Lead 
organisation 
Autonomy of 
forces 
Level of 
crime 
referral 
Plural 
partners 
Single 
referenc
e? 
Criticis
m of 
current 
strateg
y 
Future 
researc
h 
Deficie
ncies of 
current 
strategy 
Areas of 
training 
Role/respons
ibility). 
Difference 
in roles 
Guideline Relucta
nce to 
commen
t 
Guideli
ne 
Role  
Partnership 
Reluctance 
to comment 
Role/ other 
responsibilit
y). 
Areas of 
collaboratio
n 
Restricted 
guideline 
Plural 
partners 
Criticis
m of 
current 
strateg
y 
Guideli
ne 
 
Partnership Partnership Partnership Reluctance 
to comment 
further 
 NCIMP 
the only 
guidelin
e or 
strategy 
 Restrict
ed 
guideli
ne 
 
Collaboratio
n n 
Cybercrime 
category 
Ongoing 
specialist 
training 
Plural 
partners 
Area 
lacking 
awarene
ss 
Future 
researc
h 
Relucta
nce to 
comme
nt 
 
Future 
research 
Absence of  
uniformity 
Funding 
limiting 
Uncompreh
ensive 
 Militar
y 
Plural 
agencie
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training strategy doctrin
e 
s 
 Framework Restricted 
information 
Future 
research 
areas 
Future 
research 
area 
 Defenc
e policy 
 
 Autonomy of 
forces 
Cyber rime 
assessment 
still novel 
 Challen
ges to 
organisa
tions 
 Future 
researc
h 
 
 Overlap of 
responsibiliti
es 
Collaboratio
n is statutory 
     
 Partner 
agencies 
Plural 
partnership 
mandatory 
     
 Levels of 
responsibility 
Barriers to 
collaboratio
n exists 
     
 Existing 
partnership 
Barriers to 
collaboratio
n 
     
 Cyber 
security 
training 
NSS should 
be all 
inclusive 
     
 Restricted 
information 
Future 
research 
     
 Reluctance to 
comment 
Cyber 
security 
approach is 
capitalist 
     
 Plural 
partners 
      
 Future 
research 
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Appendix 4 
 Phrase frequency 
Some top phrases containing 8 words (without punctuation marks) Occurrences 
The ncimp is available on a need to 5 
Is available on a need to know basis 5 
Ncimp is available on a need to know 5 
The UK in the event of any threat 4 
The mod has the task of defending the 4 
Mod has the task of defending the UK 4 
Has the task of defending the UK in 4 
The task of defending the UK in the 4 
Task of defending the UK in the event 4 
Defending the UK in the event of any 4 
Of defending the UK in the event of 4 
The police in the event of a cyber 2 
Ncimp is the umbrella that connects all relevant 2 
Police and the ncimp is the umbrella that 2 
The police and the ncimp is the umbrella 2 
And the ncimp is the umbrella that connects 2 
The ncimp is the umbrella that connects all 2 
Police in the event of a cyber attack 2 
Some top phrases containing 7 words (without punctuation marks) Occurrences 
Available on a need to know basis 5 
Is available on a need to know 5 
Ncimp is available on a need to 5 
The national cyber incident management plan ncimp 5 
The ncimp is available on a need 5 
Has the task of defending the UK 4 
Up in the event of any threat 4 
Mod has the task of defending the 4 
The mod has the task of defending 4 
The UK in the event of any 4 
Task of defending the UK in the 4 
Defending the UK in the event of 4 
The task of defending the UK in 4 
Of defending the UK in the event 4 
Police and the ncimp is the umbrella 2 
The police and the ncimp is the 2 
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Appendix 5 
Absence of uniformity 
Area lacking awareness 
Areas of collaboration 
Areas of training 
Autonomy of forces 
Barriers to collaboration 
Challenges to organisations 
Voluntary Collaboration  
 Statutory Collaboration is 
Complexity of cyber 
Criticism of current strategy 
Cyber reports 
Cyber crime assessment still novel 
Cyber security approach is capitalist 
Cyber security training 
Cybercrime category 
Defence policy 
Deficiencies of current strategy 
Difference in roles 
Existing partnership 
Framework 
Funding limiting training 
Future research area 
Future stability 
Grey areas 
Guidelines 
Is NCIMP the only guideline or strategy? 
Lead organisation 
Level of crime referral 
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 Levels of responsibility 
 
List role 
Mandatory knowledge 
Military doctrine 
Negative past influence 
No strict framework 
NSS should be all inclusive 
Ongoing specialist training 
Other guidelines 
Overlap of responsibility 
Partner agencies 
Partnership 
Partnership/agencies 
Plural agencies 
Plural partners 
Plural partnership mandatory 
Plural policing/partnership 
Public partnership 
Recognised partner 
Reluctance to comment 
Restricted framework 
Restricted guideline 
Restricted information 
Role 
Role/ other responsibility 
Single reference 
Uncomprehensive strategy 
Vague response 
Vital role   
Wide scope 
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Willingness to work 
 
 
Appendix 6 
Code Source Source Material: 
collective responsibility AF1-CODED.docx However, I would argue that the 
military, police, government 
companies and individuals all 
have a role to play 
   
plural partners AF1-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  I would argue that the military, 
police, government companies 
and individuals all have a role to 
play. Cyberspace doesn't have 
physical boundaries so you can't 
defend it in a traditional military 
matter.  All have a responsibility 
to defend cyberspace where they 
interact and use it.     
   
NICMP AF1-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  The National Cyber Incident 
Management Plan (NCIMP).The 
NCIMP is available on a need to 
know basis.  
   
Guideline but cannot elaborate AF1-CODED.docx Source Material: 
   The NCIMP contains guideline 
on this 
   
Areas not clearly dealt with in 
the strategy 
AF1-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  Areas like the defence of CNI 
(SCADA, Banking etc), 
corporation/info sharing with 
PAGs and multi-national 
agencies, what limits sovereignty 
places on DCO-RA when 
CNE/A originates overseas. 
   
Role AF 3 -coded.docx Source Material: 
  The MOD has the task of 
defending the UK in the event of 
any threat.             
   
NICMP AF 3 -coded.docx Source Material: 
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  The National Cyber Incident 
Management Plan (NCIMP).The 
NCIMP is available on a need to 
know basis. 
   
Mixed feelings about 
cybersecurity 
AF 3 -coded.docx Source Material: 
   Cyber means all things to all 
men. There is much hype, some 
of which is justified, some of it 
not. However in the Information 
Age, having a competence in 
Cyber warfare is a must for all 
commanders. Unfortunately I 
sense Industrial Age warfare still 
dominates much of the military’s 
doctrinal thinking.            
   
Deficiencies in the strategy AF 3 -coded.docx Source Material: 
   Any strategy needs to have a 
clear, deliverable ‘end-state’, 
with balanced ‘ways’ and 
‘means’ to achieve. Sadly most 
strategies are high on ambition, 
and delusional on ‘ways’ and 
‘means’. So my focus would be 
on achieving something that is 
actually deliverable and not just a 
pipe-dream 
   
criticism of cyber strategy AF 3 -coded.docx Source Material: 
  The strategy must highlight who 
is responsible for what – too 
many 2* think they own the issue 
which is creating friction and 
empire building. The need for 
better doctrine – the JDP isn’t 
well written           
   
Role AF 4-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  The MOD has the task of 
defending the UK in the event of 
any threat.             
   
NICMP AF 4-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  The National Cyber Incident 
Management Plan (NCIMP).The 
NCIMP is available on a need to 
know basis.  
   
reluctant to elaborate AF 4-CODED.docx Source Material: 
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   It depends on what type of 
incident recorded. Cannot 
comment.           
   
Deficiencies in the strategy AF 4-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  National vulnerability impact 
assessment to assure appropriate 
proportional effort is expended 
on defence (thus denying 
adversaries easy access through 
national weak points, regardless 
of ownership) 
   
Role AF 2- coded.docx Source Material: 
      The MOD has the task of 
defending the UK in the event of 
any threat  with other 
government bodies like industry 
partners the police in the event of 
a cyber-attack. It’s wider than 
MOD, who have a vital part to 
play, but are not lead Dept.  
   
plural partners AF 2- coded.docx Source Material: 
      The MOD has the task of 
defending the UK in the event of 
any threat  with other 
government bodies like industry 
partners the police in the event of 
a cyber-attack. It’s wider than 
MOD, who have a vital part to 
play, but are not lead Dept.  
   
Public partnership AF 2- coded.docx Source Material: 
      The MOD has the task of 
defending the UK in the event of 
any threat  with other 
government bodies like industry 
partners the police in the event of 
a cyber-attack. It’s wider than 
MOD, who have a vital part to 
play, but are not lead Dept.            
   
NICMP AF 2- coded.docx Source Material: 
   The National Cyber Incident 
Management Plan (NCIMP).The 
NCIMP is available on a need to 
know basis.   
   
reluctant to elaborate AF 2- coded.docx Source Material: 
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   The NCIMP contains guideline 
on this. No comments.           
   
plural partners AF 2- coded.docx Source Material: 
  There is a relationship that exists 
among agencies not only the 
police and the NCIMP is the 
umbrella that connects all 
relevant partners.      
   
Relationship with agencies 
contained in NCIMP 
AF 2- coded.docx Source Material: 
  There is a relationship that exists 
among agencies not only the 
police and the NCIMP is the 
umbrella that connects all 
relevant partners.      
   
Deficiencies in the strategy AF 2- coded.docx Source Material: 
  There is still more to come. 
Cyber is a new challenge for 
many organisations and the 
MOD is not exempt. 
   
complexity of cyberspace AF 2- coded.docx Source Material: 
  There is still more to come. 
Cyber is a new challenge for 
many organisations and the 
MOD is not exempt. 
   
Deficiencies in the strategy AF 2- coded.docx Source Material: 
  The relationship between 
military mission critical assets 
and the network.  The value of 
information within the MOD. 
The value and subsequent 
criticality of applications and 
networked enabled platforms.           
   
NICMP AF 5-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  The National Cyber Incident 
Management Plan (NCIMP).The 
NCIMP is available on a need to 
know basis.  
   
NICMP AF 5-CODED.docx Source Material: 
       As laid down in the NCIMP 
and any Defence policy release 
for such purpose.           
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Deficiencies in the strategy AF 5-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  Provision of an integrated 
National Capability. CONOPs 
for delivery of tactical cyber 
effects in a Joint Operational 
Area (JOA). Authorities to 
execute cyber missions at the 
tactical level. The industrial base 
needed to provide the enduring 
national and tactical capabilities. 
A concept of operations 
(CONOPs) outlines the 
Commanders intent regarding an 
operation.  
   
plural partners PC 1-CODE.docx Source Material: 
      Currently there is no specialist 
department in this force. 
Cybercrime is referred to CERT 
UK or resolved through the 
ACTPOOL.The force has 
collaborated with MOD, as well 
as other organisations on issues 
of personal protection, 
infrastructure protection, and 
public crime. 
   
Levels of Responsibility PC 1-CODE.docx Source Material: 
  The force works with NCA and 
MI5. Officers will link up with 
regional cyber unit and partners 
with full collaboration on both 
side. When participation is 
required.          
   
plural partners PC 1-CODE.docx Source Material: 
   There is no framework that we 
strictly adhere to. Local 
cybercrime are dealt with locally 
while crimes that have a national 
scope are delegated to a higher 
authority. Yes  
   
local and national levels of 
crime reporting 
PC 1-CODE.docx Source Material: 
   There is no framework that we 
strictly adhere to. Local 
cybercrime are dealt with locally 
while crimes that have a national 
scope are delegated to a higher 
authority. Yes  
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Levels of Responsibility PC 1-CODE.docx Source Material: 
  MI5 provides liaisons in areas of 
collaboration, infrastructure and 
equipment sharing     
   
plural partners PC 1-CODE.docx Source Material: 
   Current policy and training has 
been given on personal 
protection. There is no priority 
for a specialist course as the need 
is met through partner agencies.  
   
Public partnership PC 1-CODE.docx Source Material: 
   Current policy and training has 
been given on personal 
protection. There is no priority 
for a specialist course as the need 
is met through partner agencies.  
   
Cyber Crime records and 
reports 
PC 1-CODE.docx Source Material: 
   There is significant caution on 
the reported figures. The media 
paints disproportionate 
information. Accurate figures are 
still being collated. Can’t 
comment on that due to security 
implications.  
   
reluctant to elaborate PC 1-CODE.docx Source Material: 
   There is significant caution on 
the reported figures. The media 
paints disproportionate 
information. Accurate figures are 
still being collated. Can’t 
comment on that due to security 
implications.  
   
Deficiencies in the strategy PC 1-CODE.docx Source Material: 
  Media collaboration, victim 
support group. Legislation on 
cyber forensics such as removal 
of malicious data online.  
   
plural partners PC 2-CODE.docx Source Material: 
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  The police as well as their 
primary role are one of the key 
stakeholders in the NCSS. The 
role of investigating cybercrime 
with partner agencies and safe 
guarding the police computer 
system is our main remit. The 
police force has a labyrinth of 
partners of which the MOD is 
one.           
   
Levels of Responsibility PC 2-CODE.docx Source Material: 
  This is still ongoing as the scope 
of crime survey data is 
expanding to include 
cybercrimes. Currently in place 
is a tiered system starting with 
the local, national and 
international levels. There are 
also specialist units that work 
across these tiers. As a 
developing area of study, 
uniformity is hard to define due 
to the autonomy of each force 
but the framework exists. How it 
is adhered to is up to respective 
forces and the nature of the 
crime. Overlaps will always exist  
   
local and national levels of 
crime reporting 
PC 2-CODE.docx Source Material: 
   fighting and policing cybercrime 
is a joint role involving other 
agencies. Global and national 
incidents are dealt by GCHQ, 
NCA and MOD            
   
Role PC 2-CODE.docx Source Material: 
  There is no strict or restricted 
role for both forces however 
military police partnership exists 
in many operations such as peace 
keeping and when and if a need 
to work together in cyber related 
incident, both forces are by law 
expected to collaborate. Areas 
like infrastructure and equipment 
sharing. 
   
reluctant to elaborate PC 2-CODE.docx Source Material: 
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   National security dictates that 
certain data are withheld. So the 
extent of information released is 
security dependant. Also certain 
Acts restrict public availability of 
certain data. No comment.  
   
plural partners PC 2-CODE.docx Source Material: 
   As always each police force 
have local and national agencies 
they work with. Yes. Such 
relationships I expect are 
mutually understood amongst 
partners.           
   
Deficiencies in the strategy PC 2-CODE.docx Source Material: 
  More funding, issues of human 
rights, etc. Existing barriers to 
collaboration… Time and tier 
pose a few barriers.            
   
Role PC 3-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  The force has little to do with 
MOD due to the difference in 
role however there is a good 
relationship with other agencies 
depending on the level of the 
offence and in view of the police 
role as an instrument of the state.     
.  
   
local and national levels of 
crime reporting 
PC 3-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  There is a consistent framework 
in use which is restricted. The 
breakdown is a 3321 tier. Tier 1. 
Highest, global and National 
Cyber Security. Tier 2 Dealt with 
by NCA and Tier 3 is the remit 
of Local police forces. There is a 
grey area of overlap but progress 
is being made to fine tune this.  
   
local and national levels of 
crime reporting 
PC 3-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  Like the previous question; 
depending on the scale. GCHQ, 
NCA and MOD deal with Tier 1.  
   
Role PC 3-CODED.docx Source Material: 
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  Very limited due to difference in 
roles. Areas of collaboration 
include infrastructure and 
equipment sharing. Note that the 
MOD does not have operational 
independence. Collaboration is 
possible were the need arises.     
   
Relationship with agencies 
contained in NCIMP 
PC 3-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  Yes. The Cyber Strategy is 
National and like mentioned, 
collaboration is a statutory duty. 
But there are known barriers to 
collaboration which we have 
touched on already.  
   
Deficiencies in the strategy PC 3-CODED.docx Source Material: 
  Key thing here is that the 
strategy should be all inclusive 
down to the citizens on the street. 
Priority should be reassessed. 
Funding made available. Other 
issues are the commercial 
interest and capitalist base in the 
cyber industry should be 
addressed. There are disparate 
areas that make up cyber security 
strategy in need of 
harmonisation.  
 
Appendix 7a 
Word Cloud 
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across tier sharing restricted vulnerability especially courses points NCIMP forces which think Incident should partners 
focus need you due national RESPONSE access NCA Local policing force officers between 
strategy comment frame funding military collaborated Management categorizing certain involved 
comprehensive extent specialist defence defending How security MOD REMARK escalation partner 
agencies event laid released cyber public rule course figures information document also 
know nature this available basis such does police have knowledge all collaboration relationship 
work more etc like many threat role Plan training areas Cybercrime task framework 
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WORD FREQUENCY 
WORDS  OCCURRENCES FREQUENCY  
CYBER 25 1.66  
NCIMP 18 1.19  
NATIONAL 17 1.13  
POLICE 13 0.86  
MOD 13 0.86  
NEED 11 0.73  
AGENCIES 11 0.73  
COLLABORATION 9 0.6  
SECURITY 8 0.53  
ROLE 8 0.53  
FORCE 8 0.53  
INCIDENT 8 0.53  
MILITARY 6 0.4  
AREAS 6 0.4  
TIER 6 0.4  
AVAILABLE 6 0.4  
EVENT 6 0.4  
STRATEGY 6 0.4  
INFORMATION 6 0.4  
UK 5 0.33  
FUNDING 5 0.33  
TRAINING 5 0.33  
KNOW 5 0.33  
PLAN 5 0.33  
BASIS 5 0.33  
PARTNERS 5 0.33  
MEANS 5 0.33  
SPECIALIST 5 0.33  
DEFENCE 5 0.33  
MANAGEMENT 5 0.33  
WE 4 0.27  
TASK 4 0.27  
GOVERNMENT 4 0.27  
BARRIERS 4 0.27  
FORCES 4 0.27  
PUBLIC 4 0.27  
CRIME 4 0.27  
SHARING 4 0.27  
THREAT 4 0.27  
DATA 4 0.27  
INFRASTRUCTURE 4 0.27  
FIGURES 4 0.27  
CYBERCRIME 4 0.27  
NCA 4 0.27  
WORK 4 0.27  
COMMENT 4 0.27  
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Appendix  8 – Thematic Table 
Main Theme and Subthemes Extract and location 
The Role in NSS 
 
• Collaborative Governance  
 
• Partnership 
 
 
 
 
• The MOD has the task of defending the 
UK in the event of any threat with other 
government bodies like industry partners 
the police in the event of a cyber-attack. 
It’s wider than MOD, who have a vital 
part to play, but are not lead Dept.(AFI 2 
Q1) 
• The police as well as their primary role 
are one of the key stakeholders in the 
NCSS. The role of investigating 
cybercrime with partner agencies and 
safe guarding the police computer system 
is our main remit. 
The police force has a labyrinth of 
partners of which the MOD is one.(PFI 2 
Q1) 
 
Levels or Responsibility 
 
• Definite Areas 
 
 
• Official Secret Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Blurring of Boundaries 
 
 
 
• Currently in place is a tiered system 
starting with the local, national and 
international levels (PFI 2 Q2) 
 
• The National Cyber Incident 
Management Plan (NCIMP).The NCIMP 
is available on a need to know basis. 
 (AFI 1,2,3,45  Q2) 
 
• As a developing area of study, uniformity 
is hard to define due to the autonomy of 
each force but the framework exists. How 
it is adhered to is up to respective forces 
and the nature of the crime. Overlaps will 
always exist 
(PI2 Q2) 
 
 
Pluralization of policing 
 
• Diverse policing? 
 
 
 
All references above 
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